US Foreign Policy and The Use of American Military Power

“As Long as The Personal and Societal Safety of American Citizens Is at Risk from External Threats, Historical Precedents Suggest That Rather Few Limits Will Be Placed on The Use of American Military Power, Or on The Constraints the United States Will Impose on The Peoples of Other Countries.”
The government of America exists for its citizens’ welfare, an obligation which encompasses being in charge of both its internal and external affairs. US foreign policy’s key principles are: defense of the physical territory of America, safeguarding citizens from attacks by enemies, promoting the status and economic interests of America, and promoting the nation’s democracy- and freedom- related values across the world. By end-twentieth century, the US’s foreign policy entailed relationships with a total of 159 states that were typically competitive, supportive at times, and at other times clearly unfriendly (Deutsch, 1997).
The government’s executive wing has largely remained in charge of US foreign policy. The President of the United States is accorded constitutional power to forge treaties, command the nation’s army, and enter into executive agreements which don’t require Congress approval. Consequently, he is ideally positioned to delineate as well as pursue the international aims of the nation (Rosen, 2003).
A number of entities give advice and attempt to influence the President on matters of foreign policy, including the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, high-ranking citizens, the Council of Foreign Relations and similar interest groups. Additionally, public opinion shapes foreign policy. The threat of getting ousted from office for an unpopular decision typically restrains excessively-aggressive lawmakers. (Deutsch, 1997).
The Soviet’s disbanding was accompanied by a post-Cold War intermission in the US. It can be better understood now as a transitional era marked by insecurity, with the nation struggling to ascertain its role within a global system having no one existential threat remaining.
The decades-long Cold War’s culmination meant that military dissuasion was not so relevant to America anymore. Terrorist acts (e.g., 9/11) were more pressing threats to the nation’s security. For safeguarding the nation and its citizens against such attacks, the DHS (homeland security department) was instituted by the US Congress in the year 2002. The Department’s mission was preventing terror attacks and aiding with recovery efforts if such attacks did occur. It combined numerous federal organizations such as the US Secret Service, Coast Guard, and FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) (Deutsch, 1997).
Thus began America’s fight against terrorism, which targeted terrorist outfits as well as the states which supported them. The foremost action on America’s part was leading an armed expedition with global coalition to eliminate the al-Qaeda terror outfit based in Afghanistan. Besides this organization, which claimed responsibility for the twin-tower attacks of 9/11, the mission also aimed at overthrowing the Taliban rule – the Afghan government which supported and sheltered the al-Qaeda. Consequently, in the year 2002, the regime fell, with al-Qaeda terrorists being forced to take flight. The US vowed to keep up its struggle against terrorism worldwide (Gill, 1993).
The Defense Department reflects a constant ethic of military control by civilians, with the Defense Secretary and individual army branches’ secretaries being civilians. The Department initially combined the naval and army departments, integrating them with America’s Air Force. But with time, this structure became more dispersed, growing to add to itself organizations like the NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), Joint Chiefs of Staff, and NSA (National Security Agency) (Rosen, 2003).
The Defense Department’s jurisdiction largely covers the sizable quantity of military-devoted tax money. During the latter part of the 90s, its yearly budget was more than 250 billion dollars. Further, over three million individuals (defense force members as well as civilians) were in the Department’s employ. The figure for the year 1998 was: 480,721 individuals actively serving within the US Army, 377,039 working for the Naval Forces, 365,639 Air Force employees, and 173,031 employed as Marine Corps members (Deutsch, 1997).
The start of this century saw US citizens’ lives interwoven into global affairs, events, and problems with local repercussions. With the collapse of the USSR in the year 1991 marking the culmination of the decades-long Cold War, America came up with novel foreign policy doctrines. Of these, the most salient included an attempt at more narrowly defining national interests. The Cold War’s ending implied America stopped considering every single international controversy as unavoidably needing some form of reaction. Furthermore, US citizens favor pursuit of national goals using negotiation and diplomatic tactics; military force ought only to be deployed in case of clear, realizable aims. They aren’t as tolerant as they were in the era of the Cold War when it comes to US military involvement abroad in case of vaguely-defined aims. Further, with the increased partisan nature of the legislative and executive wings, the Congress displays decreased likelihood of supporting armed forces action without comprehensive information disclosure. In the future, the Presidents of the nation will have to clearly cite reasons for using force (Rosen, 2003).
