Terrorism Concepts No Answer Available;

Terrorism Concepts

no answer available; no author "Dr. Hanle" could be found, either

Mao's first stage of revolutionary mobilization is the organization and consolidation of base areas, preserving certain enclaves (usually in areas that were hard for outsiders to reach, isolated and/or with rough surrounding terrain). Then, single-mission attacks meant to terrorize as well as obtain resources would be carried out to allow for progressive expansion. Finally, the enemy would be engaged in all-out warfare and destroyed.

During consolidation, terrorism is necessary in order to obtain political support, and to dissuade local citizens that might not side with the revolutionaries from becoming involved on the wrong side. Before enough power is obtained by the revolutionaries, terrorism is also the only real means of making attacks that have a real psychological effect on morale.

4)

Terrorism is meant to shatter the cohesion between the government and the populace as well as the social cohesion of the populace, but the political cohesion of the populace is a target not for disintegration, but rather for strengthening following realignment towards the revolutionaries.

5)

Aerial bombardment is impersonal and directly tactical. Terrorist assassinations are symbolic, stirring passions as well as creating tactical advantages. They also deliberately undermine the power structures and roles that exist in the political structure, rather than becoming a new expected part of that structure as can aerial bombardments.

6)

The humanitarian efforts practiced by Marines made them targets both for suspicion by the Viet Cong and provided a camouflage for the possibility of terrorist attacks, such as through the hiding of explosives that would target these humanitarian-minded Marines.

7)

Terrorism binds the cohesion of the terrorist organization by providing symbolic evidence of progress as well as real actions that can be easily observed and used as recruiting tools. As public displays, they are things that all members of an organization can share in the credit for.

8)

Wars fought by terrorists are wars of ideals, at least ostensibly, though often the guerilla warfare that they pursue is in reality more concerned with generating profits and the amassing of resources and arms for protection of the terrorist organization's leaders more than they are about the principles and injustices spoken of to the press and foreign governments.

9)

Mao asserted that political mobilization was the most fundamental condition for winning wars.

10)

Mao believed that the military force was also necessarily a political unit during revolutionary war, and that it could not be kept separate from the masses due to this political connection. The military was the force that could truly give revolutionary power, or at least the appearance of true revolutionary power, into the hands of the people, and in this manner served as a rallying point and a force of collective action and collective accomplishment.

Class 6

1)

One of the principle differences between state sponsored terrorism during the Cold War and now is that while many terrorist groups were understood to be proxies for state militaries then, now the terrorist organizations are just as likely to be using their sponsors as the other way around, and in fact most relationships have much more nebulousness about them.

2)

One of the major costs of "outsourcing terrorism" is a lack of political control, which has definitely been seen in Pakistan as the many militant and jihadist groups have proliferated and gained a great deal of monetary and political clout, such that elected leaders like Musharraf are subject to frequent assassination attempts and the rule of law is largely degraded.

3)

The exportation of Saudi-born terrorist could backfire when these jihadists return from places like Iraq and turn their attention towards the royal family, whom many of them already hate. Essentially, Saudi is promoting the idea that terrorism is a viable path to political change, and that won't necessarily sit well when the chickens eventually come home to roost.

4)

Hezbollah can now be seen as a partner to Iran rather than a proxy for its national government due to the simple fact that the Iranian government has little or no direct control over the day-to-day activities of Hezbollah, leaving the organization largely independent and focused far more on domestic Lebanese concerns rather than on issue more important to Iran.

5)

Byman suggests that rather than simply labeling states with a "rogue state" status, true regime and political change is necessary in countries that pose this threat. He also asserts that this has "little to do with Washington," however, and thus is not advocating direct military action by the U.S. Or other nations/international entities to bring about this change.

6)

Metz sees the "new" state sponsored terrorism as terrorism sponsored against external enemies, and the three goals he identifies for such terrorism are to undermine the other regime's support, to break the morale of its elites, or to change a particular policy of the regime.

7)

A primary advantage that is noted in the use of state-sponsored terrorism rather than the use of conventional military forces is the cost effectiveness of such a strategy, as it avoids the cost of outfitting and paying a conventional military force as a trade off for true control.

8)

Disbanding a terrorist organization, Metz notes, is often more difficult than starting one, as such organizations typically develop enough internal structure and drive to continue their operations without the need for the original state sponsor for resources or objectives.

9)

In order for a state to view terrorism as a viable part of their foreign policy, according to Metz, there must first be an in international situation perceived as intensely threatening, and second there must be a way for the regime to justify extraordinary violence domestically and internationally.