Corporate power and influence from the nineteenth to twenty-first century

¶ … Corporation Changed from Early 19th to 21st Century?

Corporate Change Over Two Centuries

Corporations today manifest a singularity of focus on earnings that enables them to slice unencumbered through consideration for outcomes that do not directly impact profit margins. In the book, The Corporation, Joel Bakan asserts that:

"The corporation's legally defined mandate is to pursue, relentlessly and without exception, its own self -- interest, regardless of the harmful consequences it might cause to others" (Bakan, 2005, p. 9)

Bakan argues that the institutional imperatives of corporations, coupled with their seemingly boundless capacity to become more powerful fosters a pathological orientation to doing business that poses grave economic, political, and social danger. Bakan's theory will serve as the primary touchstone in this exploration of the influence of corporate power on politics and the economy.

The first section of this paper centers on a discussion about the ways in which the economic forces of capitalism and the market society undergird the present power surge of corporations, and lay the groundwork for radical economic change -- some of which seems reminiscent of feudal economic arrangements. A discussion about the mutuality of political power and corporate power is the focus of the second section. This discussion is grounded in Steven Lukes' seminal theories of power, and ideas about the co-opting of government, touching on examples from Canadian history, such as the staples political economy theory. The paper will conclude with a discussion of Herbert Marcuse's pivotal theory: the capacity of consumerism to define what society should desire and strive for over other objectives

The Mutuality of Political Power and Corporate Power

The concept of business co-opting government is pivotal to comprehending the relationship between contemporary economics and political power. Corporations have shown their willingness to trample anyone and anything that gets in their way -- and, increasingly, politicians are willing to assist with the process. Writing on the sources of corporate power, Ted Nace (2003) listed the following:

[T] he power that large corporations derive from their political action committees, their lobbyists, their lawyers, their control over millions of jobs…the 'revolving door' that moves corporate people in and out of government agencies, the corporate ownership of media conglomerates… [and] the obscure Supreme Court decisions that 'discovered' corporate rights hidden in the language of the Constitution (p.12).

The revolving door between government positions and high-paying employment in private industry has been a difficult, if not impossible, door to shut. With their deep pockets, corporations have been able to increase lobbying to unprecedented levels, pour massive contributions into political campaigns, and conduct public relations campaigns that whitewash their unregulated impact on the environment and society. Corporate power is linked to political outcomes, to the manner in which corporations obfuscate their power and influence, and to the way that corporate power can reshape the judicial and legislative balance of power.

Robert A.G. Monks wrote that society is toe-to-toe with a "situation of great precariousness" in which it is "dangerously close to the co-option of government by business" (Bernasek, 2013). Robert Reich, former U.S. Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration and U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont assert that the U.S. has arrived at this point today. The phenomenon is certainly not particular to modern society; history provides many examples of government being co-opted by the wealthy long before the emergence of the modern corporation. One has only to look as far as Canadian history at the Staples political economy theory to understand the machinations that bring about co-optation. The writings on Harold Innis and the Staple theory illustrate how the search for and exploitation of extracted materials in Canada led to the creation of supportive institutions and shaped the regional and national political culture. The dovetailing of politics and economics is clearly illustrated in this example.

In Power: A Radical View, Steven Lukes (1975) defined two different types of power that he has derived from Spinoza: the capacity to impact the surrounding world and to dominate other beings -- the second power being a subset of the first. Lukes (2005) postulated that there are three dimensions of power that he refers to as: the one-dimensional view, the two-dimensional view, and the three dimensional view. Lukes (1975) seminal work describes a unique conceptualization of power along these three dimensions that are fundamentally related to decision-making and behavior. He defines the first dimension as "the study of concrete, observable behavior" (p. 17, emphasis in original). Thus, the first dimension is seen to be the analysis of observable conflicts over concrete political issues that occur between organized interests. The second dimension addresses the dynamics that keep potentially controversial issues from yielding "observable conflicts" (Lukes, 1975, p. 23). In other words, if behavior that is absent decision-making occurs, some potential issues are never made actual -- they just don't happen or don't appear. In as much as political analysis examines variables that constrain the agenda but are not necessarily overt -- in fact, may be hidden -- the third dimension deals with an ideological matter.

Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (Lukes, 1975, 28)

The topics of behavior and decision-making are relevant to the relation between consumers and corporations, and between politicians and corporations -- both aspects of which inform the phenomenon of corporate abuse as conceptualized by Bakan (2005).

Herbert Marcuse's work from the One-Dimensional Man, particularly The New Forms of Control, provides theory that is both relevant and valuable to an understanding of the capacity of consumerism to define what society should desire and strive for over other objectives. Often, as Marcuse argues, the social construction of consumerism comes at great cost to the personal freedom and liberty of the consumers and the workers. A fundamental tenant, according to Marcuse, is that people who consume must also labor, and so the inextricable relation is set. A primary reason for the maintenance for the consumer cycle that promotes working ever harder and longer to purchase more goods is that this dynamic takes on an essential quality. Cultural norms are so supportive of consumerism that it is not be perceived as undesirable by many stakeholders. Marcuse's criticism of consumerism aligns with Bakan (2005) and is directed at its use as an effective means of social control. Indeed, Marcuse's point illuminates the reach -- and invisibility -- of corporate social and political power.

Conclusion

Bakan's clarion call to the public has emphasized the powerful and corrosive impact of corporate non-compatibility with the public interest and the exaggerated responsiveness of corporations to shareholders. Slater and Tonkiss (2012) serve to bring together ideas and frameworks from the social disciplines that are foundational to Bakan's observations. Indeed, it in is the blurring of economic forces with political and social power that the theories about corporate greed and ungoverned influence are most fully expressed. From Nace (2003), the reader is permitted a look through the revolving door of incestuous transactions between government officials and private interests -- and is presented with some rather startling and uncommon insights into the functioning of judicial bodies. Nace highlights the dynamics that enable the astronomical growth of corporate power, an argument that aligns neatly with Bakan's assertions. Lukes (1975) illuminates the several faces of power, underscoring the perhaps lesser considered political power associated with the ability to set the agenda -- to determine what is placed on the docket and what is not. Lukes third dimension of power and Marcuse's concepts of new forms of control both strongly undergird Bakan's conclusions: consumers are generally accepting of or oblivious to the obfuscation of factors that propel them to greater and greater levels of consumerism. Any expectation that corporations will ever be apologists is completely dashed by the theories and opinions discussed here; rather one can reasonably assume that corporations will continue to echo the mantra of free market economists for some time.