TSA background check failures and criminal behavior by security screeners

Human Resources

TSA HIRING PRACTICES AND BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS

The Transportation Security Administration was created and rose to prominence after the suicidal attacks of September 11, 2001. A nearly futuristic, painstakingly detailed Human Resources approach to recruitment of airline security personnel was employed and the recruitment process was initially promising. Unfortunately, shortcomings in TSA's recruitment process, particularly in background checks of prospective employees, became sorely obvious. The consequences including but not limited to serious criminal behavior by TSA airport security screeners resulted in multiple reviews and recommendations. The latest review and recommendations of 2015 were accepted by TSA but their successful implementation is questionable.

Body: TSA Hiring Practices

Background

Though today's Americans normally think of the Transportation Security Authority (TSA) in connection with airline security screening, the United States actually began security screening throughout the country's airports in 1973 in response to multiple hijackings of domestic flights from 1961 to 1972. The Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 required security screening of all passengers and their carryon luggage, resulting in a nearly complete elimination of domestic hijacking by the 1990s (Blackburn, Marsha - U.S. House of Representatives, 2012, p. 2). The success of that Act contributed to America's complacency and near-complete inattention to terrorism, particularly to the notion of suicidal hijacking. That complacency ended on September 11, 2001 and aviation security became a high priority for the Administration and Congress. In rapid response to the 9/11 attacks, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act was enacted by Congress and signed by the President in November 2001, establishing the Transportation Security Administration in the process. The subsequent Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the overarching Office of Homeland Security and brought the TSA under its authority (George & Whatford, 2007, p. 162). Consequently, the TSA is a stronger security entity presaged by 1990s arm of the Federal Aviation Administration.

While America was taken aback by the 9/11 attacks, global terrorism experts were not as surprised. Transportation conduits were already deemed "soft" targets for extremist attacks, though 9/11 certainly fueled increased security in four general categories: improved inspection; advanced notification; law enforcement; and transportation security funding. Inspection programs include the screening of passengers, luggage and freight. Advance notification includes the information regarding contents of vehicles, trailers and containers provided to customs officials prior to arrival at ports of entry. Law enforcement ranges from air marshals on commercial flights to additional and better trained officers at every port of entry. Transportation security funding involves direct costs of increased public security to governments and the private sector (Prentice, 2008, p. 4), which has caused ongoing debate about benefits vs. expense.

The debate about security expense has hampered the TSA from birth. Congress was hesitant about funding some TSA initiatives, swiftly limited the possible number of TSA personnel and refused to increase the TSA budget, leading to severe criticism from the 9/11 Commission in its 2005 Public Discourse Project (Roberts, 2006, p. 340). Nevertheless, the United States government was the only world power that created a new national organization (here, the TSA) to monitor security in every transportation sector and to analyze threats to transportation infrastructure in the wake of 9/11 (Yoo, 2009, p. 38). That daunting task is reflected in the sheer size of the TSA: as of early 2005, the number of TSA employees had grown to 49,200 (Jones, 2006, p. 6); as of 2011, the entity employed more than 65,000, making it larger than the U.S. Departments of Education, Energy, Housing, Labor, State and Urban Development, combined; and many of those employees are members of the American Federation of Government Employees, America's biggest federal and D.C. employee union (Editors, Bioterrorism Week, 2010, p. 44).

2. Groundwork for Effective Recruitment

The foundation for selection and recruitment of TSA employees was a nearly futuristic, painstakingly detailed Human Resources approach. Post 9/11, Congress wanted TSA to redefine transportation security and use an undoubtedly capable modern workforce; consequently, those entrusted with manning TSA sidestepped the traditional "job analysis" method of searching for candidates. Rather, they used an "industrial-organizational" (I-O) framework and National Skill Standards Board (NSSB) method for developing skill standards to appropriately select a capable workforce. According to the vision, TSA workers would be suitably skilled per definite standards at hiring and throughout their careers via annual certification, receive appropriate continuous training and be suitably paid. Consequently, in the case of airport screeners, for example, "Go-Team 31" devised an entire system to define, authenticate, train, assess and certify the pertinent skills for airport screeners. NSSB assisted the process by analyzing appropriate job skills, setting skill standards, entertaining and evaluating proposals for implementation of a selection system, ascertaining valuations, ensuring authentication of the screener recruitment program, and furnishing continuing expert advice (Kolstetter, 2003, p. 40). In fewer than three weeks, NSSB and "Go-Team 31" accomplished its tasks, using a board of fifteen I-O psychologists to discern vital competencies according to the calculated work requirements. Standards were set for both current and future appropriate skill sets by studying national and international information from prior job analyses, job descriptions, training resources, performance evaluations and existing selection requirements (Kolstetter, 2003, p. 41).

