The effects of Slavophilic Russian ideas versus modern globalization

¶ … Slavophilic Russian Ideas vs. The Modern World/Globalization

The effects of Slavophilic Russian Ideas vs. The Modern World/Globalizatio

An Overview of Russia

Geography

According to Russia Travel Guide, Russia is the largest country in the world by far; spanning nine time zones, its territory covers nearly twice as much of the earth as that of the next largest country, Canada. Besides, the U.S. Department of State claims that the official name of Russia is the Russia Federation. It has an area of 17 million sq. km. (6.5 million sq. mi.); about 1.8 times the size of the United States. Its capital city Moscow has a population of approximately10.4 million people while other cities like St. Petersburg has 4.6 million, Novosibirsk has 1.4 million, and Nizhniy Novgorod has1.3 million. Russia has a broad plain terrain with low hills west of Urals; vast coniferous forest and tundra in Siberia; uplands and mountains (Caucasus range) along southern borders. Besides, its climate is of Northern continental. Russia Travel Guide notes that Russia also administers the exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast on the Baltic coast located in between Poland and Lithania.

People

The U.S. Department of State alleges that the nationality of the people of Russia is known as the Russian(s). It further argues that their population, as at January 2009, was approximately 141.9 million, whiles their annual population growth rate, estimated to be declining at the rate of -0.467%. The ethnic groups in Russia comprise of 79.8% Russian, 3.8% Tatar, 2% Ukrainian, and 14.4% others. Their religion comprises of Russian Orthodox, Islam, Judaism, Roman Catholicism, Protestant, Buddhist, other. There are more than 140 other languages and dialects in Russia; however Russian is the official language. The total population's literacy level is estimated at 99.4%. In the year 2007, the life expectancy of Russians people was averagely at 67.5 years, while that of men and women were averagely at 61.4 and 73.9 years, respectively. Its workforce comprises of approximately 90.152 million individuals (as at 2007) whereby 84% of the population represents production and economic services sector while 16% represent the government

Economy

Despite Russia's massive size, Russia Travel Guide declares that much of the country lacks proper soils and climates (either too cold or too dry) for agriculture. Instead it has huge reserves of some of the world's most important resources such as oil, gas, coal, platinum, gold, chrome, and asbestos. In 2008, U.S. Department of State asserts that Russia had a GDP of U.S.$1.67 trillion and a growth rate of 5.6%. Its natural resources comprise of the petroleum, natural gas, timber, furs, precious and nonferrous metals. In the agriculture sector, Russia produces grain, sugar beets, sunflower seeds, meat, and the dairy products. Its industry sector types includes a complete range of manufactures such as automobiles, trucks, trains, agricultural equipment, advanced aircraft, aerospace, machine and equipment products; mining and extractive industry; medical and scientific instruments; and construction equipment. Accordingly, in 2008, Russia's trade on Exports of petroleum and petroleum products; natural gas; woods and wood products; metals; and chemical was estimated at U.S.$368 billion whereby, its major markets were EU, CIS, China, and Japan. Its imports on machinery and equipment; chemicals; consumer goods; medicines; meat; sugar; and semi-finished metal products was estimated at U.S.$256 billion.

An Overview of Slavophilic Russian Ideas

Duffy acknowledges that Russia was an autocracy, ruled by Nicholas I who, mindful of the Decembrist revolt, was fearful of Western revolutionary ideas taking hold in Russia. He therefore deliberately held back his country's progression. However, Duffy suspects that the Russian intelligentsia of the 1840s either longed for Western progress or idealized the peasantry. According to Duffy, the opposing idealists were known as Westerners and Slavophiles. Complexity and innovation characterized the Western Europe in the nineteenth century and the rise of a new middle class ensured a ferment of ideas, a burst of technologies progress. This was not so in Russia where the Slavophiles embodied the painful ideological struggle of contradictory ideals.

On the 12th July 1996, following a closely fought election victory, Boris Yeltsin called his advisors to him. Boris said, 'In Russia's history in the 20th century…each epoch had its own ideology. [But] now we don't have one. And that's bad,' (969). According to Slade, the goal was set to have a unifying 'Russian idea' developed before the next election in 2000.

