United States and empire: historical analysis and implications

¶ … U.S. An Empire?

IS the UNITED STATES an EMPIRE?

Although the United States may be a hegemonic power or even an empire, a world without strong U.S. leadership would be less peaceful, less stable, and less prosperous. However, from the point of realism, the course set by the United States in the present is one that is hurling the republic toward becoming an empire.

THE AMERICAN EMPIRE

The work of Charles S. Maier entitled: "Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors" writes that: "For David Ramsay, delivering what he believed was America's first Independence Day oration on July 4, 1778, empire meant size and the future confluence 'of the different nations of the Old World, which will rise superior to any of its component parts.' The South Carolina patriot and his contemporaries envisioned settlement of a vast of temperate climate and great rivers and forests. They predicted little resistance from the sparse native population, and they were confidence to achieving eventual parity with the European powers. They believed the American republican message would knit together a huge unison of continental scope; in that sense as Jefferson said the United States would be an empire of liberty." (Maier, 2006 p. 1) According to John O'Sullivan, "Democracy and empire would progress hand in hand." (Maier, 2006; p.1) in this view, "America...would both expand and act as a force for good. Both doing both at once has not proved so easy as it promised to be at the dawn of the republic." (Maier, 2006; p.3)

II. A MOMENTOUS DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS U.S. POLICY

The work of Rashid Khalidi states that: "The 2003 war on Iraq was indeed a momentous departure from what most American fancied had always been the posture of their country in the twentieth century with respect to military conflict: that the nation would go to war only after being attacked." (2004; p.2) Khalidi notes that the war in Iraq "clearly does not fit into this pattern, for evil and aggressive through the Iraqi Bathist regime of Saddam Hussein certainly was, it had never directly attacked the United States." (2004; p.2) Iraq was considered by its neighbors to be such a minor threat that Iraq's immediate neighbors did not support what was considered "an unprovoked attack on it..." (2004; p.2) This new brand of want was stated of President Bush in September 2002 to be "waged to assure that American values prevailed..." (Khalidi, 2004; p. 2) President Bush had further stated that "these values...are right and true for every person in every society" and "as a matter of common sense, American will act against...emerging threats before they are fully formed...in the new world we have entered the only path to peace and security is the path of action." (Khalidi, 2004; p.3) Khalidi states: "This approach was dubbed 'a distinctly American internationalism' by the Bush Administration." (Khalidi, 2004; p.4)