The standards set by the NSSB encompassed: the work-oriented element, discerning what must be accomplished by TSA workers and how well it must be accomplished; and the worker-oriented element, consisting of vital individual worker skills and knowledge for the job (Kolstetter, 2003, p. 42). Applying those concepts, the NSSB determined that the work-oriented element for airport security screener job, for example, includes the five critical work functions of: controlling entry and exit points; performing security screening of humans; performing security screenings of luggage and other property; continuously improving those processes; and continuously improving individual performance by ongoing training and development. Furthermore, each of those 5 critical work functions included 23 key activities and 119 performance indicators (Kolstetter, 2003, p. 43). Meanwhile, the worker-oriented element included: academic skills and knowledge in the form of reading, writing, mathematics and science; employability through the capability of applying knowledge and skills effectively through listening, speaking and problem solving; and occupational/technical knowledge/skills for using an x-ray scanner, applying security procedures, and applying security procedures (Kolstetter, 2003, p. 43). The critical knowledge/skills for the worker-oriented element included: the ability to visually observe; the ability to speak, verbally understand, read and write English; the ability to maintain an authoritative posture; adequate tolerance for stress; adequate learning ability; appropriate customer service skills; judgment skills for making decisions, assembling and examining information, personal career growth, using technology, and problem-solving; physical abilities, such as coordination, stamina, sufficient strength and manual agility; medical abilities, such as adequate vision, hearing and mobility; adequate abilities in approved search methods; awareness of safety policies/procedures; and personal integrity (Kolstetter, 2003, p. 43). After assembling this data, the recruitment team further: reviewed and refined all issues of access, diversity and civil rights; and developed a plan for systemic fairness, equal job access and review (Kolstetter, 2003, p. 44). Armed with all that knowledge and systemic justice, the recruitment team invited bids and awarded contracts for recruitment of TSA employees, piloted at three sites in Los Angeles, Chicago and Memphis (Kolstetter, 2003, p. 44). At last, the selection could begin.

3. Official Recruitment Procedures

The TSA selection system involves multiple steps, of course. The preliminary step is completion of an online IVR application whereby the applicant's qualifications are compared to minimum requirements, such as U.S. citizenship and a high school diploma or equivalent, and preferential hiring rules for military veterans, etc. Applicants who survive that initial stage are invited to further assessment/recruitment consisting of three phases. Phase I includes: orientation; completion of forms; and computerized tests of required competencies, depending on the specific job. Phase II includes: a structured job interview; a test of physical abilities; and a medical evaluation, including drug screening through urinalysis. Phase III, which is the hiring stage, includes: a security check of fingerprints, photo and background; and a job offer, including information on salary, training, uniform fitting and job orientation (Kolstetter, 2003, p. 45).

4. Promising Initial Results

The initial results of the pilot recruitment programs were encouraging. Vacancies were announced on March 8, 2002, the first applicants were assessed on March 18, 202 at all three locations, about 1,300 airport security screeners were hired in the first testing week, the first of them were sent to Baltimore/Washington International Airport on April 30, 2002, and deployments to other airports commenced on June 28th. Encouraged by this early success, TSA had 84 job fairs throughout the United States, assessed more than 1,500,000 applicants for screener jobs and hired more than 26,500 of them. As of November 29, 2002, TSA assessed more than 1,800,000 job applicants, hired approximately 50,000 and maintained an additional hiring pool of 50,000. By December 2002, TSA hired an additional 9,000 security screeners. By the Congressional deadline of December 31, 2002, the required numbers of airport security screeners were in place and were 38% female and 44% ethnic minorities (Kolstetter, 2003, p. 45). It was beautiful but something went seriously wrong.

5. Shortcomings

a. Bloat

One problem with TSA recruitment was workforce bloat. At least partially due to Congressional mandate, the TSA workforce ballooned from 16,500 in 2001 to more than 65,000 by 2011, which is nearly a 400% increase while the total of American airline passengers increased less than 12%. Furthermore, since 2002, TSA has acquired six contracts to recruit and train more than 137,000 workers, costing more than $2.4 billion or $17,500 per employee. Finally, TSA must continually recruit high numbers of applicants because by 2011, more employees had left the agency than were employed at any given time (Joint Majority Staff - U.S. House of Representatives, 2011, p. 3). The excessive expense was at least initially due to the fact that all TSA airport security screeners were full-time employees, though the need for screeners peaks during mornings and afternoons but significantly decreases at other times of the day. Consequently, TSA uses part-time employees to accommodate those peaks and lulls. By substituting part-timers for some full-timers, creating a somewhat blended workforce, TSA staffing patterns could be aligned with workloads, as part-timers are directed to either the morning or the afternoon "banks" (Thompson & Mastracci, 2008, p. 388).

b. Failure to Perform Adequate Background Checks

The most egregious shortcoming of TSA's hiring practices was the chronic failure to perform adequate background checks prior to deploying its newly hired airport screeners. In a rush to meet Congressional deadlines, TSA did not unfailingly conduct criminal and credit background checks on new and current employees (Blackburn, Marsha - U.S. House of Representatives, 2012, p. 55). Despite its vaunted, nearly futuristic hiring schema, TSA had ineffective controls to ensure that its employees: did not have prior criminal convictions that logically would prevent them from having free access to secure areas within airports; and were authorized to work in the United States. Rather than vetting applicants on its own, TSA relied on airport operators to perform checks for criminal history and work authorization, but had inadequate oversight of those operators. Consequently, TSA did not and could not know whether its new airport security screeners were properly vetted.

