Social media as a strategic tool for shaping terrorism narratives

Role of social media in terrorism is one that is unclear for many researchers who recognize both the power of social media to disseminate unverified information widely and quickly and the power of the term "terrorism" to convey an "us vs. them" paradigm (Herzberg, Steinberg, 2012; Scanlon, 2005; Britton, 2005; Dombrowsky, 2005). Social media usage helped spread instantaneously around the world images of the death of Gaddafi. It has also helped spread messages of "terrorists," both authentic and inauthentic (Kearns, Conlon, Young, 2014). It is a tool which ultimately can aid in the rapid dissemination of information or of misinformation, and thus can help to shape public opinion in a unique way. What is unique about social media is its ability to mix authentic with inauthentic information in such a way that followers of social media are faced with the choices of either accepting the information presented them as credible or investigating the claims via third party sources. In this context, it is not surprising that Kearns, Conlon and Young (2014) assert that "lies about terrorism can be strategically employed to help a group achieve its desired goal(s) without necessitating that an attack be truthfully claimed" (p. 422). With this in mind, the role of social media becomes a significant strategic tool of groups, organizations and states wishing to shape public opinion regarding acts of terrorism.

The question is: What role do social media play in terrorism? It is hypothesized in this study that since it has been shown that states sponsor terrorism, much of what passes as "terrorism" on social media is related to false flag terrorism (Kearns, Conlon, Young, 2014) or to exercises of entrapment by state agencies. Various news outlets, journalists, scholars, and researchers have reported on both instances (Escobar, 2014; Stone, Kuznick, 2012; Windrem, Brunker, 2015). This study intends to show that social media is a tool utilized by states both to exaggerate and to capitalize on the nature, extent, and threat of terrorism.

Terrorism has been defined by the U.S. Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction as the "calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature…through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear" (Sebastian, p. 67). In this sense, terrorism is not restricted to ethnicity or geographical region: anyone who uses a calculated threat of violence or intimidation to instill fear may be deemed a terrorist. In fact, activist Russell Brand famously labeled American pundit and talk-show host Sean Hannity a terrorist when the latter aggressively accused a guest speaker of supporting Hamas. Likewise, researchers have identified several Western states as being sponsors of terrorist activities (Scott, 2008; Weiner, 2008; Escobar, 2014).

What role social media plays in terrorism depends on how states, groups and agencies prefer to use it.

II. Literature Review

The literature review was conducted first by selecting the appropriate literature using keyword searches in databases such as Sage, JSTOR, ProQuest, Questia, etc. Keyword searches were based primarily on suggested phrases from studies with which the researcher had some familiarity. The researcher used keyword searches such as "social media terrorism," which yielded studies such as Amble's (2012) "Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment" and Cho and Wilson's (2008) "Terrorism and Media in Korea." This studies, along with ones by Scanlon (2005) and Britton (2005) suggested other keywords such "false flag terrorism," which yielded the Kearns, Conlon, and Young (2014) study. As more studies were read, more keywords suggested themselves until the researcher had accumulated a broad and deep literature collection on the subject of social media and terrorism. Most of the literature on the subject is comprised of essays based on studies of relevant research in the field.

Scanlon (2005) discusses how the term "terrorism" is a misleading one precisely because of the way that the media uses it, conjuring with it the idea of an "us" vs. "them" paradigm. Scanlon's essay is part of a discussion on the sociology of terrorism, risk, and social media in a series of essays penned by Scanlon, Britton, Dombrowsky and others, who argue the issues among one another. Scanlon (2005) is startled by "how much of the debate [is]...influenced by awareness of various events and how much of that awareness [is] media related" (p. 13). The point he makes in his essay is that "awareness" of terrorism via social media has allowed the former to take on a special significance that it would not have possessed twenty years earlier before the rise of social media made information so instantaneous and capable of being sensationalized by all the major news networks monitoring and using social media. Social ideas such as terrorism, according to Scanlon, have been largely influenced by media representation.

