An analysis of technology as prevention for future terror attacks

Terrorism Tech

Technological Innovation as a Weapon Against Terrorism

The United States is regarded as among the world's most vaunted leaders in technology development. Simultaneously, its military denotes one of the most formidable fighting forces in the world, both with respect to its capability to wage war and its capacity to provide defense to the homeland. These claims are inextricably linked, with the United States channeling its technological prowess into the development of greater weaponry, greater defense resources, more effective protective gear for military and defense personnel and a host of computer, communication and media devices that can have a significant impact on preserving the lives of Americans both at home and abroad. And yet, in the face of the threat of terror, many of the technological resolutions applied to military stratagem in the recent past, and indeed many of those which have been regarded as passages to future combat tactics, are now being reexamined in the face of a different type of treat. The guerilla nature of terrorism, the unpredictable mode of this type of warfare, the frequently loosely coordinated networks and the non-incremental approach of random, small-scale attacks intermingled with an occasionally large and catastrophic terrorist event has made the application previously used military strategies either vulnerable or impotent. The diversion from traditional warfare in the face of the terrorism has therefore forced a reevaluation and reapplication of military and defense technologies as a means to strengthening defenses, eliminating threats and staving off potential future attacks.

While this has not necessarily invoked a change in the overall thrust of technology, which has focused on the refinement of such now prominent instruments as unmanned aerial drone devices for surveillance and offensive striking; communication and surveillance technologies for the gathering of crucial preventative intelligence; and computer technologies both for protection against hacking networks and for the analysis of data or the gathering of information. The result has been the initiation of a specific avenue of innovation through which is developed a set of priorities relating technological development to the prevention of terrorism. This is informed by a history which has demonstrated both the failures and successes of prevention in this precarious area of defense and also by an industry of creativity, innovation and the imagination to apply technological ingenuity to the real and pressing dangers of the global terrorism crisis. The discussion hereafter will address both the defense culture surrounding the application of technology to terrorism defense and the practical realities of this field with respect to past incidences, present conditions and future expectations.

As the current scenario denotes, the establishment of specific groups and agencies dedicated to the application of technology to terrorism defense would emerge with the rising awareness of the danger's presented to the western world by terrorism. Accordingly, such symposiums as the Force Protection Demonstrations would come into play in the 1990s, inclined by the domestic (World Trade Center Bombing-1993) and global events (Facility housing U.S. soldiers attacked in Saudi Arabia-1996) to create a context for the meeting of "military and civilian personnel from the U.S. Armed Forces, as well as federal, state and local homeland security, law enforcement and other first-responder personnel from throughout the United States, and defense media."

The purpose of the annual event is to provide demonstration, information and access to the technologies now being refined for the purposes of combating terrorism. Such symposiums are an official and government sanctioned means to proliferating this technology so as to allow decision-makers in agencies and localities throughout the United States to contribute to and participate in the defense of the nation. Accordingly, "the Force Protection Demonstrations were initiated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1997 as a result of the terrorist bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia the previous year. They have become a means of assuring that leaders responsible for physical security and force protection can stay abreast of evolving and advancing technology to counter increasing terrorist activity against personnel, equipment, and infrastructure -- in military settings as well as other government activities at home and in foreign locations."

This is the underlying mission for the military as it grapples with a threat that is quite often unseen and most characteristically unpredictable. This would, of course, only be the initiation in America's awareness of the threat truly represented by terrorism. Within a year of the inception of the FPED, terrorist efforts directed against the United States and its friends and allies would reach new heights of visibility, sophistication and coordination. Accordingly, "on Aug. 7, 1998, the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were bombed by terrorists, leaving 258 people dead and more than 5,000 injured."

This would be closely followed by the 1999 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, which was docked in a Yemen port. The collective of these events would demonstrate America's relative lack of readiness for and its relative military disconnect from the danger reflected in the threat of terrorism. With the events of September 11th, 2001, which felled the World Trade Center in New York, knocked a hole into the side of the Pentagon and sent a fourth commercial airliner aground in a Pennsylvania field.

