Hardin's tragedy of the commons and overpopulation solutions

Philosophy -- the Tragedy of the Commons

Overview of the Tragedy of the Commons

In principle, Hardin explains that the "Tragedy of the Commons" means that one of the inevitable consequences of large societies is that contemporary generations do not have a natural incentive to refrain from behavior that is decidedly detrimental to subsequent generations (or to others now). Specifically, the problem, according to Hardin, is that people can be trusted only to do what is in their personal interests and to exercise self-imposed restraint on activities that are beneficial to them but detrimental to the welfare of others.

For example, if high-profile studies revealed that breathing in aerosol deodorant vapors cause cancer in users, many current users of deodorant sprays would change their habits immediately, out of self-interest. Conversely, if the studies indicated that using spray deodorant today would cause cancer to others elsewhere in the world (but not to users), such as (for sake of argument, as a function of being carried thousands of miles in the jet stream and subsequently absorbed by fresh sources of drinking water in other continents), many fewer individuals would change their deodorant habits.

Since the natural tendency to act selfishly in this regard is so strong, the burden falls on government and political institutions to impose reasonable rules and regulations to govern behavior that is harmful to others (living elsewhere or in the future) by the same objective justification for regulating potentially harmful conduct to others contemporaneously. Hardin points out that it is not helpful to rely on the exercise of conscience because most people will choose to act selfishly rather than benevolently for the purpose of protecting future generations (or the general public if it is in the individual's personal or immediate interests to act selfishly).

Considering Hardin's Thesis about Overpopulation

The main thesis of Hardin's essay is the implication of applying the Tragedy of the Commons to the problem of overpopulation. In that discussion, Hardin presumes that the best solution to the global problem of overpopulation is encouraging people to procreate less fruitfully. Hardin argues that, in this context, the Tragedy of the Commons principle means that relying on people to respond appropriately by doing the right thing (i.e. choosing to limit their family size to reduce population growth and the strain on global resources needed to support more people) could never achieve its objective.

Moreover, encouraging people to have smaller families than they might otherwise wish to have would only work on those people with a high moral conscience, and the intellectual ability to understand the issues, and the evolved psychology not to succumb to rationalization. Their more selfish, stupid, and rationalizing counterparts would continue to procreate at whatever rate they would have without government efforts to encourage responsible family planning out of beneficence and social responsibility.

One particular result Hardin warns about is that this approach would also dilute the gene pool by benefiting those individuals who are selfish, stupid, and less psychologically evolved by allowing them to maintain their birth rate over many generations while simultaneously reducing the birth rate of those in society who are the most benevolent, intelligent, and honest with themselves. That is not a recipe for positive changes in human societies over the longer term.

Therefore, Hardin suggests that the only appropriate and reliable way of achieving the strategic objective of reducing human population growth without diminishing the gene pool to society's detriment in the process requires some form of mandated government-administrated family planning to limit the size of families. Hardin argues that classic Darwinian principles would ensure that any voluntary system of changing behavior would produce a human race that becomes increasingly incapable of resisting the natural urge to ignore what objective ethical principles require and act selfishly.

Critical Response to the Tragedy of the Commons Concept

The ideas advanced by Sen would include precisely the approach used by the U.S. federal government to encourage a nationwide highway speed limit. Specifically, the federal government cannot directly impose a speed limit on state and local highways because the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution precludes that as a matter of sovereign state rights. However, all fifty states have chosen to comply with the speed limit suggestions provided by the federal government because doing so is a requirement to qualify for substantial federal funding to state highway authorities.

As Sen implies would be the situation if governments incentivized family planning as preferred public policy, the individual states could choose to ignore Congressional preference about speed limits if they are willing to forgo federal money used to incentivize and reward voluntary state compliance. Ultimately, this is what Sen is suggesting: that governments incentivize any family size limitations and incorporate other methods of encouraging compliance (such as better education) into a comprehensive solution that is collaborative instead of an approach that overrides individual choice. To the extent that Hardin's initial premise and conclusion about the importance of reducing population growth is important, the collaborative approach to solutions proposed by Sen would probably be more effective than the override-based approach promoted by Hardin.

Finally, Sen's approach would also solve the problem identified by Hardin in connection with the dilution of moral conscience in successive human generations by Darwinian principles. Specifically, Hardin's approach is black and white in that it recognizes only two diametrically opposite responses: either forced limitation on family size or reliance on human conscience but without any plan to actually encourage compliance voluntarily. Conversely, Sen impliedly acknowledges that success through the collaborative method still requires substantial input, investment, coordination, and creativity.

A strong argument could be made that both Hardin and Sen still miss a crucial point: namely, that there is also an issue of addressing how and why people come to prefer larger families than might be optimally beneficial for society in the first place. Specifically, in the U.S., there is a standard element to the typical narrative of the "expected" life cycle that promotes having children automatically and almost robotically. Many young people simply proceed from high school or college to getting married in their twenties and then starting a family shortly thereafter without ever consciously considering whether or not that is their actual choice.

Therefore, at least in this part of the world, Sen's collaborative approach would possibly work even better if the educational component also included presenting the choice of remaining single longer and of marrying but not having children unless or until that is genuinely what couples desire as a viable and appropriate life choice for young couples. Today, childless-by-choice couples typically face an onslaught of presumptive questions about "when" rather than whether they want to become parents. Likewise, in certain Eastern cultures, family size is frequently motivated by culturally-transmitted expectations that one purpose for having many children is that they will support their parents in old age. Ideally the collaborative approach advanced by Sen would include reforming culturally-based narratives that contribute to peoples' underlying desires in the first place.