Slade claims that, in any state-building project, the state must project an image of itself as the legitimate representation of the people bounded within its territory. Slade continues to allege that for the state, this is an issue of ideology, understood as the creation of signifiers, determined by power relations, which bring disparate identities together through a process of suture, forming unity and homogeneity within the mass of relations designated by the term 'society.' As Bourdieu notes, 'every group is the site of struggle to impose a legitimate principle of group construction.'(130). For instance, Slade declares that 'Nation' and 'nationality' is an obvious example of such a principle that authorizes state power.

According to Slade, Vera Tolz has identified various principles of nationality group construction within 1990s Russia. Vera Tolz declares that the first of these is Eurasianism that was based on an emigre movement in the 1920s and 30s. It emphasizes Russia's unique place in civilization and its special geographic position; and demands a re-birth of some form of the Soviet Union, claiming that Russian identity is bound up with its expansionist history. Secondly, Vera Tolz further claims there are those schools of thought that emphasize Slavophilia. Invariably this either involves the reintegration of Ukraine and Belarus with Russia, or a unification of all Russian speakers ('rescuing' those 25 million in the Russian Diaspora), and/or a nation with the Orthodox religion as its organizing principle. A third conception according to Vera Tolz was imported from the West in the 1980s; and it is of a civic nation with solidarity based on citizenship. Slade comprehends that these competing visions had their political advocates as liberal reformers argued for the third option and the Communist and Nationalist opposition took up a mixture of the first two.

Sakwa notes that during the 1990s, the competition amongst political groupings with various quantities of symbolic capital, that is recognition and legitimacy perpetuated these fractious lines of diametrically opposed political visions and diverging ideals. This led to 'regime politics' (23) in which elections determined not simply the government but the entire political system. Elections were 'plebiscites on the nature of the system,' (23) and each system had its own principles for constructing the nation.

Batygin claim Russia needed to monopolize a conception of the nation because Yeltsin realized that a common political language was urgently in need. However, as Batygin puts it, the problem was that the historical changes and crises of legitimacy experienced by communist and post-communist regimes in Russia are linked to a positional conflict within the community of discourse; and Urban declare that 'collectively [this conflict] create[s] an intolerable situation and anticipate[s] some moment at which victors and vanquished in the struggle for state power will be declared along with the acceptance and/or imposition of a singe definition of the Russian nation'(969).

On the 29th of December 1999, Slade proclaim that it was declared by Vladimir Putin; when his Millennium Manifesto was initially placed on the Internet and published in the newspaper, a day later; that the economic well-being of the people was an ideological, spiritual and moral problem, and during that period he attempted to define the core values of Russians. More so, Slade declare that Putin, right before becoming interim president, staked out his position as the authorized representative and spokesperson of the Russian people by co-opting other positions and creating his own principles for defining Russian nationality.

Migdal appreciates Max Weber's definition of the state as being a monopoly of legitimate violence over a given territory. Migdal claim that Max Weber said the state is given legitimacy through the rational calculations of a society that requires an organizational principle for the distribution of collective goods, most basically protection on Weber's definition. For Russia in the 1990s, according to Migdal, this leaves a problem since there was (and there is) a failure to meet people's needs and this undermines the state's raison d'etre. Migdal's argument is that the state can fail to keep its monopoly on violence; and thus ineffectively distribute protection to its citizens and he declares that this is precisely what happened during Yeltsin's presidency, and continues to some extent today in Russia due to its Slavophilic ideas. Therefore, this aspect of the Yeltsin-Putin initiative is the one that inextricably linked to the question of Russian perspectives on that initiative which itself adds up to serious questions of the self-identity and self-perception of Russia.

Russia's "shock therapy." And Globalization

The reality of the global economy is that multinational corporations compete more effectively when they enjoy economies of scale in both production and distribution. As a result, large multinationals must compete with one another for both global markets and substantial and diverse productive capacity. This similarly encourages modest investment in Russia, a market of 150 million, even in the face of continuing economic difficulties and political uncertainty (Saunders, 105).

According to Sunders, the strategy developed to "globalize" Russia was known as "shock therapy." And its implementation began with the January 1, 1992 elimination of price controls on most goods. The objective of "shock therapy" was, in essence, to create a market economy in Russia as quickly as possible. Sunders claim that this was to be achieved by freeing prices and liberalizing trade policies, which would stimulate competition; and by privatization, which would create private property with all its attendant behavioral incentives for enterprises. At the same time, it was essential to make the ruble convertible and ensure that its value remained relatively stable. This meant controlling inflation and, therefore, keeping tight control of currency emissions and government spending.

