U.S. Ignorance of Stalin\'s Crimes

U.S. ignorance of Stalin's crimes for political and diplomatic purposes

The history of the Soviet Union represents one of the most controversial aspects of the history of the world. Its turbulent past as well as its complex leaders led Russia to be considered one of the strangest and yet most fascinating subjects of study in the history of our civilization. The Second World War was in this sense one of the most representative moments in the contemporary times. More precisely, the directions which the European and American diplomacy was heading in determined the way in which the U.S.S.R. behaved and treated its own citizens. From this point-of-view, it can be said that the period of the Great Purge is relevant for underling two important issues. On the one hand, the Soviet Union engaged itself in one of the most atrocious events in the history of the human kind. On the other hand, the U.S. diplomacy, together with the European political scene did not consider the full extent of the atrocities that were taking place in Russia prior to the World War. Even more, they refused to intervene despite the fact that they were relatively aware of what was actually going on the Russian territory.

There are numerous reasons which determined a lack of action in relation to the Soviet purge from 1937-8. In any case, they all relate to the political situation in Europe at the time and the growing tensions between the countries. Therefore, the way in which every country acted was directed by the national interest in the context of an inevitable war, the Second World War. From this point-of-view it can be said that by overlooking the mass killings authorized and conducted by Stalin and the Soviet leadership, the western countries ensured the Russian support against the Japanese and German opposition.

Part 1: Introduction

Thesis

The present paper will assess the degree in which the Soviet rule managed to undergo a massive purge in the years preceding World War Two without being controlled or stopped by any additional forces such as the Western countries. Indeed, the entire array of events should and must be placed in a historical background for the era; therefore, the paper will deal initially with the situation in Europe and in Russia in particular in order to include the actions of the Russian side in a wider environment of political actions. In addition, the discussion will focus on the way in which the U.S. In particular chose to deal with the situation that was taking place in the 1937-8 Russia although there was no lack of proper information regarding this aspect.

There has been a lot of debate around the subject of misinformation, misinterpretation, and even on the lack of information concerning the events that took place in the U.S.S.R. However, there is evidence that although the public opinion was little aware of the massive killings, the political leaders refused to take into account the constant messages sent from the Soviet Union. Therefore, the question arises over the actual reasons for which the Western world refused to consider and even act against the atrocities. More precisely, the paper discusses the issue of whether the U.S. ignored Stalin's crimes for its own political and diplomatic purposes. In this sense, the thesis is that indeed, the United States refused to use its political and diplomatic tools to prevent the killings and intervene to stop them.

Historiography

There are various opinions on the way in which the U.S. behaved as a result of the U.S.S.R.'s "Great Purge" of the late 30s. Firstly, there are historians who argue the fact that Stalin's actions were either misinterpreted or justified by the historical circumstances. Moreover, it was considered that the events of the time had been the subject of subjective interpretation. In this sense, the Hungarian born historian, Rittersporn argued that there has been little research done in this area and for this period, a fact which weights heavily of the accuracy of the facts from that period. More precisely, he argues that "If... one tries to publish a tentative analysis of some almost totally unknown material, and to use it to throw new light on the history of the Soviet Union in the 1930s and the part that Stalin played in it, one discovers that opinion tolerates challenges to the received wisdom far less than one would have thought.... The traditional image of the "Stalin phenomenon" is in truth so powerful, and the political and ideological value-judgments which underlie it are so deeply emotional, that any attempt to correct it must also inevitably appear to be taking a stand for or against the generally accepted norms that it implies" (1991, 23). Therefore it can be argued that there is a certain lack of information or willingness to acquire the information that determines a negative or positive outlook on the issue.

Secondly, there have been discussions on the validity of the charges Stalin had brought on the ones he executed, tried, and convicted to decades in jail. In this sense, taking into account the fact that the Great Purge officially came as a result of a military insurrection, the official motivation for the start of the massacre was related to the bringing about the order in the country and destroying the enemies of the system which were sabotaging the upper levels of leadership. Therefore, presentations of that period underline the presence of subversive actions. Thus, "this party apparat, which should be helping the party, not infrequently puts itself between the party masses and the party leaders, and still further increases the alienation of the leaders from the masses" (Getty 1985, 137).