At one time, US dominance was unparalleled and unchallenged. Russia weakened under the struggle to rise above the legacy left behind by a seventy-year-long Communist regime. The European continent was consolidated and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization expanded. For some time, this dominance appeared to suffice. The biggest conventional security concern – averting another war for power – was eliminated. American policy appeared to guide and resolve key regional disputes (in Korea and the Middle Eastern regions) (Rosen, 2003).
However, without a central US policy idea, this age was characterized by a step forward and a step backward. For instance, the nation achieved considerable headway in the field of international economics, with the establishment of the WTO (World Trade Organization) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), but faced unpleasant, unexpected setbacks in the form of the Fast Track authority’s expiry, the disastrous WTO meeting of 1999 held in Seattle, and financial crises across the globe. Democracy experienced an unprecedented growth, though in several areas, it was shallow-rooted and susceptible to failure and backlash.
During the last decade of the 20th century, the Yugoslav succession wars and quandaries of Somalia, Haiti and other "failed" nations, ensured humanitarian intervention was prioritized in the US foreign policy’s agenda. Kosovo witnessed a fair amount of success, though Rwanda was an utter disaster. Confusion reigned over policy objectives as well as means (Rosen, 2003).
Nevertheless, in spite of ambiguity, a majority of citizens felt an apparently unstoppable positive trend was being depicted in global developments. Thus, from the US standpoint, foreign participation was an issue of choice, rather than necessity. The territory outside the nation appeared to offer privileged security to US citizens as their major threat – the Soviet – had collapsed. Despite increased transnational threats owing to WMD (weapons of mass destruction) propagation, contagious ailments, environmental deterioration, and terrorism, Americans felt secure in their homeland. The safeguarding of normal life from external sources of threat appeared to be a second-order and affordable proposition (Haass, 2002).
The short period of self-satisfaction came to an abrupt, ugly end for America with the shocking attacks of 9/11, on none other than the US Pentagon and World Trade Center. The envisaged post- post-Cold War era never transpired. The US was forced to realize that the area of foreign policy continues to be highly important, and its oceans and ICBMs fail to suffice in granting the nation safety against hostile entities. The events emphasized the fact that if the nation fails to involve with the rest of the world, it doesn’t mean the rest of the world won’t; and sometimes, one will not like how they decide to do so (Rosen, 2003).
Thus, with 9/11 came the culmination of the nation’s naïveté and the dawn of an era where increasingly powerful international issues intersect with conventional concerns that continue to hold significance. The events of 9/11 were an ugly reminder of the way globalization raised risks of transnational attack. The perpetrators utilized the World Wide Web and mobile phones for communication, wired funds, and made missiles out of civilian aircrafts, claiming 3,000 innocent lives on American soil.
Threats from transnational sources may pose obvious dangers to citizens’ lifestyle, thereby calling for a firm response. Concurrently, the nation lacks the luxury to solely concentrate on such threats (Rosen, 2003), owing to the fact that conventional challenges persist and are still capable of doing considerable harm. They are mostly part of the security domain and entail matters of peace and war, usually, but not entirely, between countries. Some such challenges post-9/11 were the situations within the Middle Eastern region, Korea, Columbia, and between Pakistan and India, besides threats posed by Iraq’s potential WMD possession (Haass, 2002).