Britton (2005) asserts that the U.S. network of media channels, which includes social media, is a powerful State tool used for disseminating information designed to cause receivers of that information to form a negative view of "them" and a positive view of "us." Considering that major corporate networks will inundate Twitter with updates for casual followers, it is naive, so these scholars suggest, to imagine that social media is a platform used only by alternative groups, activists, and the underground. The corporate world and the political world is very familiar with social media and its uses.

Dombrowsky (2005) asserts as much in his essay response to Scanlon and Britton.

Dombrowsky's main argument is that terms such as terrorism ought to be viewed from a sociological perspective, especially in a post-9/11 world, where media communications lend them a changing, subjective, and almost "mythological significance," which can in turn be exploited by organizations not necessarily concerned with addressing the reality of the situation (p. 84).

The arguments of Scanlon, Britton, and Dombrowsky lay a type of sociological framework by which the nature of social media's role in terrorism may be understood even more deeply in terms of theoretical approaches.

Amble (2012) notes in his essay that social media monitoring "will lend critical advantage to governments" seeking to oppose "global jihadists" (p. 339). Amble's thesis is underscored by the suggestion that the only terrorists who pose any threat to states are "jihadist" Muslims. It is, as Kearns, Conlon and Young (2014) show, a vastly naive suggestion. This study alone has pointed out that many researchers view nearly all states as capable of sponsoring terrorism; therefore, for Amble to focus solely on the threat of "jihad" implies that he accepts the mainstream narrative concocted by pundits like Sean Hannity, whose approach has been questioned labeled by Brand, via social media (ironically) as terroristic. Amble (2012) attempts to show that intelligence agencies are using social media to track terrorist groups' activities over the Internet -- but as Windrem and Brunker (2015) have shown, intelligence agencies like the FBI are actually engaged in a process of cultivating terrorists via social media entrapment and then "busting" them, as was recently the case for an Ohio man arrested in Washington, D.C. On charges of threatening to blow up the White House. Amble (2012) attempts to highlight the legitimacy of states using social media to combat terrorism, but what he fails to convey is how states use social media to promote terrorism in their "mission" to "combat" it.

Dean, Bell, and Newman (2012) follows Amble in the same "us" vs. "them" paradigm mentality, noting how state agencies are utilizing Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to track and prevent the actions of terrorists and would-be terrorists. Like Amble, Dean et al. (2012) suggest that terrorists are using social media to unite. What they do not suggest, however, is that state agencies assist in that unification process by cultivating "home-grown" terrorists, assisting in their web productions (Escobar, 2014), funding their activities (Weiner, 2008), and spreading their image both far and wide by constantly spreading their message in both social and mainstream media. What Dean et al. (2012) attempt to show is the clever way in which state agencies are monitoring social media in order keep tabs on terrorist activity. The failure of the study is in the fact that it says nothing more, for state agencies are not only monitoring, they are aiding and abetting.

Herzberg and Steinberg (2012) provide an analysis of several case studies and offer guidance on the legalities of utilizing social media in the prosecution of terrorists. The study focuses on abiding by "international humanitarian law (IHL)" (p. 494) and notes that states are heavily utilizing social media. With so much exposure, it might make one wonder if anything is being kept confidential. But Herzberg and Steinberg see such operations as educative for the general public: they view the war on terror as a legitimate one, in contrast to what Scanlon, Britton, Dombrowsky and others say about the war. Instead, Herzberg and Steinberg recycle the standard script, asserting that "social media can serve as a useful conduit for monitoring armed conflict and tracking potential violations of IHL" (p. 505). Nowhere do they assert that Western states are some of the biggest violators of IHL in recent memory, as less-biased researchers like Stone and Kuznick (2012) have shown.

Cho and Wilson (2008) show, on the other hand, that Korea (which supports the American war on terror), is more likely to report on terror events "when they (1) take place in Iraq, (2) use crueler modes of action, and (3) are related to Korean national interests, specially supporting the American Administration policy…which the Korean government has supported since its inception" (p. 89). What Cho and Wilson indicate is that the "war on terror" has a great propaganda benefit for nations seeking to shore up support for a foreign policy that is militaristic and imperialistic. Terrorist activity of states other than those which Korea and the West oppose goes unreported, because it does not promote the ideological aim of the nation-state to report on such. The thesis of Cho and Wilson is grounded in the arguments of Kearns, Conlon and Young (2014), which is essentially that social and mainstream media are tools that governments use to shape public opinion by creating an "us" vs. "them" paradigm. Their study goes deeper into the sub-issues regarding "terrorism" as a concept than any of the studies by Herzberg, Steinberg, Amble, Dean, Bell, etc.