By comparison, there are views which see the actual conditions of the killings and of the mass murders. Thus, a former Belgian officer who analyzed the process of the Great Purge pointed out the fact that "Stalin would use methods that would have appalled Lenin. The Georgian had no trace of human sentiment. Starting with Kirov's assassination (in 1934), the Soviet Union underwent a bloodbath, presenting the spectacle of the Revolution devouring its own sons. Stalin, said Deutscher, offered to the people a regime made of terror and illusions. Hence, the new liberal measures corresponded with the flow of blood of the years 1936 -- 1939. It was the time of those terrible purges, of that 'dreadful spasm'. The interminable series of trials started. The 'old guard' of heroic times would be annihilated. The main accused of all these trials was Trotsky, who was absent. He continued without fail to lead the struggle against Stalin, unmasking his methods and denouncing his collusion with Hitler" (Bernard, 1982, 52-3) Therefore, his argument for the purge was different from Rittersporn's who considered the causes to justify the consequences.

Part 2: Stalin's crimes

The Great Purges were by no means a spontaneous affair. The main causes of the oppressive measures that were imposed in 1936 and 1937 had been the results of a struggle for power which had its roots in the Russian Revolution which overthrew the Tsarist regime at the end of the First World War. In this sense, it can be argued that the revolution had encourage the creation of an important ideological difference that influenced greatly the way in which Russian politics would be later on conducted. Thus, "it was itself a means of enforcing violent change upon that society and that party. But all the same, it could not have been launched except against the extraordinarily idiosyncratic background of Bolshevik rule; and its special characteristics, some of them hardly credible to foreign minds, derive from a specific tradition. The dominating ideas of the Stalin period, the evolution of the oppositionists, the very confessions in the great show trials, can hardly be followed without considering not so much the whole Soviet past as the development of the Party, the consolidation of the dictatorship, the movements of faction, the rise of individuals, and the emergence of extreme economic policies" (Conquest, 1991, 3). Therefore, it can be said that the means used to erase the possible political challenge coming from the forces opposing the Communist regime were the direct result of the fact that Stalin and his supporters were determined to avoid any possible overthrow or subversive action of and against the regime.

There are various reasons considered to have been the cause of the Great Purges of the late 30s in the U.S.S.R. An important yet difficult to accept justification of the Soviet actions was the instilment of fear among the population. In this sense, it is considered by historians that "the purges affected everybody from the Politburo member down to the street cleaner" (Thurston, 1986, 214) Moreover, it is argued at the same time that the most important impact the purges had was on the country's elites (Thurston, 1986, 214). The effects were on the common people in particular however, as "the fear and distrust the purge engendered kept Stalin firmly in control until his death years later, and remained in the air for decades after that. In many ways, Russia is still recovering from it, trying to deal with the fact that only a few decades ago, it inflicted on itself one of the worst holocausts in human memory" (Hochschild, 1993). Therefore, the purges were used on the one hand to discourage the people and the elites in particular from establishing a dissident opposition or a negative pole of power that could have countered the Soviet regime.

Also, another possible justification of the way in which the Soviet regime acted in that period was the complete elimination of the possible negative influences from the old regimes or more precisely of the opposing forces in Russia. More precisely, "the decade of the 1930s saw the renewal of the Soviet leading stratum. During the period the.regime progressively unburdened itself of its legacy of class prejudice and rose to its full totalitarian posture" (Unger, 1969, 2). The regime of Stalin was greatly characterized by a series of events which underlined the massive violence it promoted throughout the decades of his rule. In this sense, it is considered that the only means available for Stalin to destroy the opposition is through their actual physical disappearance.

