UN Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia

¶ … UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia

Conflict management and the U.S. And UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia

Situated on the horn of Africa, Somalia is a country that has been described as one of the most dangerous and underdeveloped areas on the continent. The country has been immersed in various degrees of violent conflict since its establishment as an independent country. It is also a region that has seen various attempts by the United Nations at conflict management. These efforts and operations have not met with any long-term success. For instance, while a United Nations arms embargo has been in place in the country since the early 1900s, the region is awash with weapons, which exacerbates and contributes to the almost incessant violence and internal conflict. (Somalia: path to recovery)

The situation in this region obviously begs the question, why have these efforts by the U.N., the United States and other countries and organizations not been successful? This paper will go some way to answering this central but very complex question. To this end, the present study will attempt to provide an overview of the history of the region with regard to humanitarian efforts and conflict management.

A central thesis that will be explored is that conflict management is an extremely important aspect of the modern political and regional landscape. This is due to fact that in the complex and globalized world in which we live no single country is isolated from others in terms of the influence and international impact that all countries have on one another. This is especially the case with regard to the African continent, where violence, humanitarian suffering and conflict have become an almost endemic part of the political and regional milieu; and where one conflict can affect the often-delicate stability of surrounding countries. In this context, conflict management and humanitarian aid towards peaceful solutions are extremely important.

Related to this is the social and political composition of the Somali situation, which is characterized by intense clan divisions and loyalties. This aspect suggests that part of the reason for the lack of success in peacekeeping efforts is due to inadequate attention being given to the interwoven and complex clan and tribal affiliations within the country. It is often the case, as many contemporary studies posit, that the internal dimensions and facets of the county have been the main cause for the lack of progression towards stability and peace in the region. (Briefing of SRSG a. Ould-Abdallah to the United Nations Security Council, UN Somalia).

There are a number of concomitant factors and variables that also need to be included in the analysis of the Somali situation and its conflict management requirements. A cardinal issue is the way in which international politics and agendas have shaped the Somali situation and have impinged upon and often derailed negotiations and efforts towards peace. It is a central contention of this paper that in order to achieve adequate conflict management, the historical and cultural past has to be taken into account - particularly with regard to the way that the internal politics of the country have been manipulated and distorted by the colonial and cold war influences.

This is also related to a further complicating factor in ascertaining the reason for the failure of management and conflict resolution efforts. This refers to the thesis that, geographical and cultural proximities are not necessarily positively contributing assets, rather they often contribute to the complication of the situation. This is because they inhabit long-standing incompatibility of interests that are the main driving motives of regional actors in involving themselves in or undertaking regional initiatives of conflict management.

Ghebremeskel)

It should also be noted at the outset that this paper will not attempt to elucidate and discuss in detail the complex and intricate evolution of agreement and disagreement that constitutes the tapestry of negotiations and counter negotiations over time in this country. While an overview of the central political events will be discussed, the focus will be rather on the humanitarian and conflict management efforts that have been initiated by various bodies and organizations. This focus is because the details of these negotiations would take much more space than allowed and would lead beyond the set parameters of this paper.

The history of Somalia in terms of conflict management has not been a success story. Menkhaus (1997) outlines the general perception of the country in term of aid and conflict resolution.

Few topics inspire more cynicism among seasoned observers of international politics than foreign assistance to Somalia. By some reckonings, no other country save Israel has received such high levels of military and economic aid per capita; certainly no country has less to show for it. Even before its collapse into protracted civil war and anarchy in 1990, Somalia had earned a reputation as a graveyard of foreign aid, a land where aid projects were notoriously unsuccessful, and where high levels of foreign assistance helped to create an entirely unsustainable, corrupt and repressive state.

Menkhaus 124)

The above is quoted at length as it provides a clear if rather damning assessment of the country in this context. The country was in a state of disarray after the Second World War. The victorious allies were in disagreement about the future of the region and this issue was put to the newly established United Nations. This resulted in a ten-year UN trusteeship of Italian Somaliland under Italian administration. (Ghebremeskel) However, this did not take into account the other areas that Somalia laid claim to and this omission was to result in a great degree of dissention in the years that followed. This refers particularly to the Haud and Ogaden territories. This issue became the subject of debate between Ethiopia and Britain until Ethiopia regained its sovereignty over the territories. (Ghebremeskel)

Central to the development of the present situation in the country and to the conflict was the growing sense of nationalism. This was to lead to a greater demand for the unification of the various areas in the desire for integral nationhood. Another related issue is that throughout the contemporary history of the country, clan and tribal rivalries were to play a major role and this aspect was to be one of the most problematic areas for conflict management and resolution.

