United Nations peacekeeping missions and their effectiveness

United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

The initiators of the United Nations in 1945 laid down the maintenance of peace and security as one among its three primary objectives. The UN Security Council has the necessary power to undertake military peacemaking action against the concerned government regime. But any such proposal is capable of being barred by any one of the permanent members. As a result of this the UN-led international military peacemaking interference has only occurred two times during 1950-53, against North Korea and in 1991, in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. But the UN has been livelier in a smaller magnitude, peacekeeping activity. Ever since 1948 there occurred about 52 peacekeeping missions, associated with more than three quarters of a million soldiers and civilian police and entailing about 1600 UN casualties. At the inception of new millennium, there existed dynamic UN peacekeeping missions in 17 states. Interference by UN peacekeepers peculiarly results after a ceasefire has been agreed to by the competing forces in an international or internal rivalry and there is a peace to keep. (Peacekeeping through UN) mission requires the sanction of the government in the country to which in which it is to be deployed and its basic job is to ensure maintenance of the ceasefire and its terms. Other jobs involve maintenance of public order and assisting with administrative, political, social and economic reconstruction. As an unbiased force, moving the legitimacy of the international community as a whole, the UN mission can generate a crucial breathing space, enabling an enduring peace to be built. The costs incurred in the process of peace keeping are to be funded by the UN member states by means of an agreed formula that extensively relates to the wealth of a nation. The rise in UN mission during the 1990s was partly the result of removal of the Soviet veto over activities in Cold War divergence areas remarkably Africa. It was also occurred remarkably in Balkan and Caucasus regions in course of the collapse of communism in Europe in 1989 and the formation of new nation states, as a result of uprising in ethnic and religious rivalries. Another element was the enhanced dynamism of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, Boutros-Ghalli, and Kofi Anan those laid great importance to preventive diplomacy, along with pre-emptive troop deployments to discourage hostilities. (Peacekeeping through UN)

UN peacekeeping mission has several stories of success. The peacekeeping missions by the United Nations at the time of Cold War were normally very effective. The UN peacekeepers normally took steps implement a treaty and schedule to isolate the conflicting parties and execute an earlier agreed upon peace accord. The illustrations of effective UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War incorporate the United Nations Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM I, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group - UNTAG, and the United Nations Observer Group in Central America - ONUCA, UNAVEM I, UNTAG and ONUCA were so effective as a result of the earlier agreed upon peace agreements, the clear mission objectives, concise enter and exist schedules and stringent adherence to the neutrality by the peacekeepers themselves. The UNAVEM I propounded the groundwork for the success of UNTAG. UNAVEM I permitted for the detachment and withdrawal of all Cuban forces from Angola. The regulated withdrawal of all Cuban forces from Angola by UN military observers was backed by the political pressure of the U.S. And USSR. (Peacekeeping in Interstate vs. International Conflicts)

Along with the removal of the Cuban forces the governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa reach a deal for a peace agreement. The new peace agreement to be enforced by United Nations Peacekeepers, and vetted by the Security Council would implement the arguments and schedules for the termination of the South West African People Organization, free elections and unified armed forces. The UN peacekeeping attempts are forced to a slow initiation as a result of the delays in services reaching in the country. As a result of this the renewed struggle is initiated between the fighting factions. But the negotiations were quite capable of banning the fighting and the peace agreement was capable of deterring the struggle and the peace negotiations were able to bring back the treaties on its approach. The UNTAG was capable of effectively enforcing the ceasefire between the forces of South Africa and SWAPO and evaluate the impartial and independent elections. UNTAG promised the diplomatically consensus settings for building Namibia were implemented. As a result of the fair and impartial implementation of the peace agreement by UN forces the UNAVEM I and UNAG missions were totally effective. (Peacekeeping in Interstate vs. International Conflicts)

An effective UN peacekeeping mission is considered to be one with having a clear and practicable mandate and with the continuous support of associating states and cooperation from the conflicting parties. An illustration of the effective mission was the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador -- ONUSAL of 1991-95, which administered the restoration of the democracy after prolonged civil war. (Peacekeeping through UN) While the United Nations assess the peacekeeping operations, it can indicate to the all round success of its missions in Cambodia. The enormous UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia - UNTAC assisted to reconstruct a nation devastated by a brutal dictatorship and a dozen years of civil war. The UN peacekeeping force was removed after organizing free elections that put a coalition government in position. Irrespective of the circumstances are quite different in each of the cases something transparently went right with the UN's Cambodia mission. Never prior to this in history has the United Nations been so vigorously engaged and so widely anticipated to react to the needs of both immediate and pervasive. (UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Lessons from Cambodia)

In several instances the advent of UN peacekeeping mission is considered as a symbol of resolving the prevailing conflicts, as the case with East Timor. In respect of some other instances it is regarded as a symbol of international acknowledgement to an effective regional peacekeeping effort, as was the case with Burundi where the African Union had a pioneer effort in administering peace and increased security. In other respects like Ethiopia and Eritrea, the existence of a UN peacekeeping operation is assisting to maintain - over a long period of time - a peace that is hazardously fragile. In absence of the experience and determination of UN peacekeeping personnel there could well be a back to hostility. In all instances the presence of UN peacekeepers in general is a symbol of the credibility and effectiveness of United Nation in maintaining normalcy in respect of peace, security and stability in the areas affected by unrest, violence and fear. (UK committed to UN-Mandated Peacekeeping) in the circumstances where the civic structures have collapsed apart, peacekeeping missions assist in the reconstruction of necessary institutions. To illustrate, in Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina, peacekeepers educated police officers to be fair and to regard the human rights of the people.