At the same time however, Stalin had long desired to create a certain strata of the society which could serve his immediate as well as the country's needs. Nonetheless, the idea of creating an apart of the society inside the Russian one is not necessarily a new idea as "the formation of a leading stratum of loyal and efficient power-holders (administrators, economic managers, army officers, scientists, engineers, etc.) was a major concern of Soviet policy in the I920. The partial reinstatement of 'bourgeois specialists', carried out against strong opposition within the party, was regarded as no more than a temporary expedient. In the Soviet view the only solution acceptable in the long run, in terms of both ideology and practical politics, lay in the creation of a new leading stratum drawn from the ranks of the 'formerly oppressed' and firmly anchored in the political hierarchy of the Communist Party" (Unger, 1959)

Finally, even Josef Stalin admitted the fact that the most important element in the conduct of international politics as he understood it terms of war was a purified and disciplined population. In this sense, he considered essential a reconsideration of the issue of political obedience. Thus, he pointed out, "we must finally understand that of all precious capital in the world, the most precious capital, the most decisive is human beings cadres. We must understand that in our present condition cadres decide everything. If we have good and plentiful cadres in industry, in agriculture, in transport, in the Army, our country will be invincible. If we have no such cadres we will limp with both legs" (Uldricks, 1977). Therefore, one of the actual motivations of the way in which the Soviet Union acted in the late 1930s was also the desire to create a strong, united, and most importantly disciplined population able and capable of dealing with the possible threat of a war.

Indeed, the historical background played a significant role in the manifestations of the Soviet Union and in particular of Stalin. The eventuality of a war became more and more a certainty. At that moment the revisionist desires of states such as Japan, Germany, or Italy were becoming a reality through the invasion of Manchuria by Japan and Italy's attack on Ethiopia. Similarly Germany was showing a rather aggressive policy through the constant remarks made at the independent status of Austria (Kissinger, 1995). Thus, "from 1937 on, Stalin was expecting war, and preparing for it (...) in view of the danger, he wanted the purge of the Party and state apparatus to coincide with a grand purge of society at large" (the Great Terror, n.d.).Therefore, it can be said that the U.S.S.R. was indeed preparing for a possible war against political powers that it considered to be superior and which demanded intense preparation.

The Great Purges had a very specific and important structure. They followed a particular path and sense of organization. On the one hand, in the beginning there were the political repressions that were designed against the so called political opposition of the regime. On the other hand, there were the persecutions that affected a large part of the people aimed for elimination.

The issue of the political repression included the repressions of the political adversaries of the Stalinist rule. However, he began preparing for the eventual reconsideration of the political scene from one which had been influenced by Trotsky's beliefs and political stands to one which was completely loyal to him and followed the same political precepts as he did. More precisely, "apart from the true politicians operating the overt machinery of Party and State, Stalin began from the 1920s to build up a personal group of agents, chosen for their lack of scruple and totally dependent on and devoted to himself (...) These men were truly disgusting characters by any standards, a cadre which had abandoned all normal political or even Communist standards and which may be regarded as in effect a personal group of hatchet men, ready for any violence or falsification at the orders of their leader" (Conquest, 1991, 14). Therefore, the first step in the Great Purges was the actual preparation of the methods through which the political society would be reshaped. The mechanism of the political life was essential for Stalin because it enabled him the opportunity to take control of the power as well as to exercise it on the people.

There were constant ideas concerning the possible infiltrations of the bourgeoisie forces which threatened the stability of the Stalinist regime. In this sense the confessions of those who had been engaged in such a process proved the validity of those ideas. Therefore, "starting in 1920, the open struggle against the Bolshevik plague ended. To fight against it from outside had become impossible. It had to be mined from within. A Trojan horse had to be infiltrated into the communist fortress.... All the threads of the dictatorship converged in the single knot of the Politburo. The coup d'etat would have to come from there" (Bajanov, 1930, 2). Therefore, it can be said that the intuition and the information Stalin had were somewhat real and that he was not driven by an enormous sense of paranoia.