TSA's documentation for background checks was also abysmal. Thousands of the records needed for vetting workers contained incomplete or erroneous information, such as a mere initial for a first name or an incomplete/erroneous/missing social security number

Further, thousands of records used for vetting workers contained potentially incomplete or inaccurate data, such as an initial for a first name and missing social security numbers. Meanwhile, TSA lacked appropriate checks to reject records with incomplete/missing/erroneous information. As a result, workers who would have been rejected if properly vetted were not only hired but were also given free access to airports' most sensitive areas (Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015, pp. 11-12).

6. Consequences

The shortcomings of TSA's hiring practices had several notable consequences, including high termination rates, high turnover rates and poor security, with more than 25,000 security breaches in U.S. airports during TSA's first decade despite the glut of full-time TSA airport security screeners (Joint Majority Staff - U.S. House of Representatives, 2011, p. 3). However, the most striking consequence of TSA's failure has been criminal activity by TSA airport security personnel, the very people who are supposed to ensure security. Crimes committed by TSA airport security include but are not necessarily limited to: theft; sex crimes, such as rape, statutory rape, child molestation, child pornography and prostitution; hate crimes; hit and run; assault; bribery; drug trafficking; illegal firearms; bypassing airport screening; murder; conspiracy; impersonating a federal officer; and driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs (Blackburn, Marsha - U.S. House of Representatives, 2012, p. 4). TSA's standard response when yet another TSA employee is arrested is: "The unacceptable behavior of a few individuals in no way reflects the dedication of our nearly 50,000 Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) who work tirelessly to keep our skies safe." However, as Congressman Marsha Blackburn's 2012 report indicates, the combined actions of TSOs frequently appearing in national headlines does reflect on TSA's TSOs (Blackburn, Marsha - U.S. House of Representatives, 2012, p. 55).

The publicized crimes committed by TSOs range from mundane off-duty misdemeanors to the outrageous criminal activity committed on the job. There are too many incidents to list but a random sampling of alleged offenders illustrates TSA's significant problem. Charles Bennett, a 57-year-old TSO at Orlando International Airport, was charged on February 1, 2010 for child molestation because he allegedly molested a 15-year-old girl and attempted to keep her as a sex slave, allegations to which Bennett confessed in writing (Blackburn, Marsha - U.S. House of Representatives, 2012, p. 9). Michael Arato, a 41-year-old TSO Supervisor at Newark Liberty International Airport was charged with Bribery on October 20, 2010 for permitting one of his subordinate TSOs to steal between $10,000 and $30,000 from airline passengers over a 13-month period, in exchange for a portion of the stolen money (Blackburn, Marsha - U.S. House of Representatives, 2012, p. 15). Minetta Walker, a 43-year-old Behavior Detection Officer, responsible for looking for suspicious characters in Buffalo Niagara International Airport, was charged on March 1, 2011 with Conspiring to Defraud the Government by Interfering with Airport Security Measures because she helped drug traffickers get past security checkpoints (Blackburn, Marsha - U.S. House of Representatives, 2012, p. 21). Christopher Allen, John Best and Brigitte Jones, all TSOs at Palm Beach International Airport in Florida and/or Westchester County Airport in New York, were charged on September 13, 2011 with Drug Trafficking for conspiring to distribute tens of thousands of oxycodone pills from Florida to Connecticut for illegal sale (Blackburn, Marsha - U.S. House of Representatives, 2012, p. 32). Many more examples of TSA employees' criminal activities could be given but these few examples should illustrate the dilemma.

7. Recommendations for improvement

The criminal enterprises within TSA's workforce certainly did not go unnoticed. So many recommendations were made so many times that listing all of them would consume this entire paper. In 2004, the Office of Homeland Security's Inspector General reviewed TSA's processes for background checks and made 12 recommendations, all of which TSA officially accepted but implement with varying enthusiasm and questionable success (Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 3). Again in 2007, TSA background checks were examined and though improved since 2004 were still found inadequate. Consequently, several additional recommendations were made for TSA improvement at that time (Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007, pp. 9-27). Yet again, in 2012, TSA's background checks were examined and found wanting; consequently, more recommendations were made and accepted (Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012, p. 39). Most recently, in 2015, TSA's background checks were reexamined. Six recommendations were made and now pending: