Commission Report Final Report of the National

Commission Report Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, represented an event of such enormity that is demanded a full and timely investigation, and the U.S. government's Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ("Final Report") attempts to do just that. This paper will provide the background of the events of September 11, 2001; what the significant impacts of the report are to the nation; and what the lessons learned have been from the report. An assessment of the Final Report's effectiveness in addressing the issues it identified will be followed by an analysis of what role Homeland Security authorities should play in the future to prevent a recurrence of the barbaric attacks of September 11, 2001. The author's personal views on the report and a summary of the research will be provided in the conclusion.

Review and Discussion

Background and Overview. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks drastically changed attitudes about personal freedom in the United States; fears that a terrorist could strike at anytime, anyplace made individuals more willing to endure personal inconveniences, such as longer lines at airport security and baggage checks in subway stations. This fear also compelled the U.S. government to implement measures that it believed would help track down terrorists and prevent future attacks (Schaffer 2003). The 9-11 Commission's Final Report purports to provide a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks, including the level of preparedness for and the quality of the immediate response to the attacks; the report also includes recommendations designed to guard against future attacks (The 9-11 Commission Report 2004). The report states that authorities in the United States knew, or should have known, that Islamic fundamentalist terrorists would attack the U.S. At some point, and that the World Trade Centers represented a favorite target, having been attacked once before already. According to the Final Report's Executive Summary, the September 11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have been a surprise. "Islamist extremists had given plenty of warning that they meant to kill Americans indiscriminately and in large numbers. Although Usama Bin Ladin himself would not emerge as a signal threat until the late 1990s, the threat of Islamist terrorism grew over the decade" (2). September 11 began with all of the 19 hijackers successfully getting through a security checkpoint system that they had presumably analyzed and knew how to defeat. The terrorists assumed control over the four flights, taking advantage of air crews and cockpits who were ill-prepared for the contingency of a hijacking by suicidal terrorists. "Existing protocols on 9/11 were unsuited in every respect for an attack in which hijacked planes were used as weapons. What ensued was a hurried attempt to improvise a defense by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction" (Final Report 7). The aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the impact on the nation's morale, consciousness, civil rights, and economy have clearly been enormous, and the manner in which the prosecution of the war on terrorism has proceeded has resulted in a level of divisiveness in this country that has not been felt since the days of the Vietnam War.

Significant Impacts Resulting from the Final Report. The Final Report highlighted a wide range of serious failures on the part of the intelligence community, as well as the U.S. diplomatic corps, in accurately interpreting the signals being received for years prior to the September 11 attacks. The Final Report also faulted the U.S. Congress for its sluggishness in addressing these fundamental issues. These findings have resulted in a reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security was established to help coordinate the country's preparedness and response to any such future threats.

Assessment of Effectiveness of the Final Report. The Final Report was comprehensive and ran to 585 pages; the report provided a series of recommendations in two parts; the first part concerned what should be done, and the second part recommended how these initiatives should be accomplished. These recommendations included 1) attacking terrorists and their organizations; 2) preventing the continued expansion of Islamic terrorism; 3) protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks (Final Report 2004). As to implementation, the Final Report emphasized the need for a national intelligence director who could better coordinate the ocean of intelligence information being collected and for improvements in the sharing of such information across the board. The effectiveness of these recommendations has been questioned by some as being too little, too late, while others suggest that basic problems that existed prior to September 11 could not be fixed by a bandaid when radical surgery was required.

What Role Should Homeland Security Authorities Play in the Future. Notwithstanding the bizarre color coded warning system currently in place by the Department of Homeland Security, this agency could play an important role in minimizing the threat of terrorists attacks in the future by providing the centralized clearinghouse activities for important intelligence information. This would likely receive a more favorable response from the other intelligence agencies that have historically been responsible for such activities since there are clear turf battles involved. In fact, from the outset of the department's creation, critics have argued that such activity not only suggests the exercise of operating or administrative authority, but also a duplication of, or intrusion into, the responsibilities of the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Relyea 2003).