One of the deadliest days in America history also left no doubt that considerable changes are needed in America's defense policy to contend with the nature of such warfare. The research encountered here demonstrates that quite in fact, it was a failure to avail itself the various technologies potentially at its disposal that prevented the government in its various agencies to tie together the various clues pointing to the approach of 9/11. Indeed, "one of the most painful things about examining the events leading up to the September 11 hijackings is realizing just how close the terrorists were to having their plot disrupted. Fifteen years ago, stopping terrorism relied on old-fashioned tools: strict physical security at vulnerable facilities, intelligence gathering by government agents, vigilance on the part of all citizens, and a sense of community in which we all do what we can to protect each other."

This denotation of 'old-fashioned tools' is especially useful to the discussion here. As the text by Ham & Atkinson (2002) goes on to argue, there have been significant developments especially in America's capabilities with respect to information technology. Its role as the leading force in the infrastructural proliferation of high speed fiber-optics networks allowing for advanced surveillance techniques and its primacy in enhancing web and computer technologies to meet highly sophisticated demands have made the United States a nation distinctly capable of finding innovative and intelligent ways to provide itself with defense against terrorist threats. As the 2002 text would contend, "the IT revolution has given us many tools -- wireless data networks, encryption, powerful miniature computer chips, the global Internet, data mining software, and many more -- that weren't available for domestic security just a few years ago.

To this way of thinking, the argument frequently posited by public officials and by the 9/11 Commission Report released thereafter would be reinforced, that the defense failures of 9/11 were intelligence failings relating to a misuse or neglect of available technologies. It is thus that the focus of such symposiums as the FPED becomes important for helping always to train a focus on the advancements which have been made in the areas of defense, intelligence and military technology. During this year's conference, the degree of innovation in place is demonstrated by the sheer variety and creativity exhibited by that which is on display. Boasting over 3,300 'commercially available' resources for the improvement of counterterrorism, "This year, FPED VII will cover 20 equipment categories, including: automated entry control systems and equipment; armored and utility vehicles; biometrics; blast protection/mitigation systems; cargo inspection devices; chemical and biological detection, mitigation and protection equipment; communications equipment; delay and denial technology; explosives detection systems; explosive ordnance disposal equipment; fence sensor systems; individual protective equipment; night vision and optics devices; non-lethal weapons and technology; physical security equipment sensor and surveillance systems; robotic vehicles and systems; unattended ground sensors; unmanned aerial vehicles; vulnerability assessment/analysis software tools; and waterside security equipment."

This emphasis is supported by recent past instances in which a degree of success has been demonstrated in foiling terrorist plots through the proper and sensible use of available technologies. To this point, past instances reveal that the application of technology is quite frequently less an issue of capability or feasibility but instead implicates more directly issues of budgeting and political priority. Evidence suggests that with the intensifying evidence of the threats represented by terrorism in the late 1990s, the tandem of President Bill Clinton and Director of the CIA George Tenet would work toward an increase in the budgeting which allowed for technological enhancement of intelligence and surveillance efforts. Though Tenet would still be the CIA head for the period of the Bush Administration which occupied 9/11, this would be a marked transition in priorities, with the new regime significantly scaling back advancements made in the funding of intelligence technologies. The foolishness of this reversal of priorities would be clearly demonstrated in the contrast between the results of intelligence efforts on 9/11 and those just two years prior.

After the resignation of Tenet, who submitted as his official reason for departure the desire to spend more time with his family, his spokesman noted that "no one in the U.S. government was more aggressive in calling attention to and dealing with the threat of terrorism prior to 9/11 than was George Tenet.' The CIA's counterterrorism budget increased 50% between fiscal 1997 and fiscal 2001, while staffing went up 60%."

This ultimately resulted in an increased level of effectiveness during those years of assessing and averting terrorist plots, highlighted by the 1999 foiling of al Qaeda's millennium hijacking plan. Here, a carefully synchronized set of airliner takeovers was to strike at prominent and highly populated points within the U.S. Or utilize the hostages onboard to negotiate for the release of previously captured terrorists. However, during Clinton's final month as president, '"in the period between December 1999 and early January 2000, [The 9/11 Commission] read, 'information about terrorism flowed widely and abundantly.'"