For almost ten years after independence, there was relative peace in the country. In 1969 General Mohamed Siad Barre took power after a coup d'etat. The motivation behind this action was that the government at the time had failed to unify Somalia. This led to the formation of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and the movement of Somalia towards to the influence of the Soviet Union. Somalia received extensive aid and assistance, as well as military assistance, from the Soviet Union during this period. This situation helped Barre in the re-unification of Somalia.

In summary, the involvement of the superpowers in the Cold War era had a telling and pervasive effect on the development of conflict in the country.

It should also be borne in mind that the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, was interested in aiding Somalis because of certain political and strategic objectives during this period. When the Soviets later changed allegiance to Ethiopia, the United States began to support and aid Somalia.

The issue of clan affiliation in the conflict in Somalia can be seen for example in 1978, when after the Ogaden War a mutiny took place with the army supported by members of the Mejerteen sub-clan who formed an armed opposition group, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). (Ghebremeskel) Another resistance movement was later formed by the Issaq clan in the northern part of the country. These group and clan affiliations and oppositions created division in the country as well as protracted conflict and resulted eventually in a failed or collapsed sates

Post-Barre Somalia is a phenomenon commonly known as "collapsed state" in the current political discourse" (Ghebremeskel)

The civil war in the country therefore was a result of the collapse of the Somali government. Another facet that added to the conflict was the end of the Cold War in the 1980s. As a result of these historical events, the strategic importance of the county was diminished and this led to a reduction of aid and a change in policy on the part of the United States, which will be discussed later. Barre was rejected by the warlords and the northern part of the country declared independence. This was to lead to further division and conflict; for example, the split in the southern United Somali Congress, which had led efforts to unseat Barre, caused an escalation in violence, especially in the Mogadishu area. (Somalia: Things Fall Apart.1993.)

The civil war led not only to widespread conflict but also affected the economy and led to famine. There was intense competition and conflict for resources between the various clans and groupings. As a result of this escalating and disturbing situation the United Nation acted. In 1992 United Nations Security Council in 1992 to authorize the limited peacekeeping operation United Nations Operation in Somalia I or UNOSOM I. (Somalia - UNOSCOM 1. Background) However, a major limitation of the initiative was that the UN force was limited to self-defense, which resulted in it being infective and virtually ignored by the various warlords in the regions.

The United States also attempted to intervene and manage the conflict. To this end the U.S. organized a military coalition with the purpose of, "...creating a secure environment in southern Somalia for the conduct of humanitarian operations" (Somalia). This coalition was known as the Unified Task Force or UNITAF and began functioning in the country in 1992 under the name Operation Restore Hope. The central aim was to restore order and reduce the impact of famine in the country. This initiative was replaced in 1993 by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

Neither of these efforts was to achieve any lasting success towards conflict resolution or management. The reason often given for this is related to the perceptions and influence of the warlords and clans. For instance, from the perspective of a warlord like General Mohamed Farrah Aidid, UNOSOM II was seen a threat to his power. Consequently, UN troops were attacked in 1993. The fighting increased in intensity leaving more than eighteen American troops and one thousand Somalis dead. The UN withdrew Operation United Shield in "http: 1995, having suffered significant casualties, and with the rule of government still not restored. (Boulden, 2001)

Many other conflicts and tribal rivalries took place and in 2006 there was a declaration of regional autonomy by the state of Jubaland. (Ghebremeskel) These events were to lead to civil war and the rise of the Islamic Courts Union. The entrance of Ethiopia into the situation in has exacerbated the conflict. In 2007, the fighting continued in Mogadishu between the transitional government and Ethiopian official troops on one hand, and Islamic militants, on the other. (Reconciliation is as elusive as ever)

Conflict management attempts.

As Adane Ghebremeskel states in a paper entitled, Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: The Somali Experience, conflict management in Africa necessitates, "... comprehending the overall debate" and in developing a conflict strategy for Somalia that would have to consider "...the political context in which the African mechanisms of conflict management have to act." (Ghebremeskel)

Ghebremeskel also make the following important assessment.

A an extensive examination of the subject is necessary in order to make a general conclusion in respect to the applicability of a regional approach to conflict management. Such an endeavor would not only need to trace the origin of the debate, but also to question the motives and the purposes served thereby. (Ghebremeskel)

This is an aspect that will be emphasized in the rest of this paper with regard to the aims and intentions of the conflict managements processes in the past that have been attempted by the United Nations and the United States. As suggested in the introduction, one point-of-view is that there has not been sufficient attention given in conflict management strategies to the internal dimensions and the numerous interweaving external causative factors that have prompted the conflict.

