The utility of force in the modern age

Rupert Smith, the Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Vintage Books, 2007)

New models of war: British General Rupert Smith's philosophy in the Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World

"Industrial war no longer exists," states British General Rupert Smith in the book The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (Smith 4). In other words, traditional 'total' conflicts waged on a global level between nations where two armies batter each other's defenses are no longer common. In the wake of September 11th, says Smith, the U.S., UK, and other major powers must realize that often the major instigators of conflicts are non-states who are waging war against other non-state actors -- against 'the West' or 'secularism' rather than 'America' ' (Smith 20). Low-level conflicts constantly simmer and only occasionally erupt in the new, non-industrialized world of warfare.

Because of the strength of the major powers, insurgent forces often try to catch nation-states unawares. "The enemy is an adversary, an opponent, not a sitting target. Response and adjustment are as much a part of a plan of attack unfolding as the original blueprint" (Smith 9). The new strategies deployed by most enemies of the West are wars of harassment, rather than actual engagement. This enables small, guerrilla, non-state actors to effectively wage war, despite the fact they have less manpower and military power. Non-state actors operate outside of the conventional rules of industrial warfare: they are unpredictable.

In industrial warfare, an entire state is mobilized against a formal adversary. But the death of costly industrial warfare should not be celebrated, cautions Smith: rather it is a shift to more lawless and tactical form of violence. The new form of warfare is simply costly in a different way. After the devastation manifested at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the favored strategy during the Cold War was that of mutually assured destruction (MAD) between the U.S. And USSR, which froze the world into a state of stability, albeit an uneasy, often terrified peace (Smith 5). However, in today's modern environment, individuals with little to lose are willing to risk personal destruction. And modern warfare, although it is less overt, is never-ending and demands constant intelligence-gathering. This kind of flexibility that challenges nations which would often prefer to be fighting 'the last war' they fought, rather than the current one.

During the Cold War, both adversaries 'played by the same rules.' The Soviet Union was even more of a perfect model of an industrialized war society, in which all resources were focused upon defeating its main adversary at the expense of economically providing for its people. But after the dissolution of the bipolar balance of power, non-state actors could openly claim the loyalty of small bands of nationals and co-religionists within the fragmented new world order. Industrialized warfare came into being with the modern nation-state, with its capability of mobilizing large numbers of relatively expendable soldiers. These individuals were organized by a larger, centralized intelligence. Today, given that various non-state cells may not be in communication with one another, there is no overarching plan -- each battle, each small attack is equally important as fighting for victory in the larger 'war' (Smith 331). The new war is local, not industrial.