US military involvement in the Korean Conflict

Korean Conflict

How did the Korean conflict begin? What were the dynamics behind this war? How and why did the United States get involved? How was the Korean conflict linked to the Cold War? These and other issues will be addressed in this paper. Thesis: The Korean conflict was indeed the first battle of the Cold War, and the United States, although it was thoroughly unprepared when it went into battle, came out a winner even though the end was a virtual standoff.

Background on how the U.S. become involved in the Korean conflict

In the book, Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War, author and professor Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. explains that after World War II the Soviet Union emerged in a "new and more powerful stance," a direct challenge to America and its "…fragile allies" (Pierpaoli, 1999, p. 17). And notwithstanding the fact that the Cold War really began to take hold in 1947 and 1948 President Truman -- known as a "legendary fiscal conservative" -- was very reluctant to increase the amount of money spent on the military after WWII (Pierpaoli, 1999, p. 18).

Truman and the Congress were trying to keep defense budgets down even though they knew that there were potential dangers in the world. Moreover, Pierpaoli writes that Truman distrusted "flashy…military officers" because he had fears that the country could become a military dictatorship (18). Truman was pragmatic about keeping the country on a peaceful path if possible and certainly he did not like the "national security establishment" and specifically did not trust the National Security Resources Board (a group that warned that a big military buildup was necessary) (Pierpaoli, 18).

In fact, Truman won the battle of wills over the military budget, until, that is, Dean Acheson replaced General George C. Marshall as secretary of state in 1949; Acheson began lobbying vigorously for a military buildup, and the "young Turks" he added to his staff were articulating a policy that included a great deal more money for the military (Pierpaoli, 21). At about the same time world events were causing consternation in Washington as well. The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in September, 1949, and in October of 1949 Mao Tse-tung and his Communist forces won the Chinese civil war; hence, "China was now 'lost' to the Communists" (Pierpaoli, 23). A few months later Senator Joseph McCarthy began his "…first barrage against alleged communist infiltration into the highest levels of the federal government" (Pierpaoli, 24).

Given these disturbing events -- and other political problems too numerous to include in this paper -- Truman began to relent on his hard line against military spending. And on June 25 of 1950, Truman had no choice but to agree to begin building up the military; that is the day that the North Koreans invaded South Korea. The president mistakenly believed that the Soviets were behind the invasion so he ordered the Air Force to "…prepare plans for destroying all Soviet airfields in the Far East" and after he ordered the mobilization of troops into combat his "…approval ratings soared" albeit some of that public admiration came from the fear in the American society that the U.S. was headed to World War III (Pierpaoli, 29).

Once the Chinese intervened into the Korean war, the Truman Administration worked to speed up the mobilization. And even though the public was unaware of it, the Truman Administration had "…reconciled the 'Korean' mobilization with the larger Cold War mobilization"; and this was a wise strategy as it turned out.

The launch of the Korean War -- a mini Cold War confrontation

In the Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command, author Burton I. Kaufman explains that contributing to the dynamics of the Korean conflict was the Truman Administration's National Security Council's report about the Cold War and how the U.S. should prepare for eventualities and hostilities vis-a-vis the Cold War. Called the "NSC-68," the report became a "key document" in terms of American foreign policy for twenty years after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. It was originally created in response to the Soviet's explosion of an atomic bomb, but Kaufman explains that NSC-68 was actually a "…field manual for waging the Cold War" (Kaufman, 1983, 28). The narrative in the NSC-68 sounded the alarm for what might be ahead militarily for the U.S.:

"The assault on free institutions is worldwide, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere" (Kaufman, 28). The NSC-68 continued:

"Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass," and any additional expansion of territory held by the Soviets (and dominated by the Kremlin) "…would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled" (Kaufman 28). As mentioned, the report was issued prior to the invasion of the south by North Koreans; and albeit the NSC-68 offered "no specific figures," it flatly asserted that the U.S. was wealthy enough to spend "…up to 20% of its Gross National Product for military purposes" (Kaufman 28).

When the North Koreans invaded the south, they had "…nearly 110,000 soldiers, more than 1,400 artillery pieces, and 126 tanks"; hence, this was formidable aggression, and it seemed to confirm what the National Security Council had alluded to in NSC-68 (Kaufman, 30).

Kaufman (31) asks, why did the north invade the south on June 25? Was Truman pressured politically to commit American ground troops to Korea? While the motives behind the north's aggression appeared initially to be part of the Cold War tensions, Kaufman believes it was not part of the Cold War, or a spin-off of the global conflict between the U.S. And the Soviets. The author asserts that the North Koreans did not attack at the "behest of the Soviet Union" and the North Koreans did not seek and receive the approval of Mao and the People's Republic of China (PRC) (32). It was truly a civil war issue, Kaufman insists, because the north attacked the south "…unilaterally and without the knowledge of either the Soviet Union or the PRC" (32).

