The war of Tripoli

¶ … war of Tripoli

As a young republic, America fought a war with the Barbary pirates who plied the waters of the Mediterranean in early nineteenth century. The Tripolitan war which took place between 1801 and 1805 opposed American and North African forces. The African states were the Sultanate of Morocco, and the Regencies of Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli which, at the time, belonged to the Ottoman Empire. However, few American historians have dedicated lengthy studies to the First Barbary War. There are a few reasons which could account for this situation. First of all, the war was rather short-lived; secondly, it took place far from the North American continent. There is also another aspect to consider here, namely that the Tripolitan War was in fact the end of a rather degrading period in national history as America was forced to pay tribute to the despotic North African regimes. Nonetheless, the importance of this war cannot be denied. The Tripolitan war was the first war America fought on foreign soil; it marked the birth of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and last but not least, it produced several was heroes which are still remembered today. This paper strives to paint a comprehensive picture of the First Barbary War by looking at its causes, development, most prominent figures, and aftermath.

The Ottomans conquered North Africa in the seventh century. By 710, the Muslim religion had reached Gibraltar which separates the Iberian Peninsula from Africa. However, it is important to note here that although Islam remained deeply rooted in the Muslim religion, over time the relationship between the Barbary States and the sultan gradually weakened due to distance and primitive communication. This, in turn, generated local fights for power as control from the authorities in Constantinople was becoming weaker and weaker. In these states, regimes changes were sudden and often violent irrespective of the name the local leader assumed: dey (Algiers), bey (Tunis), emperor (Morocco), pasha (Tripoli). This atmosphere of political uncertainty was accentuated by scarce resources, and sizable populations in cities like Tunis, Algiers, Tripoli or Tangier where people depended on regular supplies of imported food. This factor, in fact, can account for North African piracy: the Barbary States were encouraged to practice piracy by the economic prosperity of Europe and the United States, coupled with the African need to purchase food.

The sea was extremely important to North African states which often preyed on poorly armed merchant vessels on the waters of the Mediterranean Sea, and Spanish, Italian and Greek coastal towns. A significant change in their situation took place in the sixteenth century, when the Christian reconquest of Spain meant many Muslims living in Spain were forced to abandon their homes and flee to North Africa. This wave of emigration from Spain to North Africa increased the feeling of bitterness, and the desire for revenge as entire populations had lost their homes and wealth in the face of Christian persecution. Despite the fact that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, France, Britain, Spain and Sicily all sent troops to Africa in an attempt to confront the Barbary States, piracy continued. Moreover, small states were easy targets for pirates, particularly the small states of the Italian peninsula such as the Papal States, Tuscany, Venice and Sardinia.

In 1801 Tripoli declared war on the United States of America because they refused to pay tribute as they had been paying Tunis and Algiers. When the war started, the American navy had only existed for a generation. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Congress had sold off every vessel of the navy following the Revolutionary War. However, in 1798 Congress passed a bill enabling the navy to purchase 12 warships in order to face France. When the news of Tripoli's war declaration reached the United States, President Jefferson ceased some of his naval reductions as the country needed to increase its naval capabilities. Fortunately, American naval architects crafted the 44-gun Constitution, a 204ft long frigate. North African states were also forced to rely solely on their naval power which ironically, had been built using slaves. Despite its reduced proportions compared to its European counterpart, American navy troops were sent to Tripoli.

In July 1801, Commodore Dale, who had been ordered to lead the American squadron for the blockade of Tripoli, reached Gibraltar. To his surprise, upon his arrival he found Murad Rais, Tripoli's Admiral who was waiting for the American ships. Dale blockaded the corsairs but by September, Murad Rais successfully organized an escape by sending his men overland via Tetuan to Tripoli, while he himself went by a British ship to Malta, and then returned to Tripoli. In May 1802, three Tripolitanian vessels broke the American blockade and entered the open sea. In June they managed to capture an American ship, the Franklin; in addition, they held the ship members hostage, and the United States had to pay $5,000 for their ransom.

