Moche Food
Most of the artifacts traditionally recognized as part of the Moche culture revolve around a restricted and exclusive social domain (Bawden 1996). Huge pyramids, elaborate art, and exquisite crafts, all are indicative of this New World people. To the Moche, however, the aesthetics came second to what these artifacts and buildings symbolized in their social structure. "They were the active material symbols of an ideology of power, produced at the behest of an exclusive body of rulers, calculated to assert and sustain its authority." Given the size and complexity of this culture, as well as other archaeological finds and knowledge of Peruvian societies as the Incas, it is possible that the Moche also had a monopolistic control of food resources by the elite class.
It is recognized that the Moche was a hierarchal society by the time the mounds were built. In the Jequetepeque Valley, for example, a high-status female was buried with an array of items that confirmed her high status. She was covered with large hammered metal sheets, wore a large headdress with gilded silver tassels and entombed with a goblet and blackware dishes that depicted the Sacrifice Ceremony.
The middle part of the Early Intermediate period from 400 BC to AD 800 was one of the first regional states in the Andean region. This Southern Moche state was a highly centralized, stratified and organized political system in which leaders exercised considerable economic, military, and ideological power (Bawden 1996; Billman 1996; Uceda 1997). The state's authority directed the construction of these massive pyramids, led the conquest of a large section of the north coast of Peru, and organized the production of unprecedented amounts of finely crafted gold objects, pottery, and textiles
One of the questions that arises is how this nation state developed, considering the rarity of such an occurrence at this time. Billman (2002) used the Wittfogel and Steward hydraulic model as a heuristic device to analyze the initial development of the Southern Moche state. This hydraulic hypothesis theorizes that the administrative necessities for construction and maintenance of irrigation systems performed a critical role in the creation of state-level polities in specific arid environments.
Researchers define the concept of "state" in myriad ways, based on varying characteristics. Although designations vary, there is agreement that states are a general category of social organization that is dissimilar from other forms in that they (1) have relatively permanent institutionalized forms of leadership (not transient rule by charismatic leaders); (2) develop specialized, hierarchical and bureaucratic systems;
3) are organized based on land, as well as kinship; (4) finance political activities through some for of tribute collection; and (5) gain political control by the utilization of positive and negative sanctions. Research conducted over the past several decades demonstrate that Moche political organizations probably had all five of these key attributes of the state (Bawden 1996; Billman 1996; Mosley 1992; Schaedel 1985).
It is therefore believed that irrigation systems provided leaders with the opportunity to expand their political power base and economy. Political structures have been proposed by Moseley (1975) and Haas (1982, 1987) for the central Andean coast. Based on their constructs, physical control of irrigation canals by a developing elite social stratum, rather than population pressure or management, resulted in increased political centralization during the Initial period (1800-900 B.C.). That is, the level of political centralization was not related to the scale and complexity of the productive system, but to the opportunity for individuals to manipulate the productive system and create social inequality and political control (Billman, 2002).
Blanton and colleagues (1996) and Feinman (1995) recognize "corporate" versus "network" or "exclusionary" leadership strategies or modes of political economy, which have led to a concentration on the variable ways for leaders to build their political foundation in complex states. The "dual-processual theory" by Blanton et al. (1996) emphasizes similar distinctions formerly named "staple" versus "wealth finance" and "group-oriented" versus "individualizing chiefdoms" (D'Altroy and Earle 1985; Renfrew 1974). These authors' focus is based on power and its control. That is, whether elites monopolize power sources or if instead power is shared across distinct groups, the sources of this power, and whether political action is oriented to external exchange networks or to relations within the group (Earle 1997; Hayden 1995; Mann 1986).
In the corporate strategy, power is shared across different groups or segments of society and there are political structures, often kin-based, such as clans or lineages. The interrelationship of these groups is practiced with collective ritual activities, often based on fertility, which may consist of the collection of surplus food and the construction of public monuments. Socio-economic distinctions within the group are not emphasized. To the contrary, in a network strategy, individual leaders attempt to monopolize and control the sources of power, including prestige goods production. They establish a support network through kin relations as well as patron-client relationships and long-distance exchange systems. The distinction is made regarding individuals based on prestige and wealth.
