United Kingdom\'s War Against Terrorism

United Kingdom Government Response to Post-9/11 Attacks of Islamic Terrorism

Terrorism, in the context of the United Kingdom, is not new. Developed through the past century in response to the increasing rates of terrorism, the United Kingdom's modern counter-terrorism strategies encompass elements of continuity and change. Despite the significant development, there is no change to its fundamental structure as its terrorism agencies carry out similar functions in response to the challenges of globalization and the Islamic radicalism that increases the rates of terrorism (Curtis, 2010). The effects of terrorism are varied. They range from social, economic, and political effects that affect the overall performance and competitiveness of the economic prospects of a state. Basing on this, the question in focus for most across the United Kingdom, as well as, the other regions of the world has been the readiness of the agencies "modus operandi" in countering the effects of Islamic and other forms of terrorism. To date, significant evidence from the United Kingdom has prevented up to twelve-terrorist plots in Britain. Despite the success, intelligence failure in preventing the occurrence of the terrorist attack as in the case of September Eleven attack on the U.S. is considered a significant failure of the security intelligence to maintain the health of the state (Foley, 2009).

Therefore, to understand the response of states to the increasing cases of terrorism as in the case of the September 11 attack, this essay assesses the response of the UK Government to post-September 11 threat of Islamic Terrorism. The essay is structured into three parts to create an understanding of the response. The first section provides a brief analysis of the conceptualization of the failure of the intelligence bodies prior to the attack that has been used in the UK to develop responsive strategies against Islamic and other forms of terrorism. The second-section analyzes the involvement of the UK agencies before and between the September 11 attacks, while the third section assesses the response of the UK to post-September 11 attacks. Cumulatively, the analysis aims at creating an understanding of the manner the UK has responded to Islamists attacks post-September 11. As such, it shows the ways in which the UK has invested in the weaknesses identified from other states to build better intelligence system that prevents future occurrences of similar or more devastating cases of terrorism.

Conceptualizing intelligence failure that led to September 11 attacks

Significant evidence shows that no universally accepted definition of intelligence failure exists as it can occur at various levels and comes in different forms. Field (2009) simply defines intelligence failure as a process whereby there is a "warning failure" at a pint of the intelligence cycle, intelligence information collected, analyzed, or spread without substantial warning of an attack. Issues such as assuming the reliability of the sources of the terrorist attack during the initial collection of intelligence information and analysis alongside the use of deception techniques contribute to intelligence failure. According to Andrew (2009), organizational inertia and structure can also compound to the failure by failing to challenge the dominating assumptions, thereby, the vulnerability to Islamic terrorist attack. As such, the above makes inarguable that combining them made the U.S. more vulnerable to the September 11 attacks.

Intelligence failure might also happen at the level of dissemination of intelligence information, where there is the circulation of the information to other liaison partners, intelligence agencies, policy makers, and external bodies. According to Hitchens (2003), the collectors of intelligence information that have made the results have political bases have made the most significant mistakes seldom. The political nature of the intelligence information makes it difficult for the responsible agencies to convince the policy makers of their credibility and reliability, hence, increased likelihood of terrorism. Notwithstanding such, Walker (2002) appreciates that it becomes necessary for the consideration of the limits of intelligence to create a better understanding of the concept of intelligence failure. The limits of intelligence states that intelligence agencies cannot prevent the occurrence of intelligence failures in all cases. As such, the limits of intelligence create a different understanding of intelligence failure as an intermingled process consisting of success and failures, thereby, the need for the adoption of responsive strategies to terrorism post the September 11 attacks in the UK.

Therefore, it is beyond doubt as stated by Benthem (2001) that, the above makes it apparent for the need for the assessment of the response of the United Kingdom post-September 11 attacks. Although Islamic terrorism is not considered a "security agency," they do not improve their security abilities using deception knowledge and techniques of the UK signals intelligence operations. Similarly, evidence of the failure of intelligence can occur at any level as identified above, all, which led to the September 11 attacks (Curtis, 2010).

United Kingdom Intelligence and Islamic Terrorism before September 11 Attacks

Celso (2014) identifies that the governments of the United Kingdom, for decades, have had colluded relationship with the radical Islamic forces to promote sustainability of particular foreign policy objectives. The collusion began during the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union (1979-89) where diplomatic, financial, and military backing was provided by the United Kingdom (Britain) and the United States to the Islamist organizations. The conflict provided the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks with the opportunities to forge connections with the Al Qaeda before that resulted in the orchestration of the terrorist attacks on the West. Significant evidence has it that the United Kingdom has adopted various change strategies to counter Islamic terrorism. For instance, the introduction of the ASCRIBE initiative countered the growth and flourishing of seriously organized crimes through the enhanced definition of the roles of the counter-terrorism agencies. Similarly, the United Kingdom Government created the MI5 to counter the threats of the Islamists Terrorism. As such, considering this provides opportunities for the analysis of the lessons the UK learnt from its past relationship with the Islamists prior to the September 11 attacks, thereby, better understanding of the responsive strategies adopted post the attacks (Walker, 2002).