In Namibia, they administered democratic election giving rise to the independence of the nation. (Who Needs Peacekeepers?) the UN Security Council approved Resolution No. 435 during 1978 that entailed a UN supervised conversion to independence for Namibia. In consequence to the international politics the UN was not ready to execute that plan until 1989. In addition to the brief skirmish between Angolan guerillas and South African troops at the very beginning, the transition was rapid, smooth and successful. Madden analyses the factors giving rise to the Namibian success and refines four common principles for the additional peacekeeping mission of United Nation. Firstly, Madden indicates that by 1989 the timing was appropriate for settlement of the Namibian case. The Superpowers were removed from the region, other regional rivalries were emerging to be nearer and the public and political agencies were prepared for peace and normalcy. (Namibia: A Lesson for Success, chapter in Building International Community)

Secondly, the UNTAG, the UN peacekeeping force in Namibia, incorporated a considerable civilian element that was most suitable considering the political nature of the settlement process. Thirdly, the UN had been involved in Namibia for some time and so senior UNTAG personnel had considerable knowledge of the situation. UNTAG leaders were also smart in deploying well qualified staff. Finally, UNTAG had extensive mandate, and so was associated at every phase of development. Activities incorporated and so were associated at every sphere of the transition. Activities involved deportment of the refugees and their settlement, military and police watching, election supervision, public relations, release of prisoners, human rights, voter education and information dissemination. Instituting a network of regional officers, daily radio programs and weekly television spots all further contributed to UNTAG's high profile within Namibia. UNTAG was capable of asserting authority over the colonial government that increased UN credibility in view of the Namibian public. (Namibia: A Lesson for Success, chapter in Building International Community)

The UN interferences have been specifically required in the Middle East, both in respect of the observer groups and military forces. The UN first took on the task of deporting observers to watch the peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states during 1948. The observer group functioning was assumed during the post war periods of 1956, 1967 and 1973. It saw the institution of the first armed UN force to generate a stock between Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Ten nations shared soldiers. Another force was instituted after the war between Egypt and Israel in 1967 to watch the peace agreement between the groups. This occurred during a period of high tension both locally and between the great powers. In 1974, a smaller UN force was instituted on the Golan Heights to maintain the boundary line between Syria and Israeli forces. The most widespread UN operation in the Middle East is perceived by the constitution of UNIFIL following the Israel invasion of the Lebanon in 1978. Its activity incorporated watching over the Israeli withdrawal, maintaining conditions of peace and security and assisting the Lebanese government re-establish its authority. (United Nations Peacekeeping Forces - History of Organization)

Such tasks have burdened the efficacy of the UNIFIL to a great extent but the UN forces have made significant contribution by declining the level of conflict in the area. However, this accomplishment has not entailed without considerable cost. The UN casualties presently counts to more than 200. The UN has a significant part to play at the time of the struggle that erupted when the Belgian colony of the Congo attained independence in 1960. While the lawlessness and chaos were prominent in the region a UN force amounting to almost 20,000 was instituted to assist the Congolee government maintaining peace and order. It concluded that above all being engaged in entailing a ranging civil war to an end and banning the province of Katanga from seceding. It was while ensuring continuance of the UN mission in the Congo that Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold was assassinated in an air crash. Among the other significant jobs may be mentioned watching and continuing the peace keeping force that was instituted on Cyprus on account of the civil war that emerged between the Greek and Turkish populations of the island. The UN mission has effectively created a buffer zone between the two ethnic races. The UN has in such and other fields played a considerable part in declining the level of rivalry. (United Nations Peacekeeping Forces - History of Organization)

Irrespective of the efficacy of the UN peacekeeping forces over the last 50 years some circumstances have proven to be intractable, and the peace keeping missions have associated with open-ended commitments. (U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform) the degeneration of the Soviet Union and the culmination of the Cold War have varied the international conditions in that UN Peacekeepers presently function. During the after Cold War regime, the stress has been diverted to the UN Peacekeepers from international conflicts to interstate conflicts. In case of the interstate conflicts, it is quite problematic to isolate the belligerent parties and enforce the previously agreed upon peace agreements. The United Nations no more has the capability to visualize the U.S. Or the U.S.S.R. To exert pressure to belligerent nations to conform to the internationally agreed upon principles of activity. In respect of the interstate conflicts it can be very difficult to compel all the subordinate units of rival organizations to conform to peace agreements even when the parent organization has earlier endorsed the peace agreement being violated by the subordinate unit. (Peacekeeping in Interstate vs. International Conflicts)