And although the U.S. took the matter before the United Nations, because the U.S. perceived that the North Korean aggression was Soviet-inspired and Soviet backed, the U.S. was going to respond unilaterally, Kaufman continues (34). Indeed, the U.S. was paranoid about the Soviet Union's intensions, and the Truman Administration and other U.S. officials believed that if America didn't respond to North Korea's aggression, it would "…cause significant damage to America's prestige in Europe and the Middle East" (34).

Quietly the Truman Administration held the believe that the U.S. must not allow "another case of appeasement" to be carried out, similar to how the British and French were fooled into appeasing Adolph Hitler in 1938 at the Munich Conference; in that negotiation, the French and British gave Hitler part of Czechoslovakia, thinking he would be appeased (Kaufman 34). That was a disaster, and Truman did not want a repeat of that kind of diplomatic disaster in the case of Korea.

Moreover, the credibility of the Truman Administration's foreign policy was at stake; Truman could not appear to be weak, but on the other hand he had to worry about getting the U.S. into another long and bloody shooting war. Meanwhile, in the first phase of the U.S. involvement, American forces were prohibited from attacking North Korea past the 38th parallel. Truman did this hoping to avoid a direct showdown with China and the Soviets. But by the fifth day of fighting, the president authorized "…strikes against military targets in North Korea" albeit U.S. forces were asked to take care not to get into Manchuria or the Soviet border (Kaufman 38).

Primary source communication from General MacArthur to U.S.. Command

On November 4, 1950, General Douglas MacArthur wrote a "Top Secret" classified message to his superiors in Washington D.C. In the communique, MacArthur said that it "…is impossible at this time to authoritatively appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea. While MacArthur didn't believe the Chinese would intervene (which turned out to be one of the major miscalculations of the U.S. war effort), he wanted the top brass in Washington to know it was possible.

"First, that the Chinese Communist Government proposes to intervene with its full potential military forces, openly proclaiming such course at what it might determine to do…" as a follow-up to that possibility, MacArthur said such a "…contingency" by the Chinese "…would represent a momentous decision of the gravest international importance. While it is a distinct possibility and many foreign experts predict such action, there are many fundamental logical reasons against it and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant its immediate acceptance" (MacArthur, from the Truman Library).

A critical investigation into the poor preparations for war - Halberstam

Prior to his death in 2007, Pulitzer Prize-winning author David Halberstam published a 657-page book (the Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War) that covers multiple aspects of the Cold War and of course of the Korean War. On page 138 Halberstam explains that the initial American units "…thrown into battle were poorly armed, in terrible shape physically, and, more often than not, poorly led" (Halberstam, 2007, 138). The U.S. was trying to get by "…on the cheap," Halberstam explains, and it Korea "it showed immediately"; Truman wanted to keep taxes low, he wanted to try and pay off the debt from the enormous expenditures in WWII, and as was referenced earlier, Truman really wanted to keep military expenditures down.

But what that austerity program meant was that the first troops that were being trained at Fort Lewis (prior to their orders to fight in Korea) were asked to "…use only two sheets of toilet paper each time they visited the latrine" (Halberstam, 138). Moreover, the lackluster performance by the initial troops sent into harm's way in Korea was reported back in the states and caused serious concerns. "…Almost daily, there were stories of American units being driven back, of constant North Korean advances," Halberstam continues (138). Apparently the military leaders (including General Douglas MacArthur) believed America could go into Korea with a limited number of troops and keep the North Koreans from coming across the 38th parallel.

What was the genesis for this attitude? Halberstam asserts that the belief in the "…superiority of Caucasians over Asians on the battlefield" was based on racism (139). But how does that attitude stand up against the fact that the Japanese experienced numerous victories in the beginning of World War II? The author said Americans dismissed Japanese victories; the Japanese won those early battles not because "…they were Asians, but because they were fanatics" (140).

As to why the Koreans seemed to be stronger than the first American troops in Korea, Halberstam quotes Major General Bill Dean who said, "Let's fact it, the enemy has something that our men don't have, and that's the willingness to die" (140). Dean, who was later captured by the Koreans, had made that statement to Chicago Daily News reporter Keyes Beech, himself a Marine Corps veteran of WWII. Beech later wrote that the initial American troops to be sent were "…spiritually, mentally, morally, and physically unprepared for war" (Halberstam, 140). Indeed, North Korean units were better armed and in the face of their attacks, the Americans retreated again and again, and by July, 1950, the war was a "disaster" for America, the author asserts (140).