At the same time however, it is important to underline the fact that not only was Stalin right about the possible infiltrations in the Party by other groups, but more importantly the fact that the Western parts believed his arguments and decided to refrain from any punitive action against Stalin in the following years. Still, even if the Western world had not believed his arguments, the political scene inside the country, as well as the international community was unable politically and diplomatically to stop or intervene in the war.

The start of the Purge can be considered to have taken place once all the members of the Party came under intense scrutiny. In this sense, in 1935 "a classified decision of 13 May I935, entitled 'On Disorders in the Registration, Issuance and Custody of Party Cards, and on Measures for the Regulation of this Matter' sought to intensify the examination of party members by initiating the verification of all personal party documents" (McNeal, 1971, 180). Thus, the first step was taken in the direction of the members of the own Party. This measure was taken in the attempt to clear the Party from all possible non-communist influence in order to have a reliable and trust worthy party structure.

The measures taken in terms of the political arena were further applied through precise persecutions. However, the campaign for political repression affected to a large extent the common individual. In an attempt to instill fear but at the same time to increase the control Stalin had on the population, the communist regime instituted the Gulag or the labor camps as they were named (Ellman, 2002, 1153). In this sense, it was a system through which people were deprived of their liberty and were taken in places and forced to work to exhaustion. This often happened to individual considered to be dangerous for the system and for the breach of the Party's ideology. More precisely, "The Gulag had two functions, punitive and economic. To implement the latter, its inmates had to provide large amounts of hard physical labor. Prisoners who could not do that and could not do any other kind of work were for many of its officials just an unwanted burden which worsened its economic success indicators" and they were subsequently released (Ellman, 2002, 1154)

Still, the condition in which they were released equaled that of being dead; however, there are no clear figures to view the impact the Gulag had on the population; still, "the large number of people recorded as being 'freed' are not necessarily a sign of the humaneness of the system but may simply reflect -- "at least in part -- "its callous attitude to its prisoners. Second, the official Gulag statistics on mortality in the camps understate mortality caused by the camps, since they exclude deaths taking place shortly after release but which resulted from conditions in the Gulag" (Ellman, 2002, 1159).

The persecution of political leaders during the Great Purge included several points of charge. In this sense, the most prominent defendants "were convicted of various anti-soviet activities including treason and given the death penalty" (Shapiro, 1968, 68). The process of persecution of the political leaders that had influenced the way in which former politics was conducted was that of the show trials which started in 1936 and ended well in 1938. This method of reconsideration of the situation of the individual was an important factor in the way in which former politicians were treated. More precisely, it was on the one hand the signal transmitted by the political police to the population that was important. It marked the end of an era in which a great part of the population believed in and which had been a clear impediment for the well being of the communist society. As former Ambassador Davis pointed out in his writings, "the occasion was dramatized for propaganda purposes. It was designed: first, as a warning to all existing and potential plotters and conspirators within the soviet Union" (Davis, 1941) the fact that former leaders of the Bolshevik movement were brought in front of the people tried to point out to the population the power and control of the current regime. This could have been a possible reason for the trials taking into account the fact that the proceedings could hardly have been considered to be a manifestation of justice.

Another reason for which it can be said that the trials represented an important moment in the history of the Great Purge is the fact that it made the former leaders of the Bolshevik regime more visible. In this sense, "the most visible victims -- the high party and state officials who appeared in the dock at the Moscow trials-party and state bureaucrats at the provincial and district levels" were aimed by the Soviet regime both for the practical reason of the elimination from the political scene, as well as from the example they set for the greater population that the former regime was finally gone (Connor, 1972, 406).

The Moscow Trials as they have been named started in 1936. They represented a series of show trials whose aim was to eliminate the persons that supported Trotsky and his followers. In this sense, Trotsky had been accused of having set in stage a wide complot against the Stalinist regime. Thus, "once Stalin had defeated Trotsky's Left Opposition, he turned on all his opponents, including his allies on the Right. The victory of the apparatus was to culminate in the infamous Moscow Trials of 1936-38 where the 'Old Bolsheviks', including Trotsky, who led the October Revolution, were accused of counter-revolutionary activity, sabotage, murder, and collaboration with fascism" (Sewell, 2000) From another point-of-view, "the Moscow trials occurred in the last phase of the conflict between the Party leadership and the "oppositions" which had arisen in the twenties. It is therefore relevant to recall very briefly a few points about these oppositions." (Leites and Bernaut, 1954, 9) Therefore, the actions taken were a sign of revenge and desire to completely eradicate the bourgeoisie influence.