One of the first initiatives to deal with this conflict was the Horn of Africa Committee. This was an Ethio-Eritrean initiative intended to create a conference in which all parties in the conflict could participate. A reason give for the failure of this initiative is that it was not fully supported by the international community. (Sahnoun 9-10) Critics also point out that the failure of conflict management in this instance was the result of a failure to understand the depth of political and cultural involvement of the different parties, as well as the regional and sub-regional influences.

Despite setbacks, a Horn of Africa Standing Committee was established in 1992. This led to an agreement for the various Somali factions to have access to the "...unhampered distribution of humanitarian assistance and the opening of all ports, airports, and roads" (Ghebremeskel). However, " the effort of the Horn Committee was shattered by parallel initiatives of the UN and the U.S. To establish cease-fire and "appropriate" conditions for the arrival of the United Task Forces (UNITAF)" (Ghebremeskel). This again points to the complex role that external agencies and countries have played in often retarding rather than furthering the peace process.

UN Sponsored meeting in Addis Ababa was to follow in 1993 chaired by UN-Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. This led to the Addis Ababa National Reconciliation Conference. The conference issued the Addis Ababa Agreement signed by fifteen Somali faction leaders. The United Nations Operation in Somalia or UNOSOM extended from 1993 to 1994. The intervention was mainly aimed at the reduction of famine in the country and was U.S. led, with more than thirty-thousand troops involved. The operation became the province of the United Nations in the middle of 1993 and the United Nation expanded on the parameters of the project, becoming more focused on national reconciliation as a method of managing the conflict. Other aspect that were undertaken by the U.N. was the rebuilding the central government, and reviving the economy. (Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics)

This operation had a certain amount of success in reducing the armed conflict in the country. This operation also provided a space for the various factions and clans to negotiate towards a transition government. However, the interests of the warlords and clan leaders were threatened by this initiative. As a result of this perception, in June of 1993 General Aidid, who represented the Haber Gedir/Hawiye clan, killed twenty-four UN peacekeepers. This was to initiate four months of the United Nations. (Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics)

These events were also to result in the infamous "Black Hawk Down" incident and the failure of the U.S. And U.N. initiative. The operation left Somalia in 1995.

The situation in the country went for bad to worse after these events, with numerous reconciliation conferences, which brought few positive results. However, commentators also maintain that UNOSOM's civil and political work helped to "...empower a small but growing civil society in Somalia, which has since been an important force for peace-building in the country" (Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics). In spite of these efforts by both the United Nations and the United States since the mid-1990s, Somalia wqas without a functional central government. (Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics) more recent attempt to manage the conflict in the country was initiated in 2002 and was undertaken by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), under the auspices of the European Union, with the Kenyan government hosting the process. The talks were aimed at the cessation of hostilities and to work towards reconciliation. However, many obstacles and delays were encountered. These included disputes about the composition and the size of representation at the talks. A central obstacle was "...disputes over allocation of seats by subclans, control of the nomination process, and selection of individual members of parliament -- leading to delays in the inauguration of a 275-member parliament for the Transitional Federal Government

TFG) " (Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics).

In 2007, reports stated that there is growing pressure on the United Nations to,"...bolster a beleaguered African peacekeeping force in Somalia, as fresh evidence of human rights abuses and an impending humanitarian catastrophe emerge." (Crilly) Furthermore, there is a concern that the country has reached a breaking point and that "..."international action is now crucial" (Crilly).

There is also the danger that the United Nations backed ttransitional Government could fragment along clan lines. (Shabazz)

4. Summation and Assessments

One of the problems that have dogged the establishment of effective conflict management in the country is the external political situation in the region. Since its independence, many countries in the region see Somali as a security threat to the region. This perception has been complicated and exacerbated by the involvement of superpowers such as the U.S. And Soviet Union. (Habte) the involvement of the superpowers has had both advantages and disadvantages that are related to the policies and intentions of these countries. As noted, the collapsed or failed state that resulted in Somalia was partially the result of the withdrawal of interest and support by the U.S. And Russia after the end of the Cold War. This however was to lead to the U.S. And United Nations supported UNOSOM and "Operation Restore Hope." The failure of these operations led to a reevaluation of the interventionist policies and resulted in Western disengagement (Ghebremeskel).