Feinman (1995) contrasts these "corporate" versus "network" strategies of leadership as alternative avenues towards greater complexity: The corporate direction focuses on collective ritual and the potential for manipulation, public construction, integrated social segments, kinship affiliation, and relatively suppressed economic differentiation with greater egalitarian accessibility. The network direction puts the most emphasis on individual prestige and wealth accumulation, personal networks, long-distance exchange, exotic wealth exchange, and the specialized construct of status-related crafts.
Blanton et al. (1996) stress that a variety of societies with different levels of sociopolitical organization, for example tribes, chiefdoms and states, have these modes or strategies, instead of being evolutionary stages or types by themselves. Instead, Feinman (1997) argues that these are ends of a continuum cross-cutting other often-used typologies. Mesoamerican societies may have aspects of both strategies, and modes may change from one to another at different times, or cycle back and forth between corporate and network. Billman (2002) expects that differences will occur in the archaeological evidence of architecture, status and wealth distinction, and craft production and specialization among societies that emphasize these different leadership strategies. For instance, according to Blanton et. al (1996) and Feinman (1997), a change in monumental construction from platforms decorated with deities to huge royal tombs and representations of specific rulers may represent a shift in the leadership direction. Similarly, a change from collective to individualized burial handling and in mortuary display could signal a swing between corporate and network strategies. Greater wealth differentiation and status competition that is "materialized" through trade in exotic raw materials and production of prestige goods by specified craftsmen could indicate a network leadership strategy (DeMarrais et al.1996; Earle 1997).
Billman (2002) examined the change that occurred at about a.D. 1200 in the Mississippi River Valley Cahokia polity from stressing the status and prestige of communal groups through monumental constructions to emphasizing and maintaining the status and prestige of individual elites using prestige goods. He interpreted this as a transformation from a "corporate" to a "network" leadership mode. These two alternative strategies are found archaeologically in the construction of monuments, differentiation of wealth, production of crafts and in network exchange.
The time of Cahokia's decline is normally recognized at the Moore head phase, a.D. 1200-1275, due to decreased mound building and population levels. Billman's (2002) analysis of archaeological indications of household status and craft production after a.D. 1200 demonstrates maximal differences between household units in status and marine shell working; there is increased centralization of shell working and greater production by higher-status households. He attests that elite ownership of craft production, if present, was a late phenomenon. Instead of a decline at a.D. 1200, changes in the archaeological complexity indicators demonstrate changes how power was expressed and maintained by elites in Cahokian society.
Billman also uses evidence of monumental constructions and control of labor and resources for craft specialization as an indicator of centralization and hierarchical organization. Pyramids and mounds are massive and visible monuments that have been used by archaeologists as an indication of the ability of one sector of society to control the labor of others (O'Brien 1989; Trigger 1990). Craft specialization is recognized as an indicator of complexity since specialization entails a heterogeneity of responsibilities and functions, but also due to the connection seen between control of resources and labor and the emergence of elites (Brown et al. 1990; Brumfiel and Earle 1987). Archaeologists are now beginning to recognize greater variation in complex societies and to reevaluate the role of centralization, hierarchy, and differentiation (e.g., Crumley 1995; White and Pigott 1996) and what the indications of complexity actually mean.
To establish whether or not the Moche's network polity consisted of food control by the elites, it is necessary to look at other similar societies in this area. Huancaco in the Viru Valley existed approximately from 350 to 700 a.D. In the Early Intermediate Period (Bourget 2000). Despite sharing several iconographic symbols and architectural features, Huancaco cannot be considered a Moche site based on archaeological indicators such as the absence of Moche diagnostic ceramics. The variation in botanical in Huancaco suggests that distinct social groups were dedicated to different activities. For example, the possibility exists that one site was a specialized food production area; it remains unknown if the occupants were farmers, herders or involved in a variety of activities. Similarly, another site may be a specialized elite compound. Evidence of food processing in rooms located at the bottom of the mound and storage jars in the center of the building, indicate that the elite may have fulfilled more than one function or specific individuals had access to certain areas of the building for food processing.
