Viewing the Function of Policing. It Increases

¶ … viewing the function of policing. It increases understanding of the policing function at different levels hence minimizes conflict and confusion over issues in policing. It is obvious the levels of policing discussed herein are very dependable on each other. Policing like other professions obtains knowledge through experience. It follows that modern police officers look for effective policing strategies through the guidance of the police history lessons (Conser, Paynich & Gingerich, 2013). The challenges confirm that police history is incoherent, and the lessons are hard to learn. Such histories are generated by thousands of police departments in response to local conditions and the pursuit for their visions. While varied policing perspectives are a viable source of lessons, few trends shaping the function of policing at the local, state, and federal levels exist. In this case, interpretation is imperative.

Perspectives of the policing function

Local

In the U.S., policing is civilian, extremely fragmented, and predominantly local. Although police are distributed across the country, they are answerable to local elected officials. The local police officers fundamentally focused on their role as the ears and eyes of the local community members across the nation. In this context, data and raw information collectors help analysts link the dots when fed in the intelligence process (Langworthy & Travis, 2013). Some see community policing as an ideal local police approach because it assists officers know their communities while building trust. This increases the chances that residents will be willing to share information with police departments. The local police have recently been considered as individuals better positioned to deter terrorist acts. This can be achieved through taking action when appropriate and gathering information. Such a role of first preventer is coupled with the much popular role of first responders. This combination results in a meaningful and logical package that illustrates the synergy between the tactics of crime reduction. In addition, it motivates local police officers to embrace their counterterrorism function with seriousness.

From an intelligence and information sharing perspective, the chances of the local police unit carrying out its independent investigations without informing other authorities is the least desirable response. However, joint investigations could be problematic if initiated outside procedures of information sharing. For instance, if the FBI officials and the police conducted investigations, the raw data might fail to reach the intelligence unit of the agency and the fusion center of the state (Langworthy & Travis, 2013).

State

Police agencies have been seriously influenced by the post 9/11 climate. Different states have set homeland security apparatus meant to advise the legislature and the governor, oversee infrastructure protection, statewide threat evaluation and help local jurisdictions. In most states, the state police department has naturally taken an enormous role in these activities because they are the largest public safety agency of the state. Typically, the creation of state fusion centers has been with significant police participation. The state police had an intelligence unit prepared to serve a focal contact point for the national intelligence and federal law enforcement agencies (Dantzker, 2009).

The police intelligence branch of the state has failed agencies other than themselves. Even previous police intelligence commanders of the state conquer that this is due to the nature of the state police of hoarding information and not sharing with other authorities. For instance, most state police officers report that they have nothing to share with the FBI and other authorities in most cases. This tends to happen in most local intelligence meetings where all intelligence authorities discuss matters intelligence. Although they have nothing to share, they have a trend of sharing the real information among themselves and they vow not to give anything to other authorities (Langworthy & Travis, 2013).

Varies factors account for the current low-level involvement of state police in the emerging information-sharing climate. One is that the current occurrences do not warrant elements of state police involvement as more relevant. The second possibility is that the state police cover minor sections of the law enforcement function. In addition, fusion centers at the state level could have superseded police agencies of the state as the prime state level cogs within the system. Probably, this reflects how the emerging policing framework is expected to function. Although this is probably the case, obviously most local agencies and other authorities have a direct link to the FBI and other federal agencies. This helps to ensure that state-level participation is not introduced in most situations. From the perspective of efficiency, this appears to be desirable (Conser, Paynich & Gingerich, 2013). However, it could limit intelligence development and information sharing when pertinent information fails to penetrate to the broader networks like the fusion centers of the state.

Federal

The federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have evolved, so has the concept that police are eligible to the right to collective bargaining. After the events of the 9/11 attack, intelligence, and information sharing between local, state, and federal governments has improved. Many improvements stem from the Joint Terrorism Task Force of the FBI. This unit has tremendously tripled after 9/11. In different departments, active communication and communication between the FBI and the department of homeland security exist. Even with such progress, the cooperation levels tend to vary greatly (Dantzker, 2009). This cooperation is dependent on the personalities of police chiefs and individual bureau. Frequently, the FBI isolates itself from local police expertise, workforce, and intelligence. Most local and state police have been warranted federal security clearances although the historical absence of trust persists. For instance, most police executives complain about getting calls from the Joint Terrorism Task Force of the FBI, that alert them to a possible threat. When the chiefs ask for further details required to launch investigations, the bureau claims that they cannot release any further information because they do not need to know.