How the War on Terror Resembles the Vietnam War

Cold War and the War on Terror

The Cold War (CW) and the War against Terror (WAT) were similar in several ways and different in other important aspects. Each is situated in its own particular political and social era. The CW emerged in the post-WW2 years and was inextricably linked with a number of dynamic variables then shaping the global geopolitical spectrum: these variables included the rise of the Military-Industrial Complex, identified by Eisenhower as a threat to global peace and American security/prosperity in his outgoing speech on the eve of his departure from the White House (Stone, Kuznick); also included was the propaganda campaign regarding the containment of Communism (even though this was not an issue in WW2, as the U.S. was allied with the leader of the largest Communist nation in the world, Stalin of the Soviet Union -- and together they fought one of the only countries in Europe actually waging war against the Communists -- Germany); a third variable was the rise of the neo-conservative agenda manifested under the Ford Administration, who brought men like Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz (the neo-con war haws of the more recent WAT disaster) into the political fold; a fourth variable was the role of Israel in the modern geopolitical discourse, which occupied the last days of the Kennedy presidency, as JFK attempted to keep Israel from getting nuclear weapons (just prior to his assassination), and which would later become a major political hammer in the WAT (as more and more AIPAC-sponsored Congressman sought to represent Israel as an "ally" and one that should be protected in the WAT in the Middle East).

These variables intertwined with the WAT era (with the same neo-con representatives exerting influence in the White House to pursue a WAT in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, etc.), and similarities could easily be drawn between the use of bogus evidence to incite the public against the "enemy" -- Gulf of Tonkin for Vietnam during the Cold War and yellow cake uranium from Niger for the Iraq invasion in the War against Terror. Thus the two Wars can be compared and contrasted in these terms -- but also in strategic warfare terms, such as how the wars in Vietnam and in the Middle East were conducted, how insurgents reacted, how locals were trained and armed, whether crimes against humanity were committed, etc. This paper will examine these aspects of the two Wars and discuss their relation.

CW: Profit and Geopolitical Imperialism

The desire of the American Presidents Johnson and Bush (II) to appear "tough" to their opponent was evident in both wars. Immediately, following the Gulf of Tonkin incident -- which was never fully validated, as Hunt points out (84-85), Johnson had launched an attack on North Vietnam, asserting, "I didn't just screw Ho Chi Minh ... I cut his pecker off" (Hunt 85). The bravado inherent in that statement was representative of Johnson and the Cold War leaders' overall aggressive attitude toward their foes: America was determined to confront any challenge (no matter how insignificant or weak) with full force. Underlying this display was an imperialistic agenda (Vietnam had been a colony of France prior to the attempt by the U.S. to secure it (from any Soviet advancement) -- but there was also the MIC agenda: war is profitable for the military-industrial complex, and General Smedley Butler said as much in his assessment of America's neo-colonial wars prior to the 1930s during his public lecture circuit which culminated in the publication of his talk "War is a Racket."

At the same time, Johnson had no problem backing down from an Israeli attack on the U.S.S. Liberty in 1967 during Israel's Six-Day War with its neighbors in the Middle East. Perhaps the reason is found in the fact that Johnson was good friends with Zionists like Mathilde Krim (ex-member of the Irgun, who spent time with Johnson in the White House during the war) (Segev 383). Or perhaps it was that America had no geopolitical interests in the Middle East at that time other than to facilitate the agenda of Israel in its territorial pursuits/conquests by providing behind the scenes support. In Asia, it was a different matter altogether. The Vietnam War was a protracted engagement that became interminable and the purpose of which became blurred as protestors at home were shot and killed (students at Kent State University in Ohio, for example) and the MIC continued its weapons production, selling helicopters and the like to the government at a rate that would have made Smedley Butler ashamed, had he not already been dead for 25 years.

With the assassination of President Diem in South Vietnam (under orders of Washington, no less), the situation in the area was altogether untenable (leaders were propped up by the West until they were no longer useful, then they were pulled -- fast as a building on fire) (Kinzer 159-165). Confusion reigned -- just as it later would in Iraq and Afghanistan during the War on Terror. No matter the title given the actions of the U.S., the aims and outcomes were similar: in both cases, the objective was regime change. In South Vietnam, Diem had become unpopular and no longer served as a viable tool for Washington -- so he was the victim of a Washington-sponsored coup. Then the war in Vietnam heated up (once Kennedy received the same treatment at home and the war-hungry Johnson stepped into office) and the MIC went into overdrive. At the same time, the propaganda machine set the presses rolling, with tales of the inhumanity of the North Vietnamese and the need to install democracy and self-determination in the region -- even though self-determination was exactly what Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese were doing without any help from the U.S. (Stone, Kuznick). The same propaganda practices would be seen during the War on Terror, as endless articles would appear in the popular press and the same talking heads on the 24-hour news stations calling for a full-scale invasion of Iraq (Colin Powell's testimony before the UN on how Saddam had mobile weapons labs -- actual pictures of which could not be given, because there were no real mobile weapons labs, which is why the U.S. offered cartoon drawings/representations of the supposed labs where the non-existent chemical weapons were being constructed for further non-existence plans by Saddam to terrorize the West). Powell's own humiliation upon realizing that he and the rest of the U.S. had been duped by bogus intelligence, fabricated by the neo-cons in Washington, such as Perle, Libby, Wolfowitz et al., resulted in his resignation (Stone, Kuznick). Bush (II), however, was just as determined as Johnson had been to eradicate the North Vietnamese Communists, and did not care whether intelligence was accurate or not: his intention was to overthrow Hussein and the fact that it coincided with neo-con agenda to reshape the Middle East according to Israeli interests in a veritable extension of the territorial expansion initiated in the Six-Days War made it all the better.

