US Intelligence Community After 9/11

REORGANIZATION OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Reorganization, Challenges, and Problems of the U.S. Intelligence Community 9/11 Attacks

The proposal to restructure the intelligence community through the creation of DNI was floated for long before 9/11. The Commission's recommended for National Counterterrorism Center that represented virtual approaches of bridging executive branch departments and implementing interagency coordination. Later, Congress enacted a bill, and the president signed Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that led to the implementation of the recommendations. This study analyzes the rationale behind and legal provisions concerning the reorganization. The associated problems and challenges are also identified.

First, the reforms aimed at equipping the U.S. intelligence community with strategies to prevent Intelligence failures. The debate within the abilities of the DNI to induce preventative intelligence failures that focus on powers awarded and denied to such official capacities. Psychological failures happen as analysts cope with inherent uncertainties of evidence while imposing their logic. The logic is a reflection of theoretical models for people whose notion of history repeats. The political failures are attributed to the assumptions surrounding the country's defense and foreign policy (Katherine, Darmer & Rosenbaum, 2004). Subsequent organizational interests and rapid crisis of decision-making led to the desire of protecting personal reputations. The individuals had previously conspires to downgrade conveniences and warranted information.

Further, the changes improved political logic in administrative reorganization. The sources of failures in intelligence analysis were not well established in organizational structure. This was a contributing factor in the development of position of DNI. A section of the explanation is based on administrative reorganization. The government recognized that there were major bureaucratic changes including placing new posts atop entire intelligence community and reducing the non-beneficial processes. The importance of indispensable ingredients was creation of reform windows allowing permits restructuring (Nacos, 2012). The typical association involved onset of the crisis based on crisis management and instilling them with a sense of urgency. The concept was aimed at uprooting and pushing aside normal policy-making dynamics. Reform windows welcomed crisis management accompanied by large electoral victory among reorganization advocates. The initial outcomes were hollow mandates that provided ineffective and temporary political reform bases.

Fundamentally, pressure increased for extended action. The search for reorganization plans demonstrates commitment to action and the imperatives propelling policymakers. The traditional concept included restrictions on the information flow coming to other segments of the intelligence community. They quickly embraced historical analogies and points of reference to generate reorganization plans. The system pays a broader scope of attention to the relevance to problems at hand (Katherine, Darmer & Rosenbaum, 2004). The other imperative is the centralization of control over political and administrative issues of security. Decentralization and bureaucracies required strong DNI managerial leadership. The U.S. intelligence community was presented with clear lines of responsibility and authority coupled with manageable control spans. There were aspects of meritocratic personnel procedures that managed utilization of modern management techniques.

The DNI created a schedule for political logic of the rhetorical presidency & presidential commissions. The commissions are charged with the roles of educating the U.S. intelligence community. The typical involvement of the commission involves "demythologizing" of policy problems as well as legitimizing requirements for further government action in security. Second, U.S. intelligence community provides symbolic assurance to the public that the government is in-charge of problems and is taking appropriate steps in dealing with security challenges. The focus surpasses the problem per se and places government's response to serve the interests of citizens (Nacos, 2012). The DNI commissions solved problems and participated in analyzing policy. The sources of insight and information led the construction of presidency and negotiated interests in developing new and acceptable ideas. Presidential commissions served as conflict management instruments that allowed presidents build consensus within and without the government for their preferred policies. The intelligence community is more capable and innovative to address evolving issues and meeting the challenges of increasingly complex security situations.

However, the reforms have been accompanied by several challenges. The dangers here include the risks of complacency coupled with reprisals and recrimination against the U.S. intelligence community. Complacency comes from falsified senses of accomplishment that underscore the revelations and question integrity of supportive data. Complacency is sourced from the definition of intelligence. First, intelligence is viewed as an exclusive law enforcement context for the warning contexts. The goal of intelligence within law enforcement focuses on stopping illegal acts (Katherine, Darmer & Rosenbaum, 2004). Warning intelligence policymakers about the dangerous situation as a way of closely countering the actions is critical. The United States established warning system aimed at alerting policymakers towards impending actions of the military. The new system includes evidence of gradual troop build-ups, civil unrest, diplomatic actions, and domestic political maneuvering and recall of ambassadors.