Hume's and Kant's views of causation

Ume's And Kant's Views Of Causation

The purpose of the present paper is to compare the views that Kant and Hume had on the concept of causation. We will begin by discussing Hume's argument that our idea of causation is just the idea of constant conjunction. We will continue by analyzing Kant's concept, including the objections he might bring to Hume. The paper will end with some considerations regarding the copy principle and the relationship between sensation and understanding.

In Hume's opinion, the concept of causation can be understood exclusively in close connection with the process of induction. In other words, the manner in which the human being reasons is fundamentally based on induction. We associate various events and elements and depending on this association we reach certain conclusions. Therefore, association is the basis of causation. "Every idea is copied from a previous impression or feeling, and where we can't find any impression we may be certain that there is no idea. No isolated episode of mental or physical causation yields any impressions of power or necessary connection." (Hume, 39)

This view upon the mental mechanisms through which knowledge is achieved (or the impression of knowledge) has been interpreted from various perspectives. One of the interpretations has been called that of the logical positivist. According to it, Hume claims that a causal relation which occurs for a variety of times may lead to the creation of a rule. In other words, if x causes y, then every time x will appear, then so will y, as a consequence of the former occurrence. Perhaps the most important aspect that this interpretation brings to mind is the one of perception. The connections which we make between things do not actually exist in themselves, independently of our minds. They come into existence as they are perceived by us. All the qualities that the things and the phenomena we observe have are actually properties which belong to our own perceptions.

The skeptical realists on the other hand deny the view presented in the above paragraph. According to them, if y occurs when x occurs the phenomenon might be explained as a mere succession of events, which are not necessarily connected between them. Hume speaks of these connections in terms of necessity. However, the attitude towards them may vary from skepticism to their acceptance as if their existence was an objective one.

It has also been argued that the mechanism of causation has become a functional role of the mind. The experiences which we have had in the past are gathered as a sort of data base which the mind uses in order to anticipate further events.

Kant on the other hand argues that the representations translated into concepts and the concepts themselves must be in a relation of homogeneity. Nevertheless, there are the pure concepts, which he calls categories- and these are heterogeneous with the experience that they imply. Yet, neither Kant's idea, nor Hume's could be explained in the absence of the concept of succession. If the properties of the objects are actually properties of the perceptions and one thing derives from a previous one, then it is necessary for the perceptions to occur in a successive manner. One must nevertheless bear in mind the rule according to which when a certain element occurs, another one necessarily follows. Perhaps the most important objection that Kant brings to Hume's concept refers to the fact that causation must not necessarily be based upon succession. Apparently causation can be synchronic.

Hume had a powerful interest in explaining how the things and phenomena could be predicted. Is there really a law of necessary succession which makes some things occur as a necessary condition when others have come into being? And if such a type of succession does not really exist, does this imply that the future events can not be predicted? Furthermore, in the absence of a rule of this type, how will the mid perform associations between things and evaluate future happenings?

The problem becomes less difficult when discussed in terms of conjuction. In other words, the associations which the mind performs are based not on a necessary connection, but between a constant conjunction. The conjunction can be made in a spontaneous way and it does not depend upon any external law. A necessary connection would require a sort of universal law imposing certain things or schema to derive from others. This cannot be possible, as different conjectures might cause different outcomes.

On the other hand, the idea of constant conjunction removes the possibility of things occurring in an inevitable manner. The only observation which could be made refers to the repetitive character of such events. If a thing occurs when anther one does, the whole event can be interpreted as a cause-effect scheme. If this scheme is repeated for a long time then one might think that this is the natural way for them to happen. If the same "effect" is observed for a long time, then one is tempted to notice the cause, or better said, he deduces / induces the cause from the effect.

The term "constant" is relevant for a deeper understanding of the concept. It suggests that the discussed "event" is met in a constant manner. Or in other words, it occurs in the totality of the possible occasions. If there is a natural law supporting the event and their scheme, then this means that there is a natural necessity leading in this direction.

Another argument that we must bring into discussion at this point is the copy principle. According to Hume, "all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them and which they exactly represent." (Hume, 11) There are nevertheless ideas which are extremely complex and do not have any corresponding impressions. They are in fact derived from simple ideas (but the mechanism remains the same).

There are two types of evidence that the philosopher brings in order to support this argument. One refers to the physical capacities of people to receive sensory input and to create impressions based on these. In other words, people who have always been blind cannot have an idea about what color is. People who are deaf cannot have an idea of what music is (the corresponding impression is missing). The other one refers to the procedure through which when we wish to communicate the idea of an object to someone we present them with the corresponding impression.

Hume further applies this principle to even more complex and abstract ideas, such as the ones of time, space, causality or the human being. In analyzing philosophical concepts, the philosopher inquires whether the term describing them has a clear idea associated with it. In addition, he wishes to know whether there is an impression from which the idea itself is derived. If such an impression does not exist, then the only conceivable conclusion is that the term is not the proper one. Nevertheless, the idea of the resembling impression allows for a surprising development of the analysis. In other words an impression which resembles another might be the part allowing for the existence of a corresponding simple idea.

If the creation of all the ideas is based upon physical impressions, then it means that that there is a very tight relation between sensation and understanding. Just like the blind man can not have an idea about the color red, people with certain levels of intellectual preparation will not be able to create / grasp ideas that other better prepared people do.