1803 was also a successful year for Tripoli. It continued to penetrate the American blockade which in turn, ensured regular supply of food and ammunition between Tripoli and the rest of North Africa. Moreover, in October 1803, Tripoli captured one of American's biggest ships, the Philadelphia, with a crew of over 300 men. During the following couple of months, American efforts were focused on regaining the Philadelphia. In December they took Tripoli's Mastico but this victory did not compensate for the loss of the Philadelphia. Because they realized regaining it was nearly impossible, the American troops set it afire in February 1804.

Following an unsuccessful attempt to bomb the city of Tripoli in the summer of 1804, Commodore Preble decided to withdraw on September 7, and only keep two American ships in order to keep up a semblance of blockade. The failure of the American navy to defeat Tripoli led some members of the American Government, as well as Navy superiors to turn to the serious consideration of a plan which had been put together by James L. Cathcart, American consul to Tripoli. It was now left to William Eaton, consul to Tunis, to put the plan into practice. The plan consisted of a political coup in Tripoli which would have led to the overthrow of Yusuf Pasha, and the establishment of a pro-American pasha in the person of Yusuf's brother, Ahmad Qaramanli. Ahmad had been deposed by his brother more than a decade before. Ahmad would be taken back to Tripoli where on his appearance the people would rise against Yusuf.

However, when Eaton returned to Tunis in March 1802 following his secret meeting with Cathcart, he realized his plan was highly unlikely to succeed because Yusuf had found out about it, and had offered his brother, Ahmad, the governorship of Derna as well as security for his family. Behind the brothers' arrangement was the Bey of Tunis. As Ahmad was getting ready to depart for Derna, Eaton used every means to persuade him not to leave. Although he appeared to have accepted not to go to Derna, Ahmad changed his mind again when the Bey of Tunis threatened to withdraw his protection if he did not accept the position promised by his brother. Eaton had to step in again. He told Ahmad he would be arrested and deported to America unless he went to Malta to wait for American troops and financial support. Eventually the prince agreed to wait in Malta.

Once in Derna, Ahmad was promised arms and ammunition for a coup which would represent the first step towards the capture of Tripoli. However. Ahmad's political influence in the province was very small; soon, the Americans had to acknowledge that Ahmad's arrival in Cyrenaica could not mobilize the province to support their cause in Tripoli. As his revolt failed miserably in Derna, Ahmad was forced to flee in 1804, and go to Egypt. Here Eaton and Ahmad signed a treaty which stipulated that in return for his accession to the throne of Qaramanli, the prince would ensure American influence in Tripoli. Eaton brought together forces from Europe, Asia, and a few Arabic countries which would support American naval troops. Their goal was to seize control of Derna, and then march along the whole coast of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, capturing each important town in its way, and then finally attacking Tripoli. The march took six weeks, and when they reached the surroundings of Derna, after a grim assault, the town was taken and the American flag planted on its port battery. However, vitory was short-lived because they were soon surrounded by reinforcements sent to protect Derna.

Since their attempts to force Tripoli to surrender had been inefficient, American authorities were now looking for the possibility of negotiation. Also, the crew of Philadelphia was still captive in Tripoli which increased the need to negotiate peace. In June 1804, Colonel Tobias Lear, then American Consul-General in Algiers, was sent in for that purpose. The initial negotiations between the Pasha and Lear fell through because the demands of the former were unacceptable to the American part. Lear and Comodore Barron, the commander of the American fleet in the Mediterranean agreed in 1805 that Ahmad was no longer useful to the American cause. As a result, Lear met with Muhammad D'Ghies, Tripoli's Minister for foreign affairs, and eventually reached an agreement. War prisoners would be mutually exchanged, and America had to pay a sum of $60, 000 to Tripoli. However, this sum was considerably smaller than what the Pasha had asked for in 1804. Legendary Commodore Charles Morris wrote, "On the 3rd of June, a peace was concluded with Tripoli by Colonel Lear, who had been authorized by the President to negotiate."

One of the most important consequences of the war was its power to produce some of the earliest American war heroes. In the absence of news correspondents, and the far-reaching means the press has today, the accounts of the war were given by the people directly involved in it. Letters and dispatches were sent to American newspapers who often published them in their entirety. It is hard to imagine that there were no photographs, no video footage of the war. This was, in fact, the only connection between the American public, and the war going on in Northern Africa. However, Americans romanticized the war and its most prominent figures would become real American heroes whose stories even influenced contemporary popular culture.

