Vietnam War as of Today

Vietnam: An Unpopular War

VIETNAM WAR 12

The paper takes a look into the unpopularity of the Vietnam War and the failed strategies, which resulted in the defeat of the U.S. army in Vietnam.

A lot of news and opinions exist regarding the Vietnam War, which tells us about its unpopularity (Writer Thoughts). Several reasons exist about this specific topic and this paper addresses those reasons.

Different scholars have put forward arguments regarding the strategy of America, who used a conventional military strategy, rather than the one formed on the counterinsurgency principles, during the war in Vietnam. Jonathan Caverley, in his recent article, talks about a very strong challenge towards Vietnam War's historiography. Caverley rejects the focus of standard history on the strategic perspective, and organizational culture of the American army and General William Westmoreland, and presents an argument that the foundation of the American strategy in that war can be linked back to the strong public constraint, and complete influence of the leaders. These arguments do not support the evidence presented by history, but they do challenge the wisdom that has already been established regarding the Vietnam War. The officials of the administration of Lyndon Johnson never instructed their military on the ground war fight that took place in the South Vietnam's borders (McAllister, 2010). General Westmoreland never wanted to change the American military strategy, in order for the focus to stay on pacification at the expense of the tactics of search and destruction. The American military as well as the civilian officials fully believed that counterinsurgency was the responsibility of South Vietnam, which should not be assumed by the United States ground forces. Furthermore, the public opinion on this matter was weak yet played an important role on the decision making of the Johnson administration, during the important years of the war. The counterinsurgency disputes may not have been won by democracies; however, the main sources of the failures were not civilian disinclination towards the casualties.

Vietnam War in the history of America is a very controversial operation said to have been done by the military. There was a lot of domestic conflict that took place, after which a lot of the opinion of the public changed to constraining the foreign policy of America, which showed that this war was an important political incident for the public of America, as well as around the globe. The American families were glued to the television, which brought news about the war every time, raising the domestic protests as well (Lau, et.al, 1978). When the presidential election of 1968 was taking place, majority of the electorate referenced the Vietnam War to be one of the most vital problems that the country was facing. Furthermore, the war was not only a military matter, but it was also affecting the lives of the American public, in more than one way. More than half a million people in America fought the Vietnam War, which directly affected the lives of the American public, and to add the impact more, more than thirty percent of the people in America, had family members or friends fighting in the war by 1968. This made the public personally involved in the war, since they feared the death of that relative or friend in the war.

Different theories of psychology state that this particular element should have been an important part of the policy, regarding the war, because it involves attitudes of the people. It is generally understood that the people change and develop their attitudes according to the level of satisfaction they get from a certain event, which also maximizes their involvement in that event, like the Vietnam War. The theories of reinforcement state that the people learn attitudes the same way they learn habits, however, they prefer things that fulfill their satisfaction (Lau, et. al, 1978). A person who is unemployed can become a supporter of FDR, if he gets his job from WPA. The theories of conflict and incentive also state that a person might lose or gain by a certain attitude of theirs, and they adopt positions that increase their gains, as compared to their losses. Furthermore, the theories of functionality focus on psychological advantages that come through adopted attitudes, especially recognizing the fact that people struggle to increase their rewards by decreasing the penalties.

Analyzing the whole scenario, the people of America, even though had personal interest in the war, did not have any impact on the political response. The involvement of their friends and relatives in the war did make them give special attention to the war, but it did not affect the war in the political scenario. Even comparatively, the people whose relatives or friends were not taking part in the war had the same amount of interest in it politically. There was no proof that showed that the people who had interest in the war had any attitude towards it, regarding the policy. However, the attitudes of the people towards the war were symbolic (Lau, et. al, 1978). Lastly, the people with self-interest in the war did not make much difference in expanding the consistency of attitudes of the supporters, in the presidential decision of 1968. The evaluation of the candidates, the decisions of voting, and the position of the candidates, were not based on the issue of Vietnam War. In a nutshell, the personal involvement of the people of America was almost equal to none response, when it came to the political side of the war. The self-interested people, as well as those who were personally involved, had a symbolic response towards the war rather than political.

The portrayals by Larry Burrows and David Douglas of the Vietnam War are rather different; Larry Burrows' photographs show concern for the human and nonmilitary results during the war, in contrast to which, Duncan's photographs showed a powerful dedication to the U.S. soldiers, and his commitment to express the burdens that were placed on the soldiers, during the war (Thompson and Clarke, 1974). The current scholars state that the social, psychological, and sociological importance of the photographs have not yet been understood or realized completely. The visuals could work as a form of communication and infer strong influences on the beliefs, attitudes, and the opinions of the people (Thompson and Clarke, 1974). In the present time of photo electronics, it would be easy for the visual and social scientists to research and study the photographs through various modern techniques. Such opinions have also played their part in the disinclination of the Vietnam War.