With respect to empires’ history versus that of interstate relationships, America’s current position isn’t so strange. Military capability owing to extensive active armed forces engagement and superior personnel training gives rise to forces adept at transforming people into a fighting power. In fact, the Gulf War’s irregular military outcome was perhaps due to organizational capability rather than superior technology. Though considerable discussions of how information technology improves weapons, thus initiating a military affairs revolution, have taken place, far less emphasis has been laid on US armed forces training revolution guided by Vietnam War-linked challenges. Post-Vietnam War reforms at Fort Irwin’s National Training Center allowed for very realistic combined arms combat training. The American Navy’s Top Gun initiative offered realistic midair combat training, as did the Air Force’s Red Flag trainings. Information processing advancements facilitated fully-networked, computer-based armored combat training. By 1991, information from continuous military campaigns helped come up with and fine-tune warfare training simulators. Moreover, the shift from conscript armed forces to one with entirely voluntary enrollment enabled and necessitated extensive institution of such rigorous training techniques, and repetitive post-Cold War military deployment provided strong incentives for maintaining such rigorous training initiatives (Rosen, 2003).
Sound imperial governance needs to emphasize maintenance and, where possible, growth in initial advantage when it comes to military power generation capability. This explains American policy targeted at controlling airborne missile and WMD proliferation. Citizens view these attempts as being part of the endeavor towards ensuring global "stability”, which is for everyone’s good as it prevents the expensive, unneeded arms race. But from an imperial practice standpoint, America’s non-proliferation policy is an exemplary case of imperial attempts at dominating military power forms which contribute to its supremacy (Haass, 2002).
In addition, imperial governance entails rule-making and implementation. The empire’s foremost rule is: forbidding behavior which jeopardizes its position of power. Contemporary alliance diplomacy and nonproliferation pacts belong to the collection of imperial regulations the US develops and imposes. The Japan-US defense pact, NATO, and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) treaty aren’t exactly pacts between equals; rather, they may be regarded as security guarantees America accords to its subordinates and serve as means to codify interstate hierarchy. The American government’s proposed role in the year 2002, of taking pre-emptive action for destroying enemy states’ WMD construction efforts, logically extends from that policy; it is enabled by America’s improved position of power in the post-Cold War world (Haass, 2002).
In the year 2003, America attempted to basically tackle the self-same issues using, basically, the same theoretical choice of reactions. Its military strength may still reach breaking point if faced with multiple enemy parties unable to directly challenge the nation using military force, but capable of using unconventional methods to wreak havoc. Even prior to the al-Qaeda attacks, America’s armed forces were worn down by sweeping campaigns targeted at the maintenance of appropriate international order within Haiti, Bosnia and other places. Growing international terrorism indicates hostile parties’ capability of exploiting American borders’ penetrability. The nation’s response, up until now, has entailed applying force, and subsequently, withdrawing and ruling indirectly. Less emphasis has been laid on developing defensive zones or impediments (Rosen, 2003).
As in previous times, one cannot expect such impediments or offensive raids to be entirely successful; more superior internal security may be achieved economically. Tactics ought to be evaluated based on measures of economy of force, rather than as tools to guarantee absolute safety (Haass, 2002).
Another distinctive element of the US Empire in the present day is its putative nature, being governed by a democratic form of governance which espouses equality and sets store by the formal limits imposed on its personal power. The aforementioned principles are at odds with the imperial inclination of hierarchy and exerting extra-legal, unreserved violence. The nation is certainly capable of immense ruthlessness and hypocrisy, though its most blatant demonstrations of imperial influence have remained sporadic: intense, though of limited scope and duration. As imperial governance needs to self-sustain for several decades to actually work, a question worth posing is whether America, keeping in mind its principles, may be able to sustain the sort of imperial actions necessary for years together (Haass, 2002).











References
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Gill, S. (Ed.). (1993). Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations (Vol. 26). Cambridge University Press.
Gill, S. (Ed.). (2013). Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations (Vol. 26). Cambridge University Press.
Haass, R. N. (2002). Defining US Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World: The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association.
Haass, R. N., & Director, P. P. S. (2002). Defining US foreign policy in a post-post-Cold War world. Remarks to the Foreign Policy Association.
Kroenig, M. (2017). The Case for Trump's Foreign Policy: The Right People, the Right Positions. Foreign Aff., 96, 30.
Rosen, S. P. (2003). An empire, if you can keep it. The National Interest, (71), 51-61.