Poli Sci Arms Control One

Poli Sci

Arms Control

One of the primary issues facing arms control agreements made by the United States over the decades has been enforcement. This is true both of the possession and transfer of weapons in general, and in the development, either covertly or openly, of specific technologies designed for use in weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry). The first issue, that of the United States' inability to completely monitor or control the movements of the world's existing arms stockpiles, particularly intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear payloads, grew exponentially worse during the breakup of the Soviet Union and its fractious and corrupt aftermath. Precise figures on the size and extent of the Soviet nuclear arsenal are still not known by United States officials today (they are likely not known, and were not known, by the Soviets at the time of the government's collapse, given the general disorder and already rank corruption among military leaders), nor can the entire known stockpile be accounted for. Any arms limitation treaty is pointless when the extent of the world's armament remains a matter of conjecture and debate, at least to some degree.

Of course, the real threat from these unknowns is very small -- technological capability to fully arm, launch, guide, and detonate such weapons is still held by a relatively few number of countries. Such situations are indicative, however, of the larger issue at hand in any arms control negotiation. There is no international police force capable of forcing a sovereign state from suspending weapons testing or production -- North Korea and Iran would have experienced such a crackdown years ago if it were possible. This is what has allowed for the clandestine proliferation of arms following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and this is also one of the reasons that the United States has had such difficulty in effectively negotiating arms controls.

Throughout the Cold War period, the Soviet Union was engaged in a massive production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. The United States was not very far behind. Following the treaty between the two superpowers in the 1970s, however, the United States slowed production and began dismantling older weapons, reducing the nation's total stockpile of weapons. Intelligence sources suggested that the Soviets, on the other hand, continued their production of nuclear missiles without much change. The arms treaty seemed to be a losing proposition, and this necessarily created a wariness in the United States about any such future agreements. A perception about the futility of arms control makes many other nations distrust the United States' intentions in these negotiations, often leading to a breakdown in the process.

The lack of enforcement works both ways, and the nations size, power, and unwillingness to dismantle and discontinue its own extensive weapon's programs often makes negotiation seem more like coercion. This issue is an unavoidable feature of being the sole global superpower, and it is also perhaps the defining characteristic of arms control negotiations between the United States and foreign powers. It must be admitted that it does seem hypocritical to maintain one of the largest standing armies in the world with extensive international deployment in addition to large numbers of ready-to-fire nuclear missiles while at the same time asking other countries not to develop their own weapons, even as a means of defense. The United States' bargaining position in such negotiations loses any moralistic or ethical standing, leaving only the methods of physical intimidation and economic isolation, both of which are forms of international bullying.

Security and the Shaping of the Federal Government

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that there has been a dramatic change in foreign policy and the powers of the federal government in the United States in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, and the subsequent military actions in the Middle East. Public concern over safety, which was fueled by the rhetoric and misinformation of the Bush administration and others, enabled swift and sweeping reforms in the way the federal government and the military conducts itself both at home and abroad. The recently released torture memos are emblematic of the shift in attitude that took place amid the power structure of the national government of the United States, and to a large degree among the people of this country as well.

The most obvious structural change that took place during the years immediately following the attacks was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which comprised the biggest reorganization of the federal government since Roosevelt's New Deals in the 1930s. The newly formed Department, which has itself already undergone several massive internal reorganizations, functions as the hub of all intelligence and defense agencies, both at home and abroad. Even the Coast Guard and the Secret Service are now run under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security; their heretofore disparate tasks are now seen as part-and-parcel of the same overall goal, which is the protection of the nation and its citizens from further acts of violence. This in itself is a major shift in the attitude of the government, at least externally -- increasing trade across international borders was a primary focus of the prior government, as indicated by a relaxed attitude towards domestic defense. Such a perspective is now unthinkable.