The support of America for Vietnam was flawed fundamentally in moral terms, however, it was justified in the strategic terms by the U.S.; but, the traditional historians also adjudicated the strategic debate as bankrupt. The scholars state that South Vietnam was not significant in the strategic terms and Ho could not be the agent of China because of the long standing hatred between Vietnam and its neighbor, in the north. They state that if Ho was only fighting for consolidation of his country, and was not an agent of China of the Soviet Union, so South Vietnam could not be one of the falling dominoes of Eisenhower. In fact, the traditional historians stated the domino theory to be of no use (Moyar, 2006). Several events in history proved this to be true; when the U.S. was defeated in the Vietnam War, the dominoes of Asia did not fall beyond Indochina. If Ho was not a communist, but a nationalist, the U.S., would still not have any strategic interest in South Vietnam, and the American interference would have been a mistake, if the regime of Diem was not popular. Moreover, the historians think that the conventional strategy that was embraced by America, during the Vietnam War, was not capable. Even though there was a large amount of U.S. soldiers present in Vietnam, during the war, the type of commitment that was required of them to secure victory was unacceptable to American people or the government (Moyar, 2006). Despite the clarity of the scene that the U.S. cannot win the war, they were not ready to withdraw yet. This issue remained to be extended until political tiredness on the issue compelled the leaders to form a peace agreement, which before, was not acceptable. The defeat in the war was shocking for the United States, since it was the most powerful and strongest country, and the people were finding it difficult to believe that a strong army could be defeated by local guerrillas. This statement as well as the development of a view that the Vietnam war was unwinnable, has become a major problem for finding the solution for the strategists, generals and the scholars, similar to Rubik's Cube; all of whom are searching their own answers to provide for the U.S. victory. Moyar (2006) still believes that the war would have been won by the U.S. as he states that, in 1962 and 1963, the war was being won by South Vietnam. At the same time, the U.S. journalists, Neil Sheehan and David Halberstam stated that Vietnam was a mess and the U.S. began to look up for Diem's replacement (Moyar, 2006). Due to the misreading and actions of the media of the Buddhist crises, South Vietnam and the U.S., positioned against Diem, with the consequence that he was dismissed and murdered by the military.

The death of Diem put South Vietnam in a political mess, during the time which, the efforts of South Vietnam deteriorated, and North Vietnam was encouraged to execute the coup de grace, by initiating the destruction of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). The administration of Johnson was facing the chance of engaging with the ground forces of America in withdrawing their support for South Vietnam, while the ARVN was distracted from Viet Cong and the Army of North Vietnam, and their strategies drained away. Johnson selected the latter course; however, he would be affected by the poor remedial choice, rather than the illness of wrong diagnoses of the patient. Moyar (2006) is very critical of the decisions and strategies of the Johnson administration, like committing to the major ground forces of the American army in south Vietnam, as according to him, several other strategies were present, like deploying the U.S. forces along the seventeenth parallel, so that the communist invasion could be choked off (Moyar, 2006). Moyar (2006), states that the Johnson administration was very wrong to ignore these measures, which were a result of their wrong advice and incorrect intelligence from civilian abettors, who advised that such actions might result in a war with China. He implies the strategies for 1963 and 1965 would have helped in winning the war. This can be true, but there also exists a hint of disagreement, because the strategy of 1963 was not maintained after the death of Diem, while the second strategy was not even tried, and the reaction of the communists with time, could not be predicted. Finally, it is not easy to avoid the fact that the communists always had a right to form the intensity and pace of the war, despite the U.S. having deployed soldiers in Laos, which, scaled back common operations, favoring the guerillas. This would have been possible in only one situation, which is, if America had decided to invade and occupy North Vietnam in full scale. However, the intervention of China, also, could have not been ignored, and the administration of Johnson was never ready for such type of strategy (Moyar, 2006).

The non-use of the nuclear weapons throughout the Vietnam War was held in conflict, and three American administrations increased the violence level, engaging in a lot of controversial and scandalous policies. Despite the huge amount of frustrations and costs of the war, everyone was against the use of nuclear weapons in any way (Tannenwald, 2006). Different reasons played their part in the non-use of nuclear weapon during the war; the prospect of intensification and uncontrolled use, the result of the vulnerabilities of America, conservancy of the non-use tradition, and lastly, the taboo and belief that the use of nuclear weapon would not be correct. According to a lot of American leaders, the use of nuclear weapons was abominable. The use of nuclear weapons, if implemented, would have to be in large amounts, which would also be normatively as well as politically not acceptable. So, it appeared that the chances of using the nuclear weapons by the administration of Johnson would have been equal to none, despite what Admiral Sharp, the Wheeler of General Westmoreland, thought. On the opposite, Kissinger and Nixon were less influenced by moral and personal convictions, and for them, that particular belief operated as a constraint on retreat to the weapons. Nixon took a tough position and sent messages to North Vietnam, threatening them that massive force would be used if they would not negotiate. But, even then, Kissinger and Nixon were rolled back repeatedly, from the reactions of the global public (Tannenwald, 2006). Nixon was not against the use of nuclear weapons, but he was restrained from using them by his own people. Even the importance of preserving this tradition was not reflected on his thoughts.

The Chinese and soviet forces might have prevented the United States' thoughts of taking action against the sanctuaries of Vietnam that were in China, but the military did not prevent any thoughts of raiding south China with the nuclear weapons (Tannenwald, 2006). The level of fight that the U.S. could carry inside Vietnam was an important question. The American leaders here did not worry at all about the sudden response of the Soviet Union, in action to the nuclear strike by America, as they thought this was unlikely to happen, as well as about the vulnerabilities of America, in such a war. If the American leaders had no normative restrictions regarding the use of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that their military strategy of using the nuclear weapons would have received any serious consideration, even if kept in mind, that the lives of both countries' people could have been saved. It would not be correct to draw a sharp division between the risks of escalation and the taboo force, but both of them are not completely independent. The presence of such taboo helps in shaping the judgments of constitution of escalation, during the war. If the leaders of America would have thought of the nuclear weapons as just some other weapons to be used during the war, the effect would have been entirely different as well as the psychological effect. The taboo of the nuclear weapon helped in shaping the escalation, which played its part in developing the thinking of the leaders about the risks that would come with it (Tannenwald, 2006).