Thomas Hobbes and egoism in Leviathan

Thomas Hobbes and Egoism in "Leviathan"

There is, as we shall see, a deep sense in which Hobbes's values are individual rather than universal, but it is not simply a matter of having an 'egoistic' moral psychology. Motivation in Hobbes's account is necessarily egoistic only in a nugatory, definitional sense: each person strives to fulfill his own desires. This does not mean that the contents of those desires cannot be concerned with the good of others. The definitions of the passions which Hobbes supplies in chapter 16 of Leviathan include 'Desire of good to another, benevolence, good will, charity. If to men generally, good nature'. (Hobbes, 34) It is true that Hobbes did tend to explain the passions in terms of self-interest, as when he wrote that 'Griefe, for the Calamity of another, is pitty; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe'; (Hobbes, 36) but it is often unclear in such cases whether 'ariseth from' explains the feeling in the sense of analyzing its true content or in the sense of pointing to its causal predecessor. The origin of many of these definitions is found in Hobbes's early summary of Aristotle's Rhetoric; Aristotle is often as ambiguous as Hobbes and almost as reductive. Many early writers on economics and most modern economists have assumed that men are egoistic; thus they have ruled out altruism (Boonin-Vail, 31). If they use the term 'self-interest', they mean only egoism. They are here taken to be, at least implicitly, against the aprioristic idea that economics can use an assumption of self? interest that means merely interests of the self, or self-perceived interests, and which coherently embraces both egoism and altruism without thereby being vacuous.

Psychological Egoism and Leviathan

For instance, in Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes assumes that 'of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own Good' (Hobbes, 88). All apparent acts of altruism are to be explained as disguised self-seeking. Hobbes found the idea of a person's benefiting another for the other's sake to be at best an implausible and possibly a priori inconsistent, view of human motivation. In John Aubrey's Brief Lives, we are told that when asked why Hobbes had given alms to a beggar, Hobbes replied that it was to relieve his own distress at seeing the beggar's distress (Becker, 4) F.Y. Edgeworth states that 'the first principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest' (von Hayek, 16). Though he later admits that in reality 'man is for the most part an impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian' (102). So the assumption is merely a generally useful one for Edgeworth. Gary Becker rigorously and consistently applies basic economic assumptions to areas normally considered outside the field of economics (Ryan, 213). He admits the existence of altruism (and that it is part of 'rationality'), but even he assumes that this must be a separate motive, with others, from self-interest as used by economics, which is 'assumed to dominate all other motives, with a permanent place also assigned to benevolence to children' (Shapin & Schaffer, 17). So Becker follows Edgeworth's one-hundred? years-older opinion in finding the self-interest assumption extremely fruitful though not completely true. As Hill (56) and Hume (499) have also observed, using other examples, it looks logically necessary to many economists and their critics that the assumption of self? interest cannot be made compatible with altruism. But this is not so. Let us distinguish two false views on altruism:

1.

People are necessarily psychological egoists and hence never altruists. The argument can be put thus: one cannot help others unless one thereby achieves personal satisfaction, in some sense, so apparently altruistic people give up nothing for they are following their self-interest as much as anyone else (Boonin-Vail, 2).

2.

The assumption of self-interest must be false or vacuous because it is obvious that people are often selflessly altruistic. (Ryan, 210)

Hobbes and Ethical Egoism

Consider Hobbes's action of giving alms to a beggar. He stated that he gave only to relieve his own distress. That Hobbes took any interest in the beggar means that the self-perceived interests of Hobbes's included the circumstances of the beggar's. Thus his action was self-interested in the broad aprioristic sense (von Hayek, 111). We can go on to ask whether Hobbes was being egoistic or altruistic. If Hobbes were merely upset at the ugly sight of the beggar, and would rather that he had never seen him, then we can say that his behavior was egoistic: he did not view the beggar as a valuable thing in himself but as a nuisance. This is a natural interpretation to put on Hobbes's explanation of his behavior. But if Hobbes was really taking pity on the beggar as an end in himself, and would wish him to be better off whether or not Hobbes knew about it, then his behavior was altruistic. In both cases we have self-interest in that Hobbes himself has the beggar as one of his interests. In reality, it might well have been that Hobbes both found the beggar a nuisance and had some sympathy with him. So perhaps his gift would be motivated by both irritation and pity (von Hayek, 113). Neither feeling would be more real than the other in the sense that the irritation showed him not to be really altruistic at all or the pity showed him not to be really egoistic at all. Both his egoistic interests and his altruistic interests are objectively his self-perceived interests.

What about ethical egoism. This is a normative notion - i.e. one that informs us how we should behave. Make a note that if psychological egoism is factual then ethical egoism turns out to be rather uninteresting. Because there is little point in advocating that we be self-interested, if we have no other option. But presume that we can decide whether to be wholly self-interested, or to be altruistic to some amount. Should we be self-interested?

The ethical egoist wants to present himself as realistic, considering himself bounded by other egoists who are ever ready to destroy him unless he uses his strength and slyness to the maximum. Such a world does not have to be a complete jungle, because it can be in a person's importance to go into co-operation with others; there is no essential disagreement between self-interest and co-operation (von Hayek, 112). One respected theory with origins in this vision is Hobbesian contractualism, which claims to provide a self-interested basis for caring about morality. But the picture of human nature it starts from is too extreme. Even if self-interest is a dominant motive in many people, it is rarely the only motive. Besides, look around you and you will find many unsung people who do a lot of good for others, without seeking attention or external rewards. And despite the world being full of rampant egoists, this would not give a moral explanation for egoistic behavior. It would not be sufficient to say (maybe correctly) that simply by being an egoist will I supply my own interests, for the problem at issue is whether self-interest only provides individuals with reasonable cause for action. Without a doubt it is both cautious and sometimes morally allowable to look after our own selfish interests when they diverge from those of other people. However ethical egoism goes beyond this - it says that, eventually, it is all an individual ought to be apprehensive about.

Analysis and Conclusion

Ethical egoism is often formulated as a deontological principle: one ought always to do the action that contributes most to one's own welfare. But it can also be formulated as a thesis about the grounds of obligation: the only reason one ought or ought not to do an action is that it will or will not contribute to one's own welfare. Although these two formulations are not identical, they are closely related. If the only reason why one ought to do anything is self-interest, then it follows that one ought always to pursue self-interest; and in fact philosophers who hold the deontological principle usually defend it by appealing to the thesis about the grounds of obligation. Therefore, I shall regard that thesis as the more basic form of ethical egoism.