The report goes on to indicate that, due to widespread fear that terrorists, in particular those associated with the well-established threat of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network, would seek to take advantage of the possibility of a Y2K computer glitch meltdown, agencies were encouraged to share information and to seek improvements in the defense of information technology to hacking vulnerabilities.

The ultimate outcome would be the disruption of a potentially catastrophic terrorist plot with a capacity to inflict exponentially more damage and casualty than would be manifested on September 11th. In addition to strengthening encryption methods, raising security walls to improve the prevention of infiltration to government systems and diminishing the vulnerability of government or airline transmissions, the intelligence community would also utilize its access to cellular transmission interception technologies not just to trace the correspondences of terrorists but also to use cellular devices as beacons for the relaying of a wealth of data. Following a 1999 hijacking in India by Islamic Pakistani nationals, the international intelligence community kicked these technologies into high gear and experienced what should likely today be considered the greatest preventative success yet experienced with respect to technology and the threat of terrorism.

Quite to the point, officials in the United States and Pakistan were able to connect a primary suspect on the ground named Latif with a series of communications that would ultimately connect all of the dots. As a result, "part of the design began to unravel on December 25, a day after IC814 was hijacked, when the intelligence agencies intercepted a message from the hijackers in Kandahar to their source in Mumbai. The hijackers were keen to know from their friends in India about the fallout of the hijack. The call was made on a mobile phone an d it was subsequently found that several calls were made form the same number to Kathmandu and Karachi in the preceding two days. Information gathered from these dalls led the police to zero in on Latif, who in turn was updating a source in Karachi on every aspect of the fallout, from the Government reaction to public sympathy towards the hostages."

Once officials were led to Latif, they were able to disarm a plot that threatened to put as many as twelve hijacked commercial flights into the air with the intent of being used as missiles against strategic targets. The offshoot would be some template for combating terrorism. Of course, it bears noting that in addition to the fact that a change in administration and leadership philosophy in the United States would make it more vulnerable by the approach of 9/11, it may also be suggested that the terrorist cells had learned much from both their previous successes and from the foiled Millennium Plot. Namely, the duration of time which had passed between the hijacking and the intent to strike a target was far too great, allowing intelligence and defense agencies to make the necessary connections to intervene. With 9/11, the terrorists would not repeat this error, acting quickly to coordinate the hostile takeover of four airliners and approach targets faster than a decision could be reached on how to address the situation.

This would highlight the advancement made by terrorists in the sophistication and focus of such attacks. Thus, it simultaneously highlights the pressing need for advancements in technology and the intelligent application of such technology to the prevention of terrorism. Surveillance issues in particular have occupied focus, with the apparent ease of permeation of U.S. borders and public spaces such as airports of known terrorists well recognized in the intelligence community. Many of the perpetrators of the 9/11 hijackings were in fact already on terror watch lists and due for arrest if spotted, but were nonetheless able to commit their plot to almost perfect detail. This denotes a shortcoming in the area of surveillance or the use of surveillance technology. In the U.S., leaders have for years grappled with the drive to establish the most effective and appropriate means to employing one such technological device. The use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), both in private institutions and public spaces, has been in effect in a variety of capacities in its history. CCTV is a closed-loop broadcast which, contrary to public broadcasts that operate on transmitted frequency, is made feasible through an exclusive connection between a camera or set of cameras and a monitor or set of monitors. Such technology enables a transmitting source to broadcast its message only to selected receivers.

The ways in which public leaders have chosen to utilize Closed Circuit Television in recent years have been shaped by a confluence of technological progress and recent cultural trends. And due to the combined evolution in technological capabilities over the last decade -- which has led to the almost limitlessly expansive digital universe -- and the growing public interest in finding more effective ways to establish security against criminality, the dominant use of CCTV in the security industry is today greater than it has ever been.

Something which makes CCTV so attractive as a means of law-enforcement, public surveillance and internal security is the relative simplicity of its design. The technology required for such a means of security is well within the range of the modest economy terrain to even a convenience store clerk. "Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is a television transmission system in which live or prerecorded signals are sent over a closed loop to a finite and predetermined group of receivers, either via coaxial cable or as scrambled radio waves that are unscrambled at the point of reception."

