Best Counter Insurgency Tactics

Counterinsurgency

The best counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics are those that do not require armed responses. History and current global conditions suggest that for the most part governmental troops are simply not very good at suppressing the forces for change that challenge, peacefully or otherwise. But knowing what doesn't work is not the same as understanding how to put into practice what does. And there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that this issue will become even more difficult in the future as populous confrontations become less monolithic and national in scope and pick up their own armaments of support from global frustrations and jihadists calls for fidelity.

One of the better demonstrations of this problem can be seen in a 2005 piece by Sepp, a DoD analyst.[footnoteRef:1] He identifies an estimated 53 incidents across recent history and looks at the characteristics of the confrontation, over and above who won the battle, to see what has been proven effective and what has not worked. But before reviewing these specifics, it's worth restating a concern his included upfront: "The focus of all civil and military plans and operations must be on the center of gravity in any conflict -- the country's people and their belief in and support of their government. Winning their hearts and minds must be the objective of the government's efforts." [footnoteRef:2] [1: K. Sepp. Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Military Review. May-June 2005.] [2: Ibid, pg. 9.]

Sepp then lists a number of "successful and unsuccessful" COIN practices.[footnoteRef:3] A few representative examples indicate that those that have been proven effective are approaches with an emphasis on intelligence (integrating personnel into the opposition movement); that focus on the needs of the population as a whole for security and protection; that create secure zone; that isolate selected insurgents; that find a dynamic leader; that undertaking effective PSYOPS (psychological operations); that offer amnesty and rehabilitation; and that incorporate specialized military personnel into insurgent groups. Two additional proven elements include using the police forces to the greatest extent possible and expanding the police presence. Doing this apparently allows for making sure that troop visibility is minimized. [3: Ibid, pg 10.]

The unsuccessful elements convey as similar image of the limitations of military tactics. Those that do not work include those that emphasize the primacy of military direction; that use "kill-capture" methods; that require battalion-size operations or large bases; that deploy raids by specialty forces; or that try to build local forces in the image of the U.S. military. Sepp does say that peacetime government processes and open borders or uncontrolled air space don't work either, since perhaps the public may not participate or may run from volatile government.

But it is not just the U.S. military that is problematic. A 2008 study by RAND on Rethinking Counterinsurgency reviews a look at Britain's involvement against Malayan insurgents.[footnoteRef:4] Though considered relatively effective, Britain's successes centered on making connections with vital public representatives and not allowing the situation to get to a tipping point such that the dissatisfactions could not be addressed. It was also noted that minimizing military visibility was critical. [4: J. Mackinlay and A. Al-Baddawy. Rethinking Counterinsurgency. (RAND. National Defense Research Institute, 2008).]

RAND also reviewed many of the influences of the changing nature of the global culture mosaic, which demonstrates how a complex solution is likely to be needed. The following quotation is lengthy but is nonetheless instructive of their challenge and uncertainty:

The mosaic's many sectors will use an increasingly indirect approach to shift popular support in particular states away from assisting global insurgency. A coalition force therefore may be deployed in a soft security role to help a weakened state assert aspects of authority, none of which may be primarily military. However, in a serious breakdown of order the soldier has to be able to transform from being a security provider, border observer, trainer, secondee staff officer, and intelligence collector into a combat soldier. In this scenario, the continued reliance on short-term cures, strategic medicines, futuristic technologies, and special-force expeditions represents a failure to understand the past or the direction of the future.[footnoteRef:5] [5: Ibid, 53.]

The RAND quotation like other commentators interesting pushes away the potential for seeking innovative solutions based on new community technologies. But it is not clear why they do this. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that insurgent groups are finding good uses for technologies as they connect with friends and strangers alike in opposition to the government's military strategies. Why the reverse cannot be explored is unclear.