Johnson's eagerness to help the MIC, pursue the interests of the geopolitical imperialists, and turn the other cheek at the assaults of the Zionists on an American ship (an assault in which American servicemen were actually killed -- unlike in the Gulf of Tonkin incident) not only speaks to the hypocrisy of the American government at this time but underscores the uneven nature of the U.S. government's preoccupations at the time. Being tough was something that Johnson preferred only to show to the Asians and the Soviets -- in terms of being tough in response to direct attacks on his own ships near Israel, there was not even a hint of aggressiveness or assertiveness. The Cold War was a machine that was just as confused as the outcomes of the regime change in South Vietnam. The same confusion would reappear in Iraq following Bush (II)'s overthrow/execution of Saddam Hussein on bogus/trumped-up charges of being a war criminal, harboring WMDs, and supporting the attack on America on 9/11. The actual Middle East supporters of that attack (Saudi Arabia and Israel) were let off the hook (and only today, with Saudi Arabia at odds with the U.S. over its oil policy directives, are the "28 pages" from the 9/11 Commission's Report now being discussed openly by politicians, who say they would like to see the sensitive information made public). The fact is that Iraq was never about WMDs or about 9/11 -- it was about Israel and the Washington-based neo-con/Zionists' plan for a "clean break" and a new "American (Israel) Century" in the Middle East (Davis 51).

WAT: Afghanistan and Vietnam

In terms of strategic planning and execution, the wars were similar: in Vietnam, the U.S. aimed to train locals to fight the North; and in Iraq and Afghanistan, the same was done -- however, the U.S. had also trained and supported and weaponized locals in Afghanistan during the Cold War to fight off the Soviet presence in the Middle East in the 1980s. The Mujahedeen morphed into al-Qaeda, which morphed into ISIS today -- and one can trace back the interventions of the U.S. in each phase of development, illustrating how the U.S.'s plan to train and arm locals typically comes back to haunt it in the Middle East. In Vietnam, there was less risk of this development, as the endgame was less clear than the neo-con Middle East policy, which was extensively outlined in detail by numerous persons, from Israel's own Oded Yinon to the Weekly Standard's Wiliam Kristol and the PNAC papers. It was Kristol who unapologetically announced, echoing Johnson's "tough" guise, that "We need to err on the side of being strong. And if people want to say we're an imperial power, fine" (Ferguson 5). The Middle Eastern policy, as far as the neo-cons were concerned was about destabilizing regions and toppling the dominos. It was about spreading the Empire and being "strong" -- but strong for whom? For the American people? Or for vested interests (the MIC, the Israeli-U.S. citizens in Washington, the terrorist-supporting allies of the U.S. including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, who's own former PM had self-identified as the "father" of terrorism in the whole world) (Howe 38-39).

In Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, etc., there was also a domino-toppling initiative (Kinzer 154), with counter-insurgency efforts cooked up by the CIA, which also had its hands full under Nixon, dealing with Watergate fallout and ties to men like E. Howard Hunt, who threatened to spill the beans on what he knew about Nov. 22nd, 1963, if he didn't receive his bribe money. The indifference to human life that the U.S. showed in each instance of War, whether in Vietnam or in the Middle East, with its high-altitude bombing campaigns, which resulted in considerable "collateral damage" that the U.S. was always willing to shrug off (collateral damage is much more PR-friendly expression than "civilian casualties") (Ferguson 147). But high-altitude bombing in the Middle East morphed into high-altitude "drones" and drone attacks that could also result in the same kind of collateral damage (wedding parties, Doctors Without Borders hospitals) but be conducted from the other side of the planet by a man using remote control video-game like handles. The "social" aspect of War that Clausewitz had identified in his War Treatise was gone: this was wholesale destruction -- Total War -- in the name of Empire, which Kristol admitted shruggingly was "fine" with him -- so long as his objectives were met.

Crimes against humanity piled up as a result -- on both sides: terror attacks grew, and have been seen in Brussels, Paris, Boston, California, and continue almost unendingly in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and on. Fire-bombing campaigns in Asia during the Cold War were just as notoriously viewed and no matter where one looked, the U.S. when viewed objectively could not but appear as a blind behemoth striking out in all directions for the sake of "freedom" and "democracy" while it simultaneously scorched the earth and participated in the separation of the souls from the bodies of millions -- in both eras. Afghanistan had been a disaster from the start with the U.S. attempting to fight an insurgency (al-Qaeda) that was as dug-in as the North Vietnamese had been -- and as recalcitrant. The terrorist group in Afghanistan was, moreover, as emboldened ideologically speaking as the North Vietnamese had been, and were just as determined to fight to the death in order to oust the invaders (both countries' insurgents viewed the U.S. as such). Afghanistan was a war to which there could be no real end short of total decimation of the country -- and even then, there was Saudi Arabia in the wings willing to export/funnel terrorists back into the country just as it had done in the 1980s when it served as a terror pipeline for the U.S. in its proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan at the time.