U.S. Selling of Nuclear Materials and Technology

Selling Nuclear Technology

The sale of United States nuclear technology to other countries has gained more criticism, especially in light of the September 11 attacks and the current war against Iraq. Despite these security concerns, however, many corporations still advocate efforts to repeal federal laws regarding the sale of such technology to countries such as China. This paper examines the pros and cons of both positions, paying particular attention to the history and ramifications of continued sale of nuclear technology.

The United States should continue selling nuclear technology

Common perception holds that foreign countries like China, Pakistan and Algeria are the main supporters of the sale United States nuclear technology. However, many American companies such as Westinghouse, Bechtel and General Electric support the move to allow the export of American nuclear technology and parts to countries such as China.

For these companies, the reasons are economic. Domestic demand for nuclear technology has decreased drastically in the environmentally conscious 1990s. Many nuclear energy companies were thus forced to look elsewhere to market their technologies. An official at the ABB Combustion Engineering, for example, states that the survival of many such companies rely on their ability to open plants in China -- a move that could generate at least $40 billion for the beleaguered industries.

Increasingly, the American nuclear industry has had to look outside the country for more markets. The Chinese, for example, represents 50 to 75% of new market of nuclear technology.

Proponents of lifting trade restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology also argue that when used judiciously, the sharing of nuclear technology with friendly countries could foster stronger national ties. Such ties would be even more important as the Bush administration tries to rally support for the war against terrorism.

The Bush administration, for example, considered revising legislation to facilitate the sale of nuclear arms to Indonesia and Pakistan, in an effort to secure the support of these two countries in the war. Pakistan, for example, is a potential key ally because of its strategic location near Afghanistan. In exchange for sharing its technology, the United States could gain an important staging site for its military operations in the Middle East. Indonesia, on the other hand, is the most populous Muslim state in the world. The country's goodwill would be important to the Bush administration.

Furthermore, supporting China with nuclear technology in its bid for dominance over Taiwan would provide the United States with a much larger market for its products.

Finally, the controlled sharing of nuclear technology is also a way for the United States to regulate nuclear proliferation. It was much easier to regulate nuclear proliferation when the only "enemy" was Russia. Today, however, the break-up of the former Soviet Union has resulted in at least four sovereign states with nuclear weapons -- Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Due to problems like corruption and political turmoil, these countries are having difficulty regulating their nuclear weapons. It is therefore in the United States' best interest to share its own expertise to help these countries regulate and perhaps dismantle their nuclear capabilities. Otherwise, one possible alternative would be the sale of such weapons to rogue states and terrorist groups, who could then use these weapons against the United States.

The United States should stop selling nuclear technology

For many critics, however, the sale of such weapons has dangerous implications for United States security interests. In the book Selling Armageddon, author Lee Rensselaer traces the smuggling and proliferation of nuclear weapons from Russia to other newly independent states. Lee's research has uncovered a clandestine network of professional smugglers who sell these dangerous nuclear secrets to third parties. Though Russia denies such charges, Lee raises the disturbing possibility that even legally traded nuclear goods and technologies could end up in the wrong hands.

In the case of China, for example, there have been instances where the country has violated agreements regarding "dual use" technology. For example, electronic circuits that were supposed to be used in oscilloscopes were used instead to diagnose nuclear test results. Digital computers and related equipments were used in rockets. Current exports of computer-controlled machine tools and laser technology also have potential military applications.

The implications of such dual use technology are disturbing, especially in light of the fact that China has previously sold chemical weapons to Iran and magnets used for processing uranium to Pakistan. In fact, CIA sources believe that China is one of the biggest suppliers or nuclear and chemical weapons technologies to foreign countries. Other analysts speculate that material and technology from China could also be ending up in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan.

China continues to deny that such third party sales have taken place, because these sales violate both United States law and international nuclear agreements. The sale of the 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan are a cause of concern, since these magnets could be used to make weapons-grade uranium. The magnets will thus allow Pakistan to develop a nuclear program virtually undetected, a scenario that had already happened in North Korea.

Because these sales happen clandestinely, it is impossible for international bodies such as the United Nations to regulate them. It would thus be very easy for such nuclear technology to fall into the hands of rogue nations and terrorist groups. Given the current climate of uncertainty and growing concerns regarding terrorism, critics charge that it makes little sense to life the sanctions regarding the sharing of nuclear technology with other countries at the present time.