Origins of Cold War

Origins of Cold War

The long Telegram

The policy makers in Washington and Harry S. Truman overlooked the views and beliefs of Kennan, those that he expressed, in Moscow. The policymakers were continuously convinced by Kennan to back out with their plans for collaboration with Soviet Union in support of Europe and to favor a sphere of power approach in order to deteriorate the influence of Soviet Union in Europe (Keene, 1946). The development of a federation was required to oppose the power and control of Soviet Union in Western Europe and to stand against the monopoly of Soviet in Eastern Europe, as asserted by Kennan (1946).

Until the mid-1946, U.S. mission residing in Moscow as the deputy head was Kennan. With the term ending, Soviet Union showed disintegration in the system of World Bank run under the International Monetary Fund and showed disinterest in it, and this led to the U.S. state department being enquired about it from the U.S. Treasury department. A comprehensive report was a response from Kennan before the term ending in 1946. The letter comprised officially of a telegram of 5500-word report, which he sent from Moscow as a strategic document to James Byrnes in the office of the Secretary of State establishing diplomatic framework on managing good coherence with Soviet Union (Kennan, 1946).

It was the matter of internal requirements creating the primary essence of Soviet international strategy in the regime of Joseph Stalin. Kennan stated that in order to keep his reign, Stalin needed a bad international condition outside the Soviet land. The theory of Marxism-Leninism was hence interpreted, customized and copied by Stalin as a logical explanation of his ruling strategy that Soviet was under risk of harm if a system other than dictatorship was to take over since they had no idea know how to rule without that - to limit acts of cruelty which they eliminated and sacrifice which was inevitable. At present they cannot surrender this system. This is shocking how its approval is a shame to their morality and self-esteem (Keenan, 1946).

As suggested in numerous studies, the coherence with the Soviet system could only be maintained by the Western institutions, claiming them significant when Soviet regime was to show softness in their stiffness. His policy describing how to stand and support the stringent attitude of the Soviet government lied in series of logical conventions and propositions that vigilantly favored them and countered Soviet functionalities with the help of political trends shifting in the international scenario (Nash, 2008).

This telegraph from Kennan brought to attention the Navy secretary James Forrestal - a popular advocate in the Truman's bench catering the edgy link between the Soviets and them - and formerly a wartime ally with U.S.. James Forrestal assisted Kennan back in Washington, when Kennan was selected as the deputy in foreign affairs department of National War College. He then went on to publish the article 'X' on his support and encouragement of the Soviet approach (Nash, 2008; Kennan, 1925-50).

The prime objective behind his policy was to remove the U.S. troops from European premises. The encouragement of Kremlin would be increased by the settlement, against the foundation of organizations in the Eastern Europe that were an indirect enemy to the Soviet Union, annotating the amount of control that was essential to be practiced to keep a Soviet orientation (Grodzins et al., 1963).

For the time being, in 1947 in the month of March, formation of Truman Doctrine took placed. Truman Doctrine is Kennan's notice that Truman used as "long telegram" where he claimed that he would support those people who refuse to accept defeat by armed alternatives or by external stress; he believed that this was the appropriate strategy (Truman, 1947).

In the midst of situation created by the report, U.S. state department contacted the U.S. embassy in Moscow to establish the foundation of the Soviet stance over the issue, the contact laid the groundwork for the entire environment established after the war in the Soviet Union; as well as the frame and elements of this situation; factual possibilities of projections this situation will carve out; projections that develop on a non-official ground and analysis of it with U.S. perspective and view point (Truman, 1947).

In the consequent time, by the end of February 1946, U.S. embassy in Moscow was ordered to deliver their investigative stance on Soviet coherence and stature. Kennan responded to this with an official telegram of 8000 words from Moscow. Since it was an extra ordinarily long report as such a level of communication, it is still known as 'The long telegram' and it supported the American frame of mind of the government (McCoy, 1984).

Communism and Soviet nature of government were drastically detested by the embassy official. He was sure of what he was making of in his time, since 1933 that he lived in Moscow. Telegram was appreciated greatly by the U.S., and it was published for Americans with the title: The Sources of Soviet Conduct. It was the primary document strategizing a frame work for the American stature towards Soviet government for probably 2 to 3 coming decades (McCoy, 1984).

The occurrences in Soviet lands have a touch of the essence of Marxism with complete respect and regard of dogma in Soviet events and affairs. Quite a number of historians have pointed out Kennan with criticism that his telegram disregarded the Soviet faith in Communism, which is factually false. Kennan asserted that he observed that Soviet philosophy was a cascade motivated by its ancient advent which comprised of ignoring the external lands and often devastating them (Brinkley, 1994).

Kremlin's work depicts what he observes about the Soviet affairs, showing how an emotional insecurity can be viewed and treated as traditional and natural phenomena in Russia. Emotional insecurity, fears and pressure of foreign intervention, a possibility of mixing of foreign world and their world, can be an easy assumption of bad outcome if Russia would become a part of international scenario knowing what they don't know and vice versa. They have hence, developed their own happiness and contentment in fighting against what does not exist in their local vicinity (Brinkley, 1994).

Kennan was of the view that Communism evoked destruction and disregard to outside world for rulers of Russia as a logical excuse. They found it a humanitarian foundation of their ancient ideology as a part of this dogma, which justifies the fears, pressures and disturbances they experience naturally due to developed mental acceptance that this social system cannot run without such a dictatorship, practicing cruelty that they ought to stop and sacrifice they care to hate. To keep up with what they had proposed for themselves they kept killing and nipping everything in the bud, and in the present they cannot survive with it (Lippmann, 1947).

Soviet government was assuming an undesired effect of Capitalistic Western ideology and liberal social structure in USSR, asserted Kennan. To make a logical understanding of the negative effect, Russia highlighted the U.S. concept of governance as undesirable and evil and one which was hostile to Russia. They believed that the U.S.S.R. had a conflicting structural stature entangled in Capitalistic ideology which would consequently entitle impossible existence of peace (Wells, 1979).

Soviet lands are controlled by rulers who have ideological essentials of their ancient traditions which picture the other lands as the outside world, profoundly evil to them, devastating and unfriendly, lethal and unemotional, hence creating a congested frame of thinking, catering germs that will cultivate frustration and build up a turmoil which will end up as a social uprising where people will no longer suffer from pressure, getting access to their humane needs. It is documented in this thesis that it is of significant importance to enhance military and troops providing power to Russia, which socially, unintentionally and ideologically wishes to cut off from the outside world having pressure to extend military power (Russell, 2000).

Kennan's remarkably accurate apprehensions about consequence of Soviet policy driven purely by strategy established the development of following possible events:

Strategy focusing on giving pillars to pride and honor and physical strength to the state by: military development through focused industrialization; army development; army and artillery displays; secretive stature veiling internal matters, keeping weaknesses hidden and not openly pointing out the opponents.

Time and again promising strategies will be implemented to empower the Soviet empire.

The conventions and organizations at the international level will only be entertained when there will be a light of opportunity helping the Soviet union in empowering itself, exhibiting its power and weakening the morale of others.

In the residential areas, socialistic circles, there will be a practice of weakening of Western state of mind from the minds of people who are still hanging on to the orthodox Russian traditions.

Russians will find friends in the form of opponents in the outside world who overlap one of the traditional ideological elements of Russian Communism against the West.

Russians wished to take over the financial structure of the world, where they will only make financial pacts where their own financial dominations are assured (Russell, 2000).

As a matter of fact, by the end of 1980s, Soviet Union ran on these very principles.

Kennan criticized the possibilities that Soviets may be involved in invading the pro-Soviet countries with their mind sets and weaken them even if they do not form a higher level of apprehension for them.

Pro-Russian countries will be weakened through a designed framework to tackle the mindsets of the people following western ideologies.

Fights will be sparked in the countries where both countries have western ideologies

Soviet policies will be a negative framework destructive in nature, clearing their path with whatever that comes onto them that they don't like (Russell, 2000).

Kennan was afraid that communism will overshadow the governments of the West but that never happened. At least not to the extent that it was feared by Kennan. Britain and mostly America was afraid of the way communist were taking over and could potentially spy on them. Kennan wrote what he believed at the end of the document and these thoughts soon became a very important part of the document as for the twenty upcoming years they were adopted by America as their country policy. Some of these thoughts are discussed below (Anderson, 1991).

Conflict cannot be avoided: at the start of his document Kennan said that there was no way that they could come to a compromise with the Soviets and that communism was a great threat- It was not possible for the Soviet and USA to work together as the governors of soviet wanted to destroy the American nation (Anderson, 1991).

Briefly, the scholars claim that the Soviets claim that USA cannot be bound together and continue living peacefully. It is important to note here that the peacefulness of this society needs to be broken down, the cultural way of living needs to be broken along with the overall power of the state. This is the only way that the Soviets can take over. They have the political power to take over not only the best people of the world but also take over one of the very rich places in the world. They are helped by the very powerful nationalists in Russia. Their actions have major and deep influences in other countries of the world and it is possible as it run by people who have always been involved in the underground strategies that have influenced the global structures from the very start (Zinn, 2003).

Researchers say that the handling of this problem was one of the biggest things that the American diplomats have ever had to tackle or will have to in the future. It was Kennan's point-of-view that world war is not necessarily a solution of undertaking the Soviet threat. It can be defeated very easily even without it. This thinking makes him the prophet of the Cold war. However, the researcher asserts on his belief that the trouble basically arises due to our improper problem solving strategy and without making any disagreement on military level (Eisele, 2002).

Kennan declared that Soviets are still a weaker power comparatively in spite of the danger that is gauged overall against the Western World. He made a very intelligent prediction of the down falling of the Soviet government system. The scholar claims that the success of the internal power of Soviet system is still doubtful. It is still not ready to be declared practically durable and promising. Its stability, feasibility and internal soundness cannot be considered as completely possible as guaranteed (Eisele, 2002).

Kennan put forward a very important fact about the Soviets. Despite of the fact that they will avail every opportunity to extend their power and rule wherever possible and will testify against the Western resolve on being opposed, however, if they have to face any force then they would certainly back down. This picture was forecasted by the American government. They declared it within the Truman Doctrine and added to the policy of containment i.e. Soviet power does not move ahead through proper planning. It is highly reluctant to take risks. If it resists logical reasoning on one hand, then on the other it also very sensitive to the logic of force (Engerman, 2004).

Kennan always believed that threat of the Soviet Communism can be controlled if the U.S. government is courageous to trust its own methods and conceptions of the whole human community and if the nation is made aware to the realities of the Russian situation. He declared that the best possible situation of these facts is through making sure that people enjoy wealth, happiness and security. It can be feasible if war propaganda is waged so that it can be confirmed that they would come to know the positive aspects of Western freedom (O'Hara, 2005). This all lead to the foundation of the Marshall plan.

It all mostly depends on the vigour and health of the nation. World communism is just like an evil parasite that lives upon diseased tissue only. Victory over Moscow can be gained through some possible ways which are:

To take every chance and incisive measure to solve the internal matter of the society

Upgrade the self-confidence

Improve discipline

Upgrade the morale and community spirit of nation.

We must work hard and show the rest of the world that America is the better place to live in, other than the one in which they have lived their previous lives. It is not practically possible to force the people to develop political processes like they had. If Europe is considered, then people over there are fed up of the past results and therefore hesitate to take interest in abstract freedom as compared to their security. They do not want to take responsibilities and duties (Pelz, 1994). They need to be shown a right path. It is hence the duty of the government to give them a better one than the Russians. And if we would not show such things, Russians will surely take their chances.

George Kennan has explained three of the following matters in his telegram. They are:

1.

The chief motivating factors for introducing Soviet foreign policy, along with the ideological and historical background of post-war Soviet perception regarding international relations.

2.

Its success on both official and unofficial levels.

3.

The far-reaching repercussions for the U.S. foreign policy (O'Hara, 2005).