Despite the fact that America had been humiliated by being force to pay tribute, the Federalists were opposing the war. Any analysis of the domestic response to a war, in this case, the First Barbary War, must include the points-of-view of both sides. On the one hand, Republicans supported Jefferson's decision to go to war, and praised the skills and might of the American navy. On the other hand, the Federalists criticized Jefferson's decision to go to war, and even his choice of words in the case of public addresses.

Republican editor James J. Wilson's article, a New Year's Report, published in the New Jersey newspaper, the True American, in January 1805 is clearly very supportive of President Jefferson's actions. Wilson openly declares his support, and praises America's progress in the war. He argues that the war is justified because America had been threatened and humiliated by Tripoli. He invokes strong values such as patriotism, and a sense of national duty. Also, he argues that "the skill and bravery" of the American navy had "given an idea of what they can and will do, when necessity commands their employment in such enterprises."

On the other hand, Federalist editors Young and Minns criticize Jefferson for his choice of words on the occasion of an address which also included references to the success of the American Navy. Jefferson had stated that Tripoli was facing the strong energies of America which aimed at multiplying the human species. In this sense, the editors compare America's "energies to multiply the human species by ships' guns" with "giving the French liberty by the guillotine;" comparison which can be explained by the fact that the Federalists regarded the French as America's enemies, and not the British as did Republicans.

National heroes were one of the most important gains of the First Barbary War. Following the war, several naval commanders were celebrated at home thanks to their courage and dedication: "... while Decatur was building the Argus in Boston, Charles Stewart was in Philadelphia building the Siren, John Smith was building the Vixen in Baltimore, and Richard Somers in Norfolk was refitting the Nautilus as a schooner. This new force and new commander marked a revised strategy for the war."

Charles Morris was a prominent figure of American naval history. He was at Stephen Decatur's side during the burning of the Philadelphia in 1804 during the Tripoli War, and the second in command to Isaac Hull when Constitution defeated Guerriere in 1812. Although a very important commander, it is interesting to note that there is no biography of his life. The only writing on his life is his autobiography, first published in 1880, approximately two decades after his death.

The war of Tripoli benefits from extensive coverage in his autobiography. He writes, "The arrangements for the destructions of the Philadelphia in the harbor of Tripoli were soon after determined upon and the officers selected for the enterprise. It was my fortune to be among the number, which probably would not have been the case had I remained on shore duties."

Morris himself realized the fact that the significance of the war extended far beyond the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Tripoli war produced great heroic figures, and represented the true birth of American naval might: "The general arrangements and success of his expedition have become matters of naval history, but, as it was among the earliest of the operations in the Mediterranean which gave reputation to the Navy, and was the means of introducing me to the favorable notice of my brother officers, a statement from me may have sufficient interest to justify the repetition."

However, the greatest hero of the Barbary Wars was, without a doubt, Stephen Decatur. He was the first man to become a national military hero who had not taken part in the American Revolution. He was also the commander of seven frigates who took part in the Barbary Wars, and the War of 1812, and the youngest man to reach the title of captain in American naval history. In the First Barbary War, Decatur was given the command of the brig Argus which he took to the Mediterranean Sea. It was Decatur who captured the enemy ketch, Mastico in December 1803. Moreover, he took the vessel into the U.S. Navy and named it Intrepid; this particular vessel would be used in combat in February 1804 to undertake a night raid into Tripoli harbor, and destroy the former U.S. frigate, Philadelphia, which had been captured by the enemy troops four months prior. Decatur received the status of national hero, and was even praised by British vice admiral, Lord Nelson.

In his biography of Decatur, S. Putnam Waldo captured the essence of the young captain, and added editorial adornments, writing, "few gallant Americans with countless numbers of barbarians met with one common and undistinguished destruction." Waldo added, "Captain Somers's memory has sometimes been assailed by those whose timid and scrupulous system of morals evinces a zeal without knowledge..." Waldo never named these critics. Yet Waldo did remind readers in his 1821 edition of "The Life of Stephen Decatur" that naval men faced the prospect of death; their sacrifice of life "redounds to their glory and their country's weal."