Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War

The Peloponnesian War, fought roughly between 431 and 404 BC, was a conflict between the Greek city-states Athens and Sparta and their respective allies. It was an all-out struggle of ideology for control over what is now the Greek peninsula, encompassing land and sea warfare, the wanton destruction of entire towns and fields, and atrocities of such state that many believe it ended Greece's Golden Age. The predominant historian of the events was Thucydides, who forever changed the way historical documents were written by employing stricter standards of evidence, cause and effect without divine intervention, and a view of political realism based on might rather than right.

Even though he was Athenian, he finds the root cause of the War to be Athenian in nature. After the Trojan War, Athens developed at a more rapid rate than much of the rest of the Hellenic Peninsula, partially due to commerce, partially to location. As Athens became wealthier, its view was to increase its land and power by exporting its nature and system to other parts of the land (I: 13). With this fiscal and political growth, so there was also an increase in arrogance and avarice: "I believe that the trust reason for the quarrel…. Was the growth of Athenians power, which put fear into the [Spartans] and so compelled them into war" (I: 23). Sparta and her allies could not justifiable sit back and do nothing while Athens build a larger navy, army, and slowly began encroaching throughout Hellas.

Certainly, though, the war was not inevitable, but the result of human decision. Sparta had three major "reasons" to attack: 1) The Athenian attack Potidaea, 2) The decision to defend Corcyra against Corinth, and 3) Athens 'decision to restrict all trade with Megara, causing hardship to the rest of Hellas. To the rest of Greece, this proved that Athens had decided it could make decisions for all, and that it would do as it pleased to gain power and land in order to pursue its own agenda (I:68-9).

Athens, however, reminded Sparta that it had taken the brunt of the war with Persia, both in land and at sea, for the good of all Greeks. In fact, their point was that yes, they had an Empire, but that Empire was not made by conquest, but by mutual agreement and protection -- if it was good enough during the War ("after all, we did not take the empire by violence; it was the allies themselves who came and begged us to take command" (I: 75), so it should suffice in peace. Athens counseled Sparta to use caution and care, to find arbitration, to find a way to mitigate the circumstances prior to giving into the fear paradigm, and resultant war.

Make your decision with the slow deliberate care due to important matters, and don't bring trouble on yourselves by giving in to other people's opinions and complaints. Before you go to war, you must realize how unpredictable war is. The longer it lasts, the more it is likely to turn on chance. The odds of disaster are the same for both sides, and no one can see where the dangers lie…. So, while it is still possible for both sides to use good judgment, we ask you not to dissolve the treaty or breathe your oaths, but to submit our differences to arbitration according to the agreement. If not, the Gods who heard the oaths are our witnesses, and once you have started the war, we will do our best to resist wherever you show the way (I: 78).

Nevertheless, despite this rather magnanimous offer, Sparta continued to remain antagonistic toward Athens. Their King, Archidamus, warned the council that there was no income available for war, that Sparta had appropriate sea power, and that the war would last generations if they allowed it to happen:

But do not take arms just yet. Send to them instead, and make demands…. And use the time to prepare our forces. We should acquire allies… who can add a naval force or money to our power… We should also stockpile our own resources. If Athens accepts our demands, so much the better; if not, we'll let two or three years go by and then attack them, if we choose, from a stronger position. And perhaps once they've seen our preparations, and realized that we really do mean to back up our demands, they'll give in more easily… (I: 82).