The Response of the UK Government to Post-September 11 attacks to Threats of Islamic Terrorism

Evidently, the previous encounters of the UK with the Islamic Terrorists provided it with significant insights into the weaknesses of its intelligence system and the need for the adoption of responsive strategies against Islamic terrorism. However, Hewitt (2008) argues that the response of the United Kingdom Government response to the September 11 attacks showed a "reactive," politicized, and short-term mentality. Such is evidenced by the quick move of the government to introduce Acts such as the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act that focused on the adoption of strategies aiming at prevention of terrorist attacks across the United Kingdom. The main characteristic of the act was its provision for the deportation and internment of the non-United Kingdom citizens who were believed to be involved in activities contributing to terrorism. Similarly, the act advocated the adoption of other strategies such as the stricter measures related to immigration and border controls to prevent entry of terrorists to the United Kingdom. As such, the move of the government of the United Kingdom to view terrorism as a "foreign" entity that could be managed using "foreign policy" signified the reactive, politicized mentality, and short-term nature of the strategies adopted by the UK government (Segell, 2006).

As a component of the United Kingdom Government's contest strategy, the UK intelligence faced significant pressure that resulted in the consideration of different approaches to prevent terrorism in the UK. One of such strategies was increasing the allocation of resources to the intelligence community alongside its structural extension to enhance its effectiveness in adopting the desired countering mechanisms. After the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the UK Government increased the allocation of the resources to the intelligence community, resulting in the expansion of the agencies' capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorism. The expansion of the United Kingdom's intelligence community focuses on the external threats that increased susceptibilities of the countries to terrorism and provide it with the desired basis for pursuing its goal of countering domestic terrorism (Dokos, 2007).

However, empirical evidence as presented by Curtis (2010) shows that the decision to increase resource allocation to the intelligence community disadvantaged other sectors significantly. For example, the decision arguably affected the GCHQ that received 6% of the total budgetary allocation, thereby, increasing the challenges caused by the revolution of the global communications system. Indeed, the heightened visibility of the transnational Islamic terrorism as evidenced by the September 11 attacks highlighted the weaknesses with the SIGINT networks of security intelligence across the world. For instance, it showed that the intelligence system used by states such as the U.S. And the UK had analytical deficits evidenced by the disparities in the intelligence information collected and analyzed. As such, the Government of the United Kingdom acted in response to the identified weaknesses by increasing the personnel involved in countering terrorism and increased resource allocation by 40% to address the crisis. Despite the above prompt initiatives, Benthem (2001) recognizes that the war on terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan provided significant evidence of the weaknesses that existed in the intelligence network of the UK and the U.S. Governments.

Moreover, the United Kingdom responded to the post-September 11 terrorist attacks by doubling its resources devoted to preventing terrorism, including strategies such as transferring some of the personnel back to the London to work with the MI5 in countering terrorism. Similarly, the United Kingdom Government responded in its overseas states by recruiting security agents who ran disruption of terrorist operations and maintained the stability of the liaison arrangements of countering terrorism. The MI5 received significant budgetary allocations in 2004 that was used to increase intelligence activities such as surveillance of terrorist activities, interception of their communication, and agent running, thereby, early detection and prevention of terrorist activities. According to Curtis (2010), such strategies contributed significantly to the effective regionalization of the intelligence service in which the intelligence analysts gained close access to hot spots of activities linked directly to terrorism. Significant outcomes such as the arrests and conviction in the operation RHYME or the gas litmus plot and the CREVICE of the Fertilizer plot attest to the effectiveness of the MI5 in countering criminal related activities in the UK and other parts of the world. As a sign of recognition of the effectiveness of the efforts of the intelligence system in countering terrorism, the UK government doubled the employment capacity of the intelligence personnel from 2004-2008 (Celso, 2014).

Moreover, fusion bodies were formed across the UL to facilitate and enhance intelligence efforts in countering terrorism across the states' institutional boundaries. In 2003, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC) was formed to set the levels of terrorism threats for the UK and collaborate with smaller security bodies such as the police units involved in the countering of Islamic terrorism. The collaboration between the intelligence teams of different agencies enhanced the coordination of information between the intelligence communities alongside the dissemination and analysis of intelligence information related to terrorism. Furthermore, significant evidence presented by Benthem (2001) shows that the Government of the United Kingdom responded post-September 11 attacks by increasing the resources allocated to other intelligence bodies such as the National Security Advice and National Infrastructure Security Coordination. Such actions resulted in the enhancement of the efforts aimed at countering of Islamic terrorism alongside the protection of the state over the core utilities.