On page 146, Halberstam reports that the disastrous beginning to the American side of the war was "…a textbook example of what happens when a nation, filled with the arrogance of power, meets a new reality." Certainly history shows that things got a lot better for the Americans and in fact as the military geared up fully and send the proper amount of equipment and sent men more fully trained, the tide turned and the war ended albeit at a stalemate. Halberstam describes a battle that was symbolic of the violence and yet the futility of the Korean War.

The battle for Pork Chop Hill -- a microcosm of the war's bloody wastefulness

Pork Chop Hill was a garrison that the Americans held in the spring of 1953. It turns out to be an example of the unfortunate American investment that was made in Korea: a lot of lives lost in a very small victory. Pork Chop Hill was at the extreme outpost of the southern border of the 38th parallel. Halberstam writes that it had "…no great strategic benefit, and it was only of value because it had been deemed of value and because whichever side held it, the other side wanted it" (629). In March, 1953, the Chinese troops attacked Pork Chop Hill and were driven away by the Americans. However, the Chinese then retreated to a higher hill nearby, "Old Baldy," which exposed Pork Chop Hill, Halberstam explained (629). A month later, the Chinese attacked Pork Chop Hill again, with a force of some 2,300 men; a "furious [artillery] battle" took place and on the first day of this battle the "…nine artillery battalions of the Second and Seventh [U.S.] Divisions launched 37,655 rounds" at the Chinese (Halberstam, 629).

On the second day of the battle for Pork Chop Hill, the American artillery units launched 77,349 rounds at the Chinese. Despite a lot of losses, the Americans held the hill. In July, once again the Chinese attacked the hill and the battle went on for two days, with "…both sides in a virtual stalemate on the crest of the hill," Halberstam continues (630). Lieutenant Joe Clemons' unit, "King Company," took the most losses; in fact Clemons had brought 135 men up the hill to defend it, and when he came back down -- after the U.S. Army brass told the troops to leave the hill, it wasn't worth it -- he had only 14 men left (Halberstam, 630).

When the Americans slipped off the hill the Chinese were not even aware of the American departure -- basically the Americans were saying, hey, the war is almost over, you can have this little chunk of land if you want it that badly. In fact, sixteen days after the U.S. left Pork Chop Hill, the truce was signed (July 27, 1953), and a "…cruel war" that was "difficult" and "draining," was ended under terms "that no one was very happy with," Halberstam explains (630).

Halberstam's post mortem on the Korean War

Miscalculations let to a great deal of waste in this war, Halberstam explains on page 631. First, the Americans took Korea "…off their defensive perimeter" which gave encouragement to other communists (China and the Soviets) to get involved; secondly, when the Americans entered the war they "…greatly underestimated the skills of the North Korean troops they were going to face, and vastly overestimated how well prepared" the first troops sent into battle were (Halberstam, 631). But the single "greatest" miscalculation of the war was when General MacArthur (later fired by President Truman for insubordination) made the decision to "go all the way to the Yalu" due to his believe that the Chinese would not enter the war; by doing this (against the better judgment of his superiors) MacArthur caused his troops to be "…infinitely more vulnerable" (Halberstam, 631).

Moreover, the author continues (632), the Korean War gave great credibility to the NSC-68 and "…helped convert the country toward far more of a national security state than it had previously been." In other words, it prepared America for the Cold War, which was certainly "on" at that time and would be waged for more than 30 years.

The Cold War -- the aftermath of the Korean conflict

In William Stueck's book, the Korean War: An International History, the author claims that because the Americans successfully defended South Korea -- and because of the American military presence in the region -- these realities actually enabled Japan to "…pursue its economic development relatively unburdened by the commitment of resources to its armed forces" (Stueck, 1995, p. 368). The war -- and the Chinese-U.S. confrontation -- in Korea made the U.S. "…more adamant than ever regarding allied trade with mainland China" which in turn restricted the access to China that Japan had hoped for in terms of raw materials needed in Japan (Stueck 368).

Stueck mentions that the U.S. resistance to the communist attack on South Korea saved the United Nations from "…virtual extinction as a broadly inclusive international organization" (369). The author notes that just before the Korean War broke out the Soviets boycotted the UN Security Council as a protest over the Security Council's rejection of China as a member. If the U.S. had not stopped the aggression in Korea, it certainly would have "…hardened its previously flexible policy on China's seat and he PRC would have been kept out of the UN. In that case, Moscow would have likely withdrawn from the Security Council and launched an "…international body of its own" (Stueck, 369). In this case (assuming other countries would have left the UN and joined up with the Soviets' own international body) the UN would have become "…merely an organization of like-minded states in a sharply divided world" (Stueck, 369).