Wages of Crime: Black Markets,

¶ … Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy, by Naylor, and also includes a review of an essay by Bagley (2003) entitled "Globalization, Weak States and International Organized Crime."

Naylor's book is divided into six chapters: Mafias, Myths, and Markets; the Insurgent Economy: Black Market Operations and Guerrilla Groups; Loose Cannons: Covert Commerce and Underground Finance in the Modern Arms Black Market; Treasure Island: Offshore Havens, Bank Secrecy and Money Laundering; the Underworld of Gold; and, Washout: Follow-the-Money Methods in Crime Control Policy.

Naylor begins the book by saying that "politicians rush to tell the public that great crime "cartels" are hell-bent on world conquest" (2002; 1), and says that the best way the politicians find to stop all of this is to "conduct search and destroy operations against the dirty money that forms both the motive (profit) and means (working capital) of the epidemic crime sweeping through this increasingly globalized economy" (2002; 1).

He further argues that this conviction has led governments to justify "a string of remarkable legislative and political initiatives, ranging from civil asset seizure, to beating up on helpless island states, and sending military advisors to burn down Andean peasants' huts ("cocaine labs") abroad" (2001; 1). He goes on to say that this process has led to a "reversal of the burden of proof at trial, to the undermining of due process, and to the smearing of citizens with the taint of criminality while denying them the right to criminal trial that might test the truth of the accusations" (2002; 2).

From the outset, then, we see that Naylor does not wholeheartedly agree with his governments' manner of directing the war on drugs.

He later argues that two assumptions of the current war on drugs: (1) that cartels are "goose-stepping" across the world stage, and (2) that globalization has been a godsend to international crime, are false. He argues throughout the book that organized crime has always been part of society, and that 'globalization' as a term means nothing more than the "process that began as far back as Marco Polo; it is the process by which information about trade spreads across national and international frontiers, and goods and money soon follow" (Naylor, 2002; 5): under this definition, he argues, globalization has not eased the criminals' lot, rather, the organizations just continue as they ever did.

He then goes on to argue that many of the factors considered 'wrong' by today's Western governments, for example, corruption, had been encouraged by Western powers in the past, "to build up slush funds by which their Third world allies could pay for weapons, stage a coup, or just keep the money out of the hands of a successor regime that may be hostile to Western interests" (Naylor, 2002; 9).

Naylor has an extremely cynical view of Western governments, and their approach to developing nations, to international crime, and to drugs, in particular. He concludes by saying that "never in history has a black market been defeated from the supply side," and that, "the failure to "win the war" [on drugs] becomes a pretext for increasing police budgets, expanding law enforcement powers, and pouring more money into the voracious maw of the prison-industrial complex" (Naylor, 2002; 11).

He ends his book with a review of Bush's post-September 11th crime-control policy, which is based on the assumption that "the best way to deal with the presumed epidemic of crime is to find, freeze and forfeit the money" (Naylor, 2002; 287). He says that post-9/11, this policy has become entrenched in national security rhetoric, and also in action. He links this entrenchment of this thought to action taken against al-Qaeda, and (in articles by him, subsequent to his book) also to the attack on Iraq.

In short, Naylor's book argues that the system currently in place to deal with "cartels" and the illegal drug trade are wholly inadequate, and are leading to an infringement of civil liberties, certainly for Americans, but also for people the world over, who are being affected by the U.S.' uncompromising stance against the international drug trade.

An article by Bagley (2003) entitled, "Globalization, weak states and international organized crime" reinforces some of Naylor's arguments. He argues that weak states are the best places for organized crime to flourish, using the cases of Russia and Colombia. In Colombia, in particular, he singles out the lack of transparency in the banking system as a factor in the rise of organized crime there.

He disagrees with Naylor on the influence of globalization on the international trade in drugs, saying that, "it is undoubtedly the case that the process of globalization has facilitated the international dimension of the actions of cartels over the last decade," "by reducing the size of the world, so that it is easier for criminal networks to be strengthened" (Bagley, 2003).

He further argues that the "neoliberal tendency towards widening the divide between rich and poor [in many Latin American countries], coupled with a lack of legal, viable, manufacturing and export industries....have, in the past few decades, led to ideal conditions in which international crime can develop, and mulitply" (not a literal translation; Bagley, 2003).

He then goes on to analyze, in great detail, the process through which the deep criminalization, which, he argues, is now embedded in Russian society, developed, and also summarizes the activities of the "mafia" in Latin America and the Caribbean, discussing Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Cuba, and Brazil and the Southern Cone in detail (linking the drugs trade with the action of guerrilla groups, such as FARC in Colombia).