Apart from the above responses witnessed in the UK after the September 11 attacks, societal consequences also became evident as the intelligence bodies tried to prevent the occurrences of future terrorist attacks. Among the societal consequences witnessed in the UK, include suspicion, discriminatory backlash, and censorship that prompted the government to adopt heightened interventions of countering terrorism. Before the attacks, most of the activities of the foreigners or the UK citizens were viewed as innocent acts with no undesired intent to the society (Dokos, 2007). However, it is apparent that after the attack, such activities were viewed with great suspicion, especially in relation to the perception the people had towards the Islamists. In response to this, the government stressed the need for the adoption of various interventions such as reporting unusual behaviors and ensuring the vigilance alongside developing interventions that aimed at ensuring safety and security of the victims of terrorism. Censorship was also adopted as evidenced by the reduction of the television programs that featured events similar to the September 11 attacks to ensure social stability and existence. Similarly, Bamford (2004) recognizes that adopting censorship in the United Kingdom, and the United Stated provided the opportunities for healing of those affected directly and indirectly by the attacks.

Under the traditional paradigm of the law related to terrorism, act of terrorism is considered as international behaviors and not acts of war. As such, the treaties of the international criminal law dictate that states are obliged to adopt strategies most applicable and useful to criminalize acts and to come up with appropriate strategies for cooperating with other countries to counter terrorism. Post September 11 attacks on the U.S. became an important turning point in the UK characterized with the expansion of the law enforcement approaches of combating terrorism. For instance, it became apparent that the United Kingdom Security Council adopted anti-terrorism act that obliged all the member states to criminalize the provision or collection of funds used for supporting terrorist activities in the UK. The United Kingdom adopted acts that supported the initiatives adopted by the U.S. such as intensifying the exchange of intelligence information related to terrorist actions and movements across the world (Curtis, 2010).

It is largely appreciated that having a "real" intelligence system is the most effective way a state can use to pre-empt or prevent terrorism. The Government of the United Kingdom adopted strategies that focused significantly on the heightening of the intelligence functioning. As identified in the earlier analysis, intelligence failures occur in different stages of the intelligence cycle, such as collection, dissemination, and analysis. Significant analysis of the September 11 attacks shows that most of the factors that contributed to the faults of the intelligence system. Basing on this, the UK embraced strategies that aimed at preventing intelligence failures that could increase its vulnerabilities to terrorism attacks. Actions such as doubling the intelligence personnel involved in the running of different intelligence efforts such as direction, collection, analysis and dissemination attest to the dedication of the UK Government to ensuring the prevention of the Islamic terrorism (Celso, 2014).

Other than the agencies involved in prevention and pre-empting of terrorism identified above, the UK government also devoted most of its resources for the creation of other small intelligence agencies that could aid in the prevention of Islamic terrorism. For instance, significant analysis has it that the Government of the United Kingdom increased the provision of resources for the creation of other intelligence agencies such as the Anti-Terrorist Branch also known as the SO 13. The Anti-Terrorist Branch was formed as a unit that engaged in the investigation of terrorist activities and conducting pre-emptive operations. Whereas the above analysis has shown that the role of the M15 was mostly to collect information on the terrorists, the Anti-Terrorist Branch, assisted the local police by conducting operations that aimed at preventing terrorist attacks in the UK (Andrew, 2009).

Similarly, the post-September 11 attacks saw the creation of two other intelligence agencies that performed the purpose of acting as the foreign arm of the intelligence network of the UK. Of the two-intelligence systems are the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) also known as the M16 that handled the responsibility of acquiring and providing information related to actions and to the intentions of the people outside the British Islands. Essentially, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) is handled with the responsibility of collecting human intelligence across the borders using agents and informers who are in constant interaction with the people across the world. The other agency formed to ensure prevention and pre-empting of terrorist attacks is the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) that is handled with the responsibility of collecting signals intelligence related to terrorist acts and interactions. Moreover, after the September 11 attacks, the United Kingdom appreciated the need for the adoption of terrorism prevention and pre-empting strategies such as restriction of air travel across the world with the aim of regulating the possibilities of security threats. Measures to ensure safety of public spaces such as increasing the number of police conducting police patrols and increasing surveillance signified the change strategies adopted by the UK in response to the terrorism (Bamford, 2004).