The trials in themselves represented a series of three judicial appearances by some of the most representative members of the former regime and their sentencing to death or imprisonment. The first of the series had been triggered by the assassination of Sergei Kirov, governor of Leningrad which had been set in place by Stalin and was blamed on the former Bolshevik regime. Therefore, "Stalin arranged for Kirov to be shot (...) and on the same day, issued a decree hastening the trial and execution of those accused of 'terrorist acts'. Tens of thousands of people alleged by Stalin to be supporters of Leon Trotsky, the former commander of the Red Army and exiled leader of the Left Opposition within Stalin's Communist Party, were blamed for Kirov's murder and deported to Siberia. Zinoviev and Kamenev, also key Bolshevik leaders in the revolution of October 1917, were arrested. The works of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the brilliant left-wing economist Yevgeni Preobrazhensky were removed from libraries. The prestigious Society of Old Bolsheviks was disbanded, the Communist youth organization purged, and the death penalty lowered to include 12-year-olds" (the Moscow Trials, n.d.) Therefore, the executions were clear to have begun on a false accusation. Nonetheless, those involved had to pay dramatically. More precisely, "in August 1936, Zinoviev, Kamenev and 14 others were brought to dock. They were charged with helping Trotsky murder Kirov, attempts on the lives of Stalin's "henchmen on the Politburo, and plotting to shoot Stalin. No evidence in the form of confessions was produced, nor were those implicated in the fictitious conspiracy brought to the witness stand. After five days in court, all the defendants were sentenced to death. Executions followed swiftly" (the Moscow Trials, n.d.).

The next trial was held in 1937 when "Pyatakov, Radek (who received a twenty-year prison sentence) and Sokolnikov" had also been tried for treason and crimes against the regime (Persson, n.d.). Finally the last trial included "Bukharin, Rykov and Yagoda among the accused (...). A total of 54 people were brought before the court during these public trials, 47 of which were sentenced to death. Long prison sentences were handed down to the rest" (Persson, n.d.). Therefore, it can be said that the trials which took place included some of the most representative members of the former regime.

There is an interesting element to be pointed out in this sense. Throughout the trials, the witnesses and even the accused were determined in a certain manner to give a confession of the deeds they had been trialed for. In this sense, a relevant example is that of Krestinsky, a former member of the Bolshevik party and then a member of the first Politburo who in his initial statement before the court pled not guilty, as the records of the court hearing show. More precisely, he stressed the fact that "I plead not guilty. I am not a Trotskyite. I was never a member of the bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, of whose existence I was not aware. Nor have I committed any of the crimes with which I personally am charged, in particular I plead not guilty to the charge of having had connections with the German intelligence service" (Persson, n.d.). However, the second day the plea was changed into that of guilty as "in the face of world public opinion, I had not the strength to admit the truth that I had been conducting a Trotskyite struggle all along. I request the Court to register my statement that I fully and completely admit that I am guilty of all the gravest charges brought against me personally, and that I admit my complete responsibility for the treason and treachery I have committed" (Persson, n.d.). Therefore, in the face of such change of attitude, it is important to consider the phenomenon.

There have been analysts who took into consideration this issue and concluded that the false confessions of those accused were in particularly due to the ideological belief of the Leninist doctrine. More precisely, it was considered that the only way to follow was the right way. More precisely, "one of the major factors which led former oppositionists to capitulate to the Stalin regime was their belief that certain forecasts of theirs -- forecasts concerning the unfavorable consequences of Stalin's policies -- had proved false" (Leites and Bernaut, 1954, 27). Therefore from one point-of-view, the false statements and confessions were a matter of ideology and of belief in the power of the leadership despite the fact that the respective leadership was an oppressive force.