Consequently, Saunders appreciates that successful economic reform was to create a new middle class that would become a powerful political constituency favoring the consolidation of economic and political reform in Russia. As Anthony Lake suggested, this would serve larger American interests by promoting peace between Russia and other democracies and, therefore, enhance American security.

Russian Perspectives

Anton Steen's work which was funded by the Norwegian Research Council as part of a bigger project on elites and democracy in Russia, involved 980 interviews with members from regional, cultural, political, business and spiritual elites. Between 1998 and 2000, the statistics on attitudes, including trust and confidence revealed a major shift in attitudes. In 1998, 'only 28% of the elite overall; and 17% of the regional elite wanted a greater centralization of power' (112) but by 2000 this had almost inexplicably leapt to 54% overall. By 2000, 75% of the elite supported Putin compared to just 33% that had supported Yeltsin who had enjoyed just 13% support amongst Duma deputies. Slade declares that this was shown by the Federation Council's (FC) attempts to impeach Yeltsin in 1999. Besides, the 1998 Presidential Administration (PA) was given the least confidence by respondents in Steen's study.

Hoffman declares that Steen's research affirms that 'the orientations at the elite level are reflected in mass attitudes thus, indicating that there has been a deep distrust of institutions across the whole spectrum of elite groups in Russia. In 1998, the Russian people also held the PA and President himself at a very low level of trust, only 9% trusted Yeltsin' (147). It was also established that as much as 20% of the population was fiercely opposed to national government'. In addition, support for the PA and President jumped by 2000. Moreover, Sakwa claims that "the first three years of Putin's reign saw his approval ratings stay between 65-73%, with 60% of Russians believing that Putin puts Russia first; and only 28% believing that Putin is more worried about his own image" (70).

Therefore, Hoffman claims that the rejection of revolution and change by Russians shows that Putin was effectively trying to establish a discourse focused on unity and stability knowing that the binary oppositions of politics during the Yeltsin era had created a situation where the state was unable "to muster a critical mass of leaders who articulate[d] one or another political discourse that resonate[d] in political society." (198). Putin was establishing autonomy by going beyond the already given political visions in order to address the rifts of political society, to 'assuage the more liberal communists and traditional nationalists and pre-empt the extremist Red-Brown ideologues….to heal or pacify the whole nation.'(134). Putin wants to establish a national interest and deny 'the abyss between elite and mass interests and ideologies, the amorality of the new elites and the alienation of urban and rural masses.'(138). Hoffman further suggests that the idea of a 'national interest' was 'virtually inoperable' in 1998, and it is with this in mind that we can understand Putin's purpose in bringing in a new Russian idea below:

The Russian Idea

In Putin's Vital Speeches of the Day 66/8 in 2000 that was (and is) dubbed the 'Millennium's Manifesto', he gave his new Russian idea below:

Another foothold for the unity of Russian society is what can be called the traditional values of Russians. These values are clearly seen today.

Patriotism. This term is sometimes used ironically and even derogatively. But for the majority of Russians it has its own and only an original and positive meaning. It is a feeling of pride in one's country, its history and accomplishments. It is the striving to make one's country better, richer, stronger and happier. When these sentiments are free from the tints of nationalist conceit and imperial ambitions, there is nothing reprehensible or bigoted about them. Patriotism is the source of the courage, staunchness and strength of our people. If we lose patriotism and national pride and dignity, which are connected with it, we will lose ourselves as a nation capable of great achievements.

Belief in the greatness of Russia. Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and cultural existence. This determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and this cannot but do so at present.

But Russian mentality should be expanded by new ideas. In the present world the might of a country as a great power is manifested more in its ability to be the leader in creating and using advanced technologies, ensuring a high level of people's well-being, reliably protecting its security and upholding its national interests in the international arena than military strength.

Statism. It will not happen soon, if it ever happens at all that Russia will become the second edition of say, the U.S. Or Britain, in which liberal values have deep historic traditions. Our state and its institutions and structures have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people. For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and initiator and main driving force of any change.

