Tibetan culture and language had always been distinct, yet had always been linked to China -- while the Dali Lama was seen as a worthy one for whom gifts and alms were necessary and the Manchu Emperor was also seen as a revered figure worthy of respect and lay patron, but not a spiritual teacher (Goldstein & Rimpoche 44). But although it shares some cultural ties and history with China, Tibet today also maintains a distinct cultural, unique identity. Monasticism and the Tibetan Theravada Buddhist tradition in general are integral to Tibetan culture in a way that is anathema to modern, communist China. "During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government was responsible for the destruction of more than 6,000 monasteries in Tibet. The contents of these monasteries - religious images and statues - were destroyed or looted, and millions of ancient and priceless manuscripts burnt" (Thurman 9). This hostility continues up to the present day: "In September 2007, State Religious Affairs Bureau Order No. 5 made it illegal for any Tibetan religious leader to recognize reincarnations without their permission and approval" (Thurman 11). Rural Tibet has a startling percentage of individuals who are monks or whose lives revolve around Buddhism, and these ties the Chinese government finds itself continually in the position of thwarting, to uphold the official position of state secularism.

International support for a free Tibet has wavered. For example, even India, despite its own freedom from British control, vacillated during the takeover of Tibet -- fearing China's wrath if it took Tibet's side stymied the leadership, in deference to Chinese...

Tibet unquestionably controlled its own affairs from 1913 to the invasion in 1951 yet "it is equally unquestionable that Chinese leaders in the twentieth century, Nationalist and Communist alike," genuinely "believed that historically Tibet was a part of China and its severance was due to Western Imperialistic efforts (Goldstein & Rimpoche 815). Unfortunately, by the time of the Chinese invasion, few of the monks who dominated Tibetan life understood the language of international diplomacy and could articulate a position of autonomy to articulate their own position. Also "when the final showdown with China came in 1950-1951, Tibet had only a handful of officials who spoke English well," which made securing publicity difficult (Goldstein & Rimpoche 822). Since then, despite the growing prominence and more skilled public relations management by the Dali Lama, "occasional attempts to influence China's human rights policies or its actions in Tibet by threatening commercial sanctions" proved "largely ineffective" during the 1990s (Waley-Cohen 280). But in the twenty-first century, as greater international attention and celebrity support has highlighted the plight of Tibet now Chinese control of the state seems less secure.
Works Cited

Goldstein, Melvyn C. & Gelek Rimpoche. A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State. Berkley: University of California Press, 1991

Thurman, Robert. No Faith in the State. Free Tibet. December 14, 2008. http://www.freetibet.org/files/NoFaithFINAL.pdf

Waley-Cohen, Joanna. The Sextants of Beijing. New York:…