The appropriate role of the courts in controlling the discretion of merger authorities has become one of the key issues in European merger law and policy in recent years. This article investigates judicial review of merger decisions, taking a comparative approach by examining cases from the EU, UK and Germany. We observe an apparent increase in the willingness of the EU and UK courts to scrutinize merger decisions, and a long-standing tradition of close scrutiny in Germany. In respect of the EU and UK, we consider agency theory offers a convincing explanation--that increased scrutiny is explained by the need to enhance the credibility of merger policy. In German
UK Constitution
The Concept of UK Parliamentary Supremacy in the Modern World: Relevant or Remnant?
Parliamentary supremacy, the doctrine explicitly outlined by a.V. Dicey as lying at the foundation of the implicit British Constitution, has long been assumed to be a fundamental and essential aspect of British law and constitutionality, insists that the parliament of the United Kingdom retains ultimate sovereignty, and is ultimately answerable to no other body, domestic or international. Whether or not this is actually the case in real world applications, or indeed whether it has ever been entirely true, is a matter of heavy debate, however. Even at the time of Dicey's first explicit construction of this concept there were perhaps some significant limits on the principle, and the modern world contains many other examples of limitations and controls placed on parliamentary supremacy.
There are several factors and institutions that can be seen as limiting parliamentary supremacy and establishing bodies of law that are perhaps even higher than the British Constitution. Because this Constitution is unwritten, at least in specific and explicit form, it is difficult if not impossible to ascertain precisely where supreme power lies, and the growing importance of international bodies such as the European Union and other international bodies of law serve as further restrictions on parliamentary supremacy. These quite explicit elements and other less codified practical realities serve to limit the degree to which the parliament acts as the truly supreme governmental entity, making Dicey's construct ultimately irrelevant.
Dicey's Doctrine
Dicey's proposed doctrine of parliamentary supremacy or parliamentary sovereignty means, quite simply, that no other body can limit the powers of a sitting parliament in the United Kingdom, and that no parliament is bound by any legal restrictions created by any other body, even previous parliaments (Alder, 2007). Parliament, in other words, is supreme, not only in terms of the current entities that comprise the government of the United Kingdom, but in terms of all laws, practices, judicial decisions, etc. (Adler, 2007). This premise means that the parliament could enact a law or take an action that would otherwise be considered unconstitutional -- the very idea of an unconstitutional act of parliament becomes an impossible paradox if Dicey's premise is accepted, as the parliament is the very foundation of the Constitution and the power vested therein (Adler, 2007; Allan, 2011). The implications of this fact would be quite far-reaching, indeed, if it could be demonstrated that the construct of parliamentary supremacy existed in practice.
The idea that a parliament would be able to perform actions and enact laws completely contrary to any previous parliament and in fact contrary to standard and accepted practices and constitutional practices would render legal practice in the United Kingdom all but impossible (Allan, 2011). Understandings of the full implications of Dicey's doctrine and constitutionality appears to be quite lacking in public applications of the law, as well (Murken, 2009). The constitution itself is a subject of poor understanding, according to many legal scholars (Walker, 2000).
Practical Limitations
From even the brief analysis of Dicey's doctrine examined above, it can be seen that the concept of parliamentary supremacy has never been practically implemented to its logical conclusion, and it is all but inconceivable that it ever would be. In addition to the sheer logical absurdity of a parliament answerable to absolutely no one, however, the modern era has provided many other concrete, explicit, and practical impediments to true parliamentary sovereignty. Some of these impediments have been domestic in nature, and thus could be considered untested if practically apparent; others, however, are international in nature and can be seen as constituting a conscious, willing, and explicit reduction of parliamentary supremacy.
Domestically speaking, there have been a series of judicial decisions that would seem to limit parliamentary supremacy, insisting that judicial review is necessary in the case o fcertain legal formations and applications (Allan, 2011). Others have noted that the fundamentals of federalism, which are responsible for dispensing authority within the United Kingdom and for keeping the nation together as a political unit, are simply incompatible with the existence of any unitary or supreme authority, parliamentary or otherwise, thus making Dicey's doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty a false premise for any federalist nation (Walker, 2000). Legal practice has continued to demonstrate that the application of British law does not recognize a true sovereignty as existing in the parliament; though this is the highest legal entity in the United Kingdom, it appears more bound by practice than formative of it (Murken, 2009).
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