This most basic model requires nothing more than a coaxial cable, a camera and a monitor. This last item is essentially a television without tuning receptors.

Further research denotes that expanding certain technological capabilities within the realm of CCTV surveillance could have a dramatic impact on the ability of Homeland Security agencies to locate and apprehend individuals who possess proven and known threats to security. For instance, Ham & Atkinson refer to the prospects of "face recognition technology that can detect known terrorists as they move through crowds at vulnerable events such as the 2002 Winter Olympics."

It is conceivable that had such technology been availed to air safety and airport security personnel that the significantly documented period of heightened intelligence chatter in the summer leading up to 9/11 might have produced the apprehension of known terrorist plots.

This is to say that in the case of 9/11, even a relatively accessible form of technology such as this was poorly proliferated such that some of the highest traffic international airports in the United States could be accessed by individuals with well-known records of involvement with terrorist networks, interaction with other convicted or killed terrorists and personal criminal records or fugitive statuses were able to exit and enter the United States, its flight schools, its airports and its commercial airliners without fear of detection. This would prove a catastrophic misuse or under-use of existing technologies.

Indeed, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 highlighted to the rest of the industrial world the fundamental need for strong and meaningful routes to security. Naturally, the growing abilities becoming through digital technology and video surveillance became a purposeful avenue through which to explore the most optimal way to achieve such an end. Governmental emphasis and a public demand created the drive toward new security legislation. In 2002, such legislation appeared, and attempted to incorporate all of the above consumer and video law-enforcement devices into one cohesive strategy of public surveillance. Thus, "Part 11 of the UK Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill (ATCS) will allow automated surveillance of the private lives of a substantial proportion of the population through analyzing the pattern of their electronic communications. The powers are deliberately broad, and can be exercised quite generally for non-terrorist as well as terrorist investigations."

This would highlight a sense that such technologies and the effective application thereof could be considered dominant even in the face of potential privacy concerns. This highlights the philosophical and political challenges which also often intercede with the selected route of application for certain technologies. Indeed, this controversial note is perhaps even further emphasized by the argument of some that the application of available technologies with greater innovation in the field of warfare will have the impact of improving security against the threat of terrorism. As with many of the preventative measures connoted by surveillance either in terms of monitoring transmissions or in terms of using video surveillance and facial recognition in public spaces, the approach of waging warfare against specific nations for their alleged support of terrorist activities has the proclivity to generate objections both in terms of the rightness of such acts and in terms of their effectiveness.

That stated, it should be understood that a primary objective in the innovation of technologies for prevention of terrorism is the creation of weaponry that enhances military capabilities. From a strategic and theoretical perspective, there is a strong, even dominant, contingent in America's decision and lawmaking bodies which supports the idea that terrorism can be prevented through military measures. That noted, the improvement of technologies for warfare has to this juncture proven useful in certain aspects of the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The use of Predator Drones especially, both for carrying out tactical surveillance and small scale strategic attacks, would be significant in helping U.S. soldiers to fight conflicts on difficult and dangerous terrain while reducing casualties.

As Enderle (2004) denotes, there are myriad justifications for the increased use of this type of technology, which increasingly moves soldiers out of harm's way. As the article indicates, "remote controls are relatively inexpensive and would allow the drivers to operate in comfort and safety from remote locations. We continue to have folks out of work and manufacturing plants that are underused. Rather than shipping more potential hostages to Iraq, why don't we put them to work here building things that make the folks already over there safer and more effective?"

This denotes an argument in favor of technologies that can increasingly diminish the types of wartime casualties that have been all too common in Iraq. The presence of so-called Improvised Explosive Devices has contributed to the maiming and fatality of thousands of American soldiers whose patrols might have perhaps been carried out by unmanned tanks and aerial devices. The more effective and safer carrying out of tactical maneuvers would have the effect not just of removing soldiers from harm's way but also of making the war effort more effective and less costly. Reducing the psychological and physical taxation of war on American soldiers might be considered a primary objective in improving the war's likelihood of succeeding in its objectives of removing terror agencies from power and replacing them with a system of democratic order.