In case of the interstate conflicts it can be much problematic to compel all the subordinate units of rival organizations to adhere to the peace agreements even when the parent organizations has earlier endorsed the peace agreement being violated by the subordinate unit. The most cumbersome sphere of international rival is the consequences of mass human rights violations and genocide by the opponents. In case of the interstate rivalry there sometimes exist no clear 'good guy vs. bad guy'. In case of interstate rivalries, the internationally agreed upon cease fire and peace agreements are acknowledged by warring parties and then broken, in quick succession, for example, the conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia - UNPROFOR - B generates an excellent illustration of the problems of peacekeeping forces in interstate conflicts confronts.

UNPROFOR was accorded a mission by the UN Security Council that was too costly in its scope to be continued by the forces assigned. The UNPROFOR was not installed with adequate numbers of troops to generate a strong deterrent to the hostile forces. UNPROFOR was not capable of safeguarding UN designated Safe Havens and resultantly, Serbian forces committed numerous war crimes against Moslem civilians in the UN designated safe areas. Moreover, the UNPROFOR forces were taken prisoners by Serbian forces in the areas around Sarajevo to discourage NATO air strikes. The serious problems UNPROFOR experienced in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a straight consequence of too large a mission without adequate deployments of troops to preserve the peace process they had deployed to implement Interstate conflicts that will entail to be the most problematic operations that the UN peacekeepers will be associated with. The UN peacekeepers are required to be adopting a specified mandate and sufficient umbers of troops to ensure success. (Peacekeeping in Interstate vs. International Conflicts)

Three missions - the ones in Lebanon and the Western Sahara and the one between India and Pakistan - normally were not accomplishing their mandates and as per the UN sources they had only a marginal role to more secure and stable environments. Three others incorporating the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East and the missions in Angola and Cyprus - were only partially accomplishing their mandates but had made some positive contributions to stability. The missions in the Golan Heights and between Iraq and Kuwait were effective in carrying out their mandates and sharing to stability in the respective regions of operation. More significantly however, six of the missions were not associated with the settlement agreements as called for by U.S. policy and diplomatic efforts to determine the conflicts had stalled or were stalemated. (U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform) Moreover, less effective was the 1992-95 missions in Somalia that was humiliatingly removed after confronting an attack from the competing forces. Explaining its ineffectiveness, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali indicated that the international community cannot impose peace. The peace can only come from the Somalis themselves. (Peacekeeping through UN)

During the past half century, the United Nations peacekeeping missions have not successfully led operations entailing for the exertion of force. This includes both missions authorized to apply force in consonance with the provisions contained in Chapter VII of the UN. Charter and those missions, whose consent calls for coercive action but do not specifically, authorize it. Partially, it is the confinements of the UN organization that put at risk the success of such operations. Several, illustrations assist exemplifying such facts. Out of the 42 peace operations led by the United Nations since 1945, the operations in Bosnia from 1992-95, and Eastern Slavonia from 1996 were specifically authorized to exert force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The four other UN peacekeeping missions like Lebanon imitated during 1978 and still continuing, the Congo during 1960-64, Rwanda during 1993-96, and the second phase Haiti mission during 1995-96 had no sanction but had the mandates entailing for coercive actions. (U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform)

Of such operations the ones in which the United Nations had full leadership were inhibited by the confinements mentioned earlier. To illustrate, irrespective of the Security Council calls for action, the United Nations could not attain adequate troops, equipment and reinforcements to successfully carry out the operations in Rwanda, Bosnia and Somalia. With regard to Bosnia about 34000 additional troops were required to combat attacks on safe areas but only 7600 could be provided. Confinements of UN, command and regulations inhibited the commanders from successful deployment of forces to mission-critical regions in Somalia, Bosnia and the Congo. The National contingent regularly sought instructions from their capitals prior to deployment of troops and in some cases they deny to redeploy.

Lastly, the desire of UN to exert force in Somalia, Bosnia and Congo was considered uncertain at the basic considerations and resulted in the UN forces to drop credibility among the warring nations. The UN missions persistently depended upon the consent of the warring parties to continue operations. In Bosnia the UN officials were hesitant to exert airpower to combat attacks against the safe regions, partially due to the threats of retaliation, but also since they feared such action would make it emerge that they were taking sides in an internal fight. Besides the UN mission in Bosnia attained roadblocks, sought clearance from the warring factions before moving its vehicles, and allowed the warring factions to effect the deployment of troop contingents. Such activities partially replicate the fundamental organizational principle of ensuring that the sovereignty of its members is regarded at all times. (U.N. Peacekeeping: Issues Related to Effectiveness, Cost, and Reform)