In addition, the elite and farmers were dependant on each other. The theory is if one of these sites produced food daily for the other, elites most likely had the means to ensure that food supplies were provided. Thus, it can be supposed, notes Dionne (2002) that the elite power was based on a redistribution system and exchanged services or resources against food. That is, the relationship between both sites went beyond hierarchical facts. Dionne (2002) believes, based on botanical evidence, that at least two social groups were living at Huancaco. One site was more than likely occupied by a specialized elite, but was also engaged in a variety of activities, perhaps feasting, confirmed by the presence of storage jars, hearths, evidence of food processing, and trash deposits. The other site most likely served as a working area to farmers and herders. However, it remains unclear if they actually produced food for the elite. It still remains to be determined is the nature of the relationship between the sites.
The extensive knowledge of the Inca may shed some light on the polity of earlier states, such as Huancaco and Moche. DeMarrais, Castillo and Earle (1996) studied the varying forms of power and how they equate to the Inka. Social power is the capacity to control and manage the labor and activities of a group to gain access to the benefits of social action. Throughout history, rulers and chiefs have used economic, political, military, and ideological power as a means to attain their goals. The choice of one strategy over another greatly impacts social evolution, since such choices reflect the historical circumstances and the objectives of the groups and greatly differ in cost, efficiency and sustainability. Military control is effective in the short run, where control over the means of destruction is possible, but warfare is a costly and unstable way of establishing power relationships. Economic control consists of land tenure systems and property rights that permit direct control over production and exchange. However, economic control is difficult except in an insular setting in which control of the seaways provides similar opportunities for elites to limit access to goods and resources. In other situations, strategic control of ideology contributes to the centralization and consolidation of political power.
Inka feasts were the most direct element of the relationship between the state and subjects, and rituals materialized the power and wealth of the state on a grand scale. After conquering new territory, the state alienated all agricultural lands militarily and symbolically and reallocated them to a kin-based corporate group in granting land rights back to the community, the Inkas legitimated their rights to labor service. In reality, however, the state did not interfere with traditional land tenure practices, and the subsistence and welfare of its members remained the kin-groups' responsibility. Subjects tilled agricultural lands set aside for state use and worked newly defined state lands. Other crews formed the military, built facilities, temples, and storehouses, and constructed roads that tied the Inka centers together. In return for these services, the state hosted work parties, providing workers with food and maize beer. Excavations at Huanuco Pampa suggest that state hospitality took place on a massive scale (Morris and Thompson 1985). This Inka center, although located a distance away from agricultural lands and local population centers, contained many storehouses with abundant foodstuffs. Central to Huanuco Pampa was a main plaza where feasts were described by early Spanish chroniclers. In the plaza's excavated assemblage, the high-necked Inka liquid-storage vessel probably used to serve the beer in public ceremonies.
Inka feasts thus expressed the state's authority, at the same time embedding it in long-established relationships between a community and its leader (Morris and Thompson 1985). Maize was a status crop in Andean culture prior to the conquest; local chiefs carried heavy jars of beer with them as they journeyed to meet their political responsibilities (Rostworowski 1977). In pre-Inka period excavations, Peni, maize and large liquid-storage vessels were found primarily in elite domestic areas. This suggests local chiefly hospitality (Earle et al. 1987). After the conquest, however, the Inkas appear to have taken over the role of host in this strategic region; local elite-sponsored feasts declined in frequency. Also, as the Inkas expanded their ritual obligation, overall maize consumption significantly increased. Chiefs regularly hosted feasts to demonstrate their capacity to marshal quantities of food beyond the reach of others Such hospitality may have lead to dependency and encouraged loyalty among individuals who came to rely upon it to help meet their daily subsistence needs (Barth 1969). At the state level, the costs of sponsoring a large scale feast or ceremony surpassed the resources of a single individual. The vast storage facilities of the Inka empire are testimony to the enormous cost to the state of underwriting its frequent feasts (D'Altroy and Earle 1985).