Part 3

The American perspective and attitude on this issue is rather interesting to be noticed. There are views which consider the United States to have been uninterested in intervening in the killings and persecutions that were taking place in Russia at the time despite the fact that the diplomatic mission in the Russian capital had ensured a large amount of information. Nonetheless, it was in fact a matter of the balance of power that had to be maintained and of the support the United States had to be sure of in the eventuality of a war against Germany and Japan.

Some of the most important information coming from Russia belonged to the former U.S. ambassador to Russia, Joseph Davis who had served a three years mandate and was one of the participants at the Moscow Trials. The accounts he provides are extremely useful for pointing out the degree of information the United State had acquired in relation to the events that were taking place. Thus, one of the most representative parts of his dispatches takes into account the proceedings of the trials and offers a personal account of the events. However, it is important to consider his perspective as part of the tools which made up the general image on the situation in Russia an image which combined with the geopolitical context led the United States not to consider a physical and diplomatic intervention in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R.

One of the first points Davis makes in one of his dispatches from 1937 is his most striking impression. Thus, in connection to the Trotsky-Radek he pointed out that "I attended the trial, which lasted six days, assiduously. It was terrific in its human drama" (Davis, 1941). From the very beginning he offers a grim image of the situation in the court room and the events that unfolded during the trials. It was therefore a situation which clearly announced a rather difficult procedure. The ambassador gave a very detailed account on the environment and on the court room, an element which indicates in fact that the United States benefited from a very detailed information source which could have provided all the necessary data for having a thorough and accurate account of the proceedings as well as the events that actually took place. Moreover, it must be pointed out the fact that the Ambassador was by no means denied the access in the court room which indicates the fact that the Soviet Union was setting such trials also for the international public, not only as a sign of internal authority. Finally, it must be pointed out the fact that the only valid and unequivocal account of the entire dispatch was the presentation of the physical facts and their description. In other words, his own views were marked by a constant doubt on the actual proceedings he had taken part in.

His accounts included a thorough background of the accused and of the political framework which had demanded the trial; more precisely, he pointed out the revolutionary tradition of the Russian state, as well as the current situation in the country. The important part of his dispatch at this point is the fact that the ambassador is diligent in offering a very accurate image on the trials and on the situation in Moscow. Therefore, there can be no discussion over the availability of the information.

The presentation of the trial was done in a subjective manner; however, the lack of objectivity is relevant for the personal impressions it offers and gives a fair description of the information which reached the United States and which was unable to move the U.S. administration to take action. Thus, Ambassador Davis points out several issues he considered to be doubtful. In this sense, he expresses his limitations concerning the validity of the evidence, the signatures of the defendants, as well as the clear plea of guilt from the part of the accused (Davies, 1941). Indeed the evidence which was provided at the trials was suspicious especially taking into account the fact that the most important facts the accused were charged with were not found, an element which clearly weakens the Russian case. Nonetheless, although Davies did show a sign of doubt, he failed to stress it in the dispatch.

The United States cannot invoke scarce evidence to support the lack of involvement in the events that were taking place in Russia. The official presence of Ambassador Davies to Moscow was a reliable source of information for the ongoing process of the persecutions and the show trials which dealt with the political purge of the former regime. In this sense, Davis indicated several times that the trial had been in fact a means to show other aspects of the Soviet conduct, rather than to offer a clear and fair account on the guilt or innocence of the ones accused. More precisely, he commented that "the most extraordinary part of this trial, from a western outlook, is that there was even a trial at all. The accused had all entered the plea of guilty. There remained nothing for a court to do but to hear possible pleas for clemency and to adjudge the fact that sentence the days and n which presumably all proof was produced that the prosecutor could possibly adduce- from our point-of-view an entirely useless proceeding" (1941). Therefore, given the redundancy of the proceedings themselves, it was obvious that indeed, the charges, the evidence, as well as the trials themselves had been mere fabrications of the Stalinist regime to send other messages to the public and the world.