III. ELEMENTS of an EMPIRE DEFINED

Maier makes an examination of "the recurring elements of empires and asks to what extent the United States shares these attributes and what some of the possible consequences for our current political choices..." are. Maier writes that the United States "has become an empire of a new type, its ascendancy based not only on military superiority, but on economic and technological prowess and the appeal of its popular culture. The United States allegedly dominates by virtue of soft as well as hard power." (2006; p.8) Maier points out that it is not only territorial frontiers boundaries established by empires because empire also: "...to defend internal sociopolitical frontiers as well as external boundaries." (2006; p. 10) Empires are both "horizontal and vertical structures of governance - extending their gradients of privilege and participation outward through space and downward into society." (Maier, 2006; p. 10) Rome's republic lasted 2000 years and fell into ruin in the mere space of 12 years, Maier states that: "Ruination, does not mean just defeat, it can mean an acceptance of violence and even torture, a coarsening of values, the arrogance that insists, no matter what brutal exceptions may ensue: "Trust us; we're uniquely selfless." (Maier, 2006; p.11) Maier states of empires that they "have a voracious appetite for self-celebration and they reward their talented wordsmiths. An empire - we insist on this - is not just a state that subjugates other peoples or states. It is not just a 'superstate' or a large component of the state system. It is a system of rule that transforms society at home even as it stabilizes inequality transnationally by replicating it geographically, in the core and on the periphery." (Maier, 2006; p.21) the empire is driven by expansion because of the position it must take to defend the previous expansion already made. Alternatively, as stated by Maier the "empire does not emerge as a fit of absence of mind. Instead, it represents a fit of what social scientists call a path dependency, that is, clinging to choices made early on whose reversal seems unthinkable. The imperial project is sustained, not because its advocates always press it further, but because even the hesitate can see no 'responsible' way to liquidate it." (Maier, 2006; p. 21) What is left behind according to Maier "is a body - the earlier republic body politic now transformed. Maier states that it is impossible to actually understand:."..the structural order of domestic and international politics apart from each other. (p. 145) This is stated to be because "the structure and inequalities of empire recapitulate themselves at all levels of international, national, and local activity, although often with more naked brutality abroad or in racial enclaves at home." (Maier, 2006; p. 146) Andrew Hurrell writes: "...the changing norms of international society have had a significant impact on the character of the great power club. Being a great power has never been solely about the possession of large amounts of crude material power. It has been closely related to notions of legitimacy and authority. A state can claim great power status, but membership of the club of great powers is a social category that depends on recognition by others; by your peers in the club, but also by smaller and weaker states willing to accept the legitimacy and authority of those at the top of the international hierarchy." (p.4) Hurrell relates that the difficulties "facing potential aspirants to the great power club is the criteria for membership may militate against them...or the criteria may change in ways that work against their particular interests." (Hurrell, p. 4) According to Hurrell, two theories exist relating to the distribution of power and "...the patterns of power politics that result. For neo-realists, the crucial feature of any system is the distribution of material power, and hence the dominant political reality of the post-Cold War order is the preponderance of the United States. Military power and war are central to understanding how power is distributed and what counts as a great power: 'Great powers are determined on the basis of their relative military capability. To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world.'" (Hurrell, p. 4) According to Hurrell: "From this perspective, the puzzle of the post-Cold War period, and even more of the post-September 11 period, has been the absence of overt balancing behavior against the United States. Some explain this simply as a reflection of the overwhelming power of the United States. Others suggest that whether or not balancing behavior occurs reflects not just the fact of U.S. power but rather how the U.S. uses that power. U.S. predominance will be stable to the extent that Washington plays to its soft power strengths and its reputation for non-expansionist intentions. Thus the U.S. will get more of what it wants if it recognizes the extent and potential of its soft power and acts judiciously on that recognition. " (Hurrell, p. 6) However, the argument also exists that stability is greatly dependent upon the self-restraint of the United States as well as its "willingness to engage with international institutions as a means of signaling that strategic restraint." (p. 6)

IV. REALISM and RESTRAINT

Huslman and Lieven (2005) in the work entitled: "The Ethics of Realism" write that the greatest gift imparted to the United States and the world-at-large is the political achievement "...of knitting together a bipartisan coalition determined to promote containment regardless of which party was in power. The Truman administration succeeded in politically isolating the left wing in the Democratic Party that favored some form of accommodation with the Soviet Union, epitomized by the former Vice President Henry Wallace." (p.1) it has traditionally been the thought of most Americans that policy containing no moral constraints and aims should be avoided and this is evidence by the public opinion of Americans during the cold war in relation to the support provided by the U.S. To ruthless dictators" even when there were compelling reasons of national interest to do so." (Huslman and Lieven, 2005; p.2) Since September 11, 2001, "both neoconservatives and Democratic hawks has sought to make this specific moral notion the central element of American foreign policy, particularly in the case of the Muslim world." (Huslman and Lieven, 2005; p. 2) Americans are at the present relating concern "by the seemingly limitless ambition of this project and the severe geopolitical risks to which it could lead." (p.2) Ethical realism is said to stand for "...an international strategy based on prudence; a concentration on possible results rather than good intentions; a close study of the nature, views and interest of other states and a willingness to accommodate them when possible; and a mixture of profound American patriotism withy an equally profound awareness of the limits both on American power and American goodness." (Huslman and Lieven, 2005; p. 6-7) it is stated that in relation to realism, which is essentially moralism that "Any foreign policy without a moral component should be anathema to a country that aspires to stand as "a shining city on a hill' to the rest of the world." (Huslman and Lieven, 2005; p. 7) Morgethau states that: "The equation of political moralizing with morality and of political realism with immorality is itself untenable. The choice is not between moral principles and the national interest, devoid of moral dignity, but between one set of moral principles divorced from political reality and another set of moral principles derived from political reality." (Huslman and Lieven, 2005; p. 7) According to Huslman and Lieven: "There is little doubt...that the world is fortunate that the United States stands as the ordering power at the century's end. A strong America is the bastion of the present civilized political order. However, neoconservatives, through their policies of expending blood and treasure for problematic gains such as Iraq, are significantly retarding America's ability to act against the true barbarians at the gate - Al Qaeda and Islamic extremists." (Huslman and Lieven, 2005; p. 8)