This theory began with the study that due to the politics all around the world, the Soviet leadership got divided into capitalist and socialist societies. Due to this, USSR is still in the hold of the aggressive capitalism, as a result of which the idea of a permanent peaceful society does not seem to be practically possible. Soviet leaders' were suspicious of the countries outside their own. This suspicion did not come from any objective or scientific examination across Soviet's borders but was born because of the necessities of the inner-Russian environment which then led to having a phobic view of the outside world affairs. The root cause of this belief was the sense of insecurity that stemmed from Russian tradition and instinct. The latter was formed because of two elements: Russia's deep and long agricultural past; and fear of coming in contact with the economically and socially developed Western countries. The latter element gave birth to the sense of insecurity which is seen in the Kremlin's hostility against the West as its rule was in ancient form which made its psychological base artificial and fragile which could not stand a comparison with the Western countries' systems. In this relation, Marxist-Leninist ideology became the best driver for sense of insecurity in Bolshevist regime as it offered the best justification for Kremlin's fear of Western countries (O'Hara, 2005).

Kennan concluded that in order to increase the U.S.S.R.'s power in international community, the Soviet aimed their policies at strengthening this power. It is of more importance that Soviet rulers mostly attempted to reach their goals by means to totally destroying their enemies' power. For total destruction they would use every means in their power whether direct or indirect to infiltrate and destroy the social, political and moral society of the Western countries by means of exploitation of the contradictions present in the capitalist system (Kennan, 1946).

Kennan has provided an austere picture of the Soviet Union. To sum up his view, he mentioned in the start of the 5th and last part of Telegram that the forceful and alarmist tone of the United States had to face a political force that was committed to the level of fanatics that no modus vivendi can be achieved with the U.S. (Kennan, 1946).

Harmony, traditional way of life and international authority can be disrupted, destroyed and broken in order to control the power of the Soviets. When considering these circumstances, Kennan said that the U.S.'s strategy was to stop the expansion of the Soviets (Bennett, 1985).

Nonetheless, concluding Kennan's Telegram instead of recommendations for instructions and applicable action steps, Kennan warned that when dealing with the Soviets, Americans should approach them with objectivity, calmness and thoroughness. Kennan was convinced that the capabilities of the U.S. can solve the problem without any direct clash or a war-like conflict. He thought this because unlike Hitler, the Soviet Union leaders were not adventurist or schematic as they were sensitive to the thought of force and can withdraw if a strong force was standing opposite to them; and Soviets were far behind the West economically (Kennan, 1946).

Due to this, Kennan further argued that U.S. interests can be best achieved by building a vigorous and healthy American society as well as picturing its constructive and positive image in the minds of the other world countries (Kennan, 1946).

Comments and Criticism

The most interesting fact about the Long Telegram is that it does not provide or elaborate any containment definition or concept that Kennan became famous for. The containment definition presented by Kennan was seen in an article published in the paper of Foreign Affairs. The Long Telegram was not the first attempt of Kennan to discuss the political regime's nature of Bolshevist. Nonetheless, the telegram was not a clear and precise work of Kennan as it full of ambiguities (Kennan, 1946).

This telegram has brought forth conflicting interpretations over many issues.

The first uncertain question relates the view of Kennan to the post-war outlook of the world and politics of the Soviet. The thesis can help determine Kennan's strong conviction about the Soviet leaders' dogmatic adherence as the lethal capitalist-socialist war in the Long Telegram. As a result, and due to the Bolshevist's regime's insecurity, the Western countries in no way can safeguard the confidence of the Soviet's for mutual benefits. In contrast, the Soviets were determined to become a strong international country and work in a systematic manner to destroy and weaken the West (Kennan, 1946).

Such analysis requires more scrutiny. It has been correctly observed that the main problem is the application of the interpretive model to the Soviet Union - its hostile foreign policy was born out of the internal needs and necessities which led to the inadequate attention to barriers placed by West's environment especially the U.S. becoming the main factor behind Soviet's behavior. Kennan discounted and disregarded any security interests and objectives of the Soviet Union references that caused the regime in Moscow to pursue, regardless of any political or ideological features. In the same manner, Kennan noted the economic drawback of the Soviet Union and exaggerated that the capabilities and abilities of the Soviet Union to infiltrate that Western countries (Kennan, 1946).