Disasters Three Mile Island and the Challenger

Disasters

Three Mile Island and the Challenger Disasters

The series of memo's entitled "The Filthy Five from the Three Mile Island Disaster" details how a conflict over the operation of the Three Mile Nuclear Facility, between the Babcock & Wilcox Company and the operators of the Three Mile Island Nuclear facility, led to the greatest nuclear power disaster in the history of the United States. While the builders of the reactor warned the operators that their operating procedures were incorrect, the operators refused to accept the findings of the builders and continued to operate the facility incorrectly, with the result being a nuclear power disaster.

The initial memo, called "Memo 1," explains two incidents where operators did not follow procedures as recommended by the B&W company. (Kelly) In response, came "Memo 2," which was written by the management of the facility and stated that the other operators "responded in the correct manner considering how they have been trained…" (Walters) This is an indication that the operators may have trained in the incorrect procedures, but the memo was worded in such a manner as to divert attention away from those who were responsible for the two initial incidents.

However, Babcock & Wilcox were extremely adamant in Memo 3 that the procedures used by the operators, primarily bypassing the high pressure injection system after a LOCA (Loss Of Coolant Accident), were incorrect and could lead to "core uncovery and possible fuel damage." (Dunn 3) And even though the B&W company followed up with another memo, Memo 4, specifically telling the operators when to bypass the HPI and when not to, the operating managers refused to accept the recommendations of the builders of the plant. (Dunn 4)

Instead the operators wrote the final memo, Memo 5, which stated that they believed that following the procedures outlined by B&W could cause the Reactor Coolant System, RCS, to solidify, and thus did not follow recommended procedures. As a result, the Three Mile Island Facility suffered a catastrophic meltdown as the core became uncovered and the fuel rods began to heat up to a point damaging the entire facility and surrounding area.

Had the operators followed the procedures recommended by the builders of the reactor, the disaster could have been prevented. The operators believed that they knew more about how the reactor worked than those who designed and built it. It was in the grey area between design and actual operation where the operators made their mistake. While sometimes complex machines need minor alterations to the initial design, the operators took this concept too far. They actually believed that their operating experience made them better at diagnosing problems than those who designed the reactor.

As a result of the arrogance of the operators, they continued to bypass the high pressure injector system when they had a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). And as the B&W company predicted, this led to uncovering of the core rods and the subsequent heat buildup. Since the operators were unable to bring the coolant system back online, the heat continued to build until catastrophic damage was done to the reactor.

The next set of memos concentrate on the space shuttle Challenger and the disaster that befell it. These memos involve a problem that engineers discovered on the booster rockets, the O-rings, which were supposed to seal different parts of the rocket together but were in fact failing to do so. While the problem was identified well in advance of the Challenger disaster, the memos indicate that the directors of the shuttle program were more interested in the possible effects to the program's schedule, as well as the costs involved in discovering and fixing the problem, than to the possible dangers this problem posed.

The first memo is a rather straightforward description of the problem and while it states that "Engineers have not yet determined the cause of the problem," (Cook) it does go on to describe possible causes for the O-ring failures. These include the putty used to seal the O-rings, the secondary O-ring itself, or "unidentified, assembly procedures." (Cook) But this memo clearly states that "flight safety has been and is still being compromised by potential failure of the seals." (Cook)

Indicating the focus of the directors of the program, the memo then delves into the potential impact on the program's budget and flight rate. Without even discovering the cause of the problem, the directors are discussing their budget and the effect of this problem on it. One incriminating quote in the memo states "the impact on the FY 1987-8 budget could be immense." (Cook) It is absolutely clear that the most important aspect of the problem of O-ring seal leakage was the potential financial problems associated with it and the impact of the number of flights scheduled.

The second memo responds to the first by describing 12 instances of in-flight O-ring erosion, and gives the "prime suspect" for the cause: the new type of putty used to seal the O-ring. The memo also blames the EPA for the lack of proper putty as the company that made the original putty went out of business due to EPA regulation on the use of asbestos. The memo then indicates that the directors decided that the cheapest solution was the best way to identify the problem. In other words they chose to blame the failure of the O-rings on the problem that had the least expensive and relatively easiest way to fix; new putty. (Davids)