Modern Russian society does not identify a strong and elective state with a totalitarian one. We have come to value the benefits of democracy, a law-based state, and personal and political freedom. At the same time, people are alarmed by the obvious weakening of state power. The public looks forward to the restoration of the guiding and regulating role of the state to a degree which is necessary, proceeding from the traditions and present state of the country.

Social solidarity. It is a fact that a striving for cooperative forms of activity has always prevailed over individualism. Paternalistic sentiments have struck deep roots in Russian society. The majority of Russians are used to connecting improvements in their own condition more with the aid and support of the state and society than with their own efforts, initiatives and flair for business. And it will take a long time for this habit to die.

In conclusion, according to Hoffman, Putin's manifesto is rich in inter-discursivity, appropriating elements from competing ideologies and rejecting binary oppositions in order to win the war of position within the discursive field thus creating 'an all-national spiritual reference point that will help to consolidate society, thereby strengthening the state.' (135).

As Slade puts it, this reference point, a new Russian idea, helps construct an image of the state as a nation of people represented by a spokesperson, the president. Slade comprehends that any state-building project must construct principles of identity for the people of the nation and this was (and is) a major aspect of Putin's manifesto. Therefore, Slade figures out that Putin overcame (and still overcomes) the legacy of the previous principles of division contained within the Russian past, the scars of previous suturing of society.

The effects of Russian Slavophiles Ideas to the Modern World

According to Saunders, the eventual outcome of Russia's reform process is all the sadder when one takes into account the fact that, from the vantage of 1992, Russia was supposed to be an "easy" case for globalization. At the time, in addition to having plentiful natural resources and a highly educated population, Russia was blessed by a vibrant free media; a leadership determined to pursue radical economic reform and rapid integration into the global economy; and a population eager to soak up American culture in any and every possible form. After a decade, Russia should have been well on the way to becoming a prosperous and friendly democracy. The fact that a country having so many advantages has failed to follow the course projected by globalization theory should raise serious questions.

Professor Waliki claim that 'it is difficult to overestimate the influence, direct and indirect, of Russian social and political ideas, especially those which rose during the hundreds years that followed the Decembrist revolution, upon the way Russia live and think today' (456). Professor Waliki further claim it would scarcely be denied that the impact of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath has been no less universally transforming than that of the French Revolution. It would take a very fanatical materialist -- hard-boiled beyond the bounds of realism -- to deny that ideas have played a dominant role both in these developments as direct causes of both thought and action, and not merely as rationalizations or disguises for deeper, at times more occult factor, social, psychological, environmental and the like. Yet, in comparison with the vast literature devoted to the ideas of the French Enlightenment and the reactions to it, there are monographs on the thought of individual theorists, or ideological groups, or periods, both in Russia in western languages, some of the of first-rate quality.

Consequently, Sunders claim that Russia has not lived up to its hype. He alleges that nine years of independence down the line; and tens of billions of dollars in form of as an international assistance with voluminous foreign advice, Russia is far from having met the expectations of a bright future that was on the widespread in 1991; the time of the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Instead, Russia remains a poor and a semi-authoritarian country; thus a considerable disappointment.

More so, Sunder note that Russia's transformation under Putin has begun to look like one step forward and two steps back. While the country is experiencing modest economic growth, largely attributable to windfalls from high oil prices and a cheap currency, its political system and its foreign policy are increasingly troubling. The "dictatorship of law" proclaimed by the Russian president seems to be taking shape as simply a more effective version of the semi-authoritarian system created by Yeltsin; justice is still dispensed selectively and is used in full force only against political opponents of the regime. Internationally, Moscow seems to be strengthening its ties with former Soviet allies such as North Korea while reviving decades-old efforts to expand and exploit differences between Washington and European capitals.

According to Duffy, the Slavophile attitude to the East-West was illustrated by the following facts. To a romanticized medieval Russia, the Slavophiles looked back to the period before Peter the Great where a paternal Tsar had kept a loving eye on his 'children'. Their belief in the virtues of the 'common folk' and the uniqueness of Russia's historical development was bound up with the stability of the Orthodox Church as opposed to the fragmented Protestantism of the West. More so, they believed an embodied and a unique spirit of communal life, that is, the peasant 'obschina' (commune). Duffy declares that to the Slavophiles, Peter the Great had betrayed Russia by attempting to introduce Western values into the harmony of Russia's superior society.