Some of this information regarding other locations may be extrapolated for the Moche. Donnan (2003), for example, states that the Moche probably did not have markets or money, but almost surely they practiced a redistribution system characteristic of Andean people at the time of European contact. Subjects gave local lords food and commodities, which they redistributed to nobles of lesser rank. Thus, vast amounts of food, raw materials, and handmade goods were systematically collected and redistributed effectively.. The surplus from redistribution supported a corps of full-time artisans who created objects for the elite. The lords used many of these items to demonstrate their power and wealth; others they gave to lesser nobility to maintain social and political allegiances. Supporting skilled craft specialists in this way created an ideal climate for stimulating artistic excellence and encouraging the innovation of sophisticated technology.
Archaeological indicators in Moche may show that food was also correlated with a network system. Ryser (2000) states that "In prehistoric complex societies such as the Moche on the North Coast of Peru, social status and social control was partially defined by access to certain highly valued goods and specialized services, and the ability to control certain kinds of production." Early state Andes rulers controlled the agricultural economic base in addition to symbols with religious or supernatural significance. The Moche preference for lima and common beans was not restricted to use solely as a staple food crop. Commoner populations in the Moche Valley appear to have consumed more common beans than elite leaders and rulers. In addition, symbols of Moche ideology are represented in icons of lima beans found on ceramic vessels. Similarly, Whiteman (2000) believes control over staple resources established the foundations for political development of Moche and Chimu elite classes. He states that "Exceptional preservation of artifacts and abundant architectural remains provided an excellent opportunity for me to study prehistoric resource management and levels of political centralization during the Moche Phase of Peruvian prehistory." He thus infers aspects of staple food storage and centralization through his study of the development and changes in architectural storage structures through time. With the growing complexity of societies, it is possible to observe an evolution of state-controlled storage facilities that accommodate the food surpluses required to support craft specialists and elite classes.
Wilson (1999) studied the construct of structures on the basis of food control. The Huaca del Sol, the larger of two platform mounds at the Cerro Blanco site, has huge basal dimensions of 340 x 160 meters. At its higher southern end it stands 40 meters tall, as one of the largest prehispanic adobe brick structures in South America. Alfred Kroeber, an anthropologist who conducted ethnographic and archaeological research in both North and South America in the 1920s, visited Cerro Blanco and discovered that the Huaca del Sol was built with an unusual construction technique involving the placement of bricks in a series of discrete, mud-jointed columns that rise vertically from the pampa right up to its maximum height.
Based on this construction technique, Kroeber (1929) suggested that the structure was built as a single unit, instead of in incremental steps over time, and perhaps by different social groups, "each contingent of a community building its own wall or column." Later studies by members of the Harvard Chan-Moche Valley project (Moseley 1975) added their finding that the adobe bricks on each column are imprinted with "maker's marks" that to a large degree are unique from column to column. This suggests that separate groups contributed to the mound's construction, "in return for which they were permitted, if not required, to add a lasting (if hidden) set of symbols that commemorated their work on the project" (as reported in Wilson, 1999).
Wilson (1999) projected a similar Inca model called mit'a back on Moche times to determine if the state may have provided food and drink to people whose labor involved a "command performance" they could not easily refuse. That is, by the time of the Moche, the relationship between the state and its citizens had become a coercive one based on asymmetrical power and a type of "fictive reciprocity," rather than the balanced reciprocity most likely found for centuries in more localized, egalitarian Andean groups such as the Q'ero and Ayllu Kaata.
Donnan's (2003) excavation of the woman at San Jose de Moro, accompanied by clothing and gear worn by a priestess in the sacrifice scene, along with other archaeological work in the past 75 years, demonstrates "fairly clearly that the Moche culture represents a multivalley conquest polity that itself grew out of prior evolutionary trends, including the development of the complex of Andean cultigens, population growth, and the associated rise on this infrastructural base of local level chiefdoms and states" (Wilson 1999). Moche society was clearly stratified into distinct social segments, expressed in differential burial practices (DeMarrais, Castillo and Earle 1996; Donnan 1990) and settlement patterns. Settlements vary in both site size and function and within them it is possible to identify socially differentiated areas, or neighborhoods (Bawden, 1982). The Moche economy was characterized by diversification of production, craft specialization, long-distance exchange, and construction of a large-scale irrigation infrastructure.
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