War on Terrorism: Is it Justified? On

¶ … War on Terrorism: Is it Justified? On September 11, 2001, two separate airliners, loaded with passengers, were flown into the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. This was soon followed by a similar act in Washington, D.C. that destroyed part of the Pentagon. Passengers on another plane attempted to retake it from hijackers, and that plane crashed into the Pennsylvania countryside, undoubtedly preventing a fourth attack.

By the time the second plane flew into the south tower of the World Trade Center, we knew these were deliberate attacks. By the time the Pentagon had been attacked, there was a widespread perception that we were at war. Spokespersons and reporters drew comparisons to the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, there are troubling differences to the attack of December 7, 1941, particularly in who the enemy was or is in each situation. There was no doubt in 1941.

Japan planned the attack, sent the carriers, trained the pilots, and dropped the bombs. They had signed a pact with Germany and Italy, and the three countries had agreed that an attack on one was an attack on all. We were instantly cast into war in two different theatres against three different countries, but we clearly knew who the enemy was.

As Pipes (2002) said, "WITH WHOM, or what, is the United States at war? The answer to this question has far-reaching implications for strategy, for public diplomacy, and for foreign and domestic policy alike. It may seem that the answer is obvious; but it is not." This time, since September 11, 2001, these issues aren't as clear. This is the first time the United States has viewed itself as being in a state of war but not at war with another country.

Certainly some kind of retaliatory response followed by some kind of plan to prevent future assaults was appropriate and called for. However, one could argue that a war is a more extended and planned response. The goal of a war is to defeat the enemy. Can we even say who the enemy is in this case? If we cannot define who the enemy is, justification for acting against them seems tenuous.

If the identity of the enemy shifts over time without any new attacks, expanding the range of targets seems questionable. President Bush and other government spokespersons have told us multiple times that the terrorists in Afghanistan and their protectors would not be the other targets. In the first few weeks after September 11, whenever President George W.

Bush referred to the target of the war as "evildoers" or "the evil ones." (Pipes, 2002) Eventually this was clarified to the Al-Queda terrorist network led and funded by Osama Bin-Laden, but this precision was blurred by the revelation that this network had cells all over the world in many countries. Those who question the direction the war may take fully understand the horror of September 11, 2001.

They know that nearly 3,000 people died in New York City, and they know that no rational person could justify attacking civilian buildings with no military significance. They recognize that the attack on the Pentagon just emphasized that the attackers did not make this distinction, and the standard for warfare, agreed to by virtually all countries of the Earth, has been that wars will not be started by sneak attacks. Pearl Harbor was not supposed to be a sneak attack, at least technically.

One major concern, even in the face of all the senseless horror that started this "War on Terrorism," is that we haven't found a way to clearly define exactly who the enemy is, and how and when the war will be done. This is new and uncertain territory; any of us can go to the library and find a picture of our country's leaders signing pacts with both Germany and Japan, signifying that both sides agree the war is over.

Our history books show specific dates, and they are often printed on calendars. We don't have this for the "War on Terrorism." As the fighting in Afghanistan waxes and wanes, we hear government officials debating who the next targets of our warfare will be. We know the fight against the Al-Queda will continue; we are assisting the Philippines in their fight against terrorists to the benefit of both governments. But we no longer have a clear focus.

One way to gain focus is to pick an individual to represent what we're fighting against. In World War II we had a ready-made figure in Hitler.

Stephen (2001) makes the point that we still tend to pick individuals on which to focus our anger: "a couple of decades ago, the man every American loved to hate was Colonel Gaddafi; ten years later, it was Saddam Hussein; now Osama Bin Laden is the devil incarnate about whom every American has become an instant expert, courtesy of CNN." Even Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, has acknowledged that it is unrealistic to believe that we will "[eliminate terrorism] from the face of the earth." (Pipes, 2002).

Victory for this war has been describe as an environment where Americans can live in freedom, in a country where others cannot "adversely affect our way of life." (Pipes, 2002). As Pipes points out, that is "hardly an objective to hand to a general and say, "Accomplish this." (Pipes, 2002) The United States government did a good job of identifying who the enemy was as precisely as possible, as soon as possible after the incident. There were of course no identifying marks on the planes used in the attacks.

Our military leaders couldn't look up and say, "Those are Al-Queda warplanes. Now we know who to attack." Nevertheless, the government made a strong case for believing the Al-Queda terrorist network to be behind the attacks. Because of the government's ongoing intelligence work regarding terrorists and terrorist groups, we already knew that the terrorist group known as "Al-Queda" was training and moving freely in Afghanistan. The military goal was never to conquer the country of Afghanistan but to destroy the Al-Queda camps there.

As more intelligence was gathered, it became clear that Al-Queda and the current government of Afghanistan, the Taliban, were so tightly intertwined that both had to be removed (Pipes, 2002). This goal has largely been met although fighting continues. Pockets of Taliban and/or Al-Queda fighters remain in Afghanistan, and the intent seems to be to rid Afghanistan of them entirely. It's been well documented that Osama Bin-Laden planned the attacks, so his Al-Queda network seems defensible by any standard.

The Taliban did everything they could to prevent retaliation for the attacks, and as it turned out, were in power because Bin-Laden financed them. Most people rapidly concluded that they also were a legitimate target. Albom makes the point that the terrorists who attacked us," we are dealing with an enemy that speaks only the language of death" (2001). Negotiation was never a viable option. Critics of this War on Terrorism make valid points. They see representatives.