Kearns, Conlon and Young (2014) illustrate how "over half of terrorist attacks are not credibly claimed" which leads them to assert that "there are four lies about terrorism" that are utilized by state media, including social media: "false claiming, false flag, the hot-potato problem, and the lie of omission" (p. 422). Each of these lies is used for strategic state purposes -- namely to construct the "us" vs. "them" paradigm which assists states in building public support for projects of foreign destabilization and imperialism.

Steuter and Wills (2009) support the study of Kearns, Conlon and Young (2014) when they provide empirical and qualitative analysis of "the way in which an image of the 'enemy' is constructed and framed in dominant media discourse" in Canadian media (p. 7). Their study suggests that Western states employ the very same terroristic activities via mainstream and social media that they condemn in "enemy" countries. Steuter and Wills argue that the ideological aim of Western states employed in the "war on terror" is mimic the policy of the 1984 Orwellian state, which declared that War is Peace. It is a particularly astute observation and one that looks more deeply into the role of social media in terrorism than the superficial studies performed by Herzberg and others.

IV. Findings & Analysis

The majority of the subjects in the study are expected to echo the ideology of the state, which is that terrorists are mainly "jihadists" seeking to destroy Western ideals of democracy, freedom, etc. It is anticipated that a few subjects sampled will appreciate the ways in which states control social media both to exaggerate the threat of terror and to draw out "would-be" terrorists from the floorboards of society. However, what this researcher expects to find is that most citizens are accepting of social media's reports on terror, without seeking outside, third party verification. They will, rather, accept as fact the unverified reports that they see on Twitter, Facebook or YouTube, as accepting them is easier than doing one's own research into the subject.

This evidence will neither prove nor disprove the thesis of this paper, but when coupled with the arguments posed by various researchers surveyed in the literature review, the findings will provide support for the notion that states are effective in their control of the dissemination of information and misinformation via social media as it regards terrorism and the war on terror.

The findings should also indicate whether citizens are able to appreciate how state agencies will act as a "honeypot" to lure unsuspecting individuals into entrapment situations. It is expected that most subjects will view cases of entrapment as deserved, stating that the individual "drawn out" by agencies like the FBI deserve to be arrested since they clearly showed to have designs against the state. Some subjects may show hesitation in accepting the legitimacy of such actions by state agencies. When asked about their hesitation, it is likely that they will express concern regarding the justice of entrapment and the notion that states should "cultivate" home-grown terrorists in order to "prevent" terrorism -- when in actuality the exercise appears to be nothing more than a self-promoting stunt designed for mass media consumption.

Finally, the findings are expected to show that individuals embrace social media precisely because of its ability to be "up-to-date" with its instantaneous dissemination of information (or misinformation) and that the speed of arrival is more important than the trustworthiness or accuracy of the claims made via social media. In the final result, it is anticipated that the majority of subjects will view social media as a form of "reality entertainment" and whether information is fabricated, manipulated or exaggerated is irrelevant -- what matters is the constant coverage and stream of events, which, if not critically analyzed, are consumed willingly by the followers of social media.

V. Conclusions

It is concluded that social media plays a role in terrorism that is not suspected by the majority of citizens of states who sponsor the war on terrorism. Because terrorism has become a term used to construct an "us" vs. "them" paradigm, citizens accept terrorism as something that "jihadists" do, not their own states. Thus they do not think critically about the information disseminated via social media. Instead they consume it without thinking and thus serve the interests of the states, groups and agencies utilizing social media to construct the paradigm. The underlying, geopolitical motives of the "war on terror" are not discussed openly in public or mainstream media and thus go ignored or unknown by the average citizen. So while researchers have shown that Western states engage in terrorism and false flag terrorism to further their own geopolitical interests, most citizens of these states accept that notion that they are "fighting" terrorists abroad rather than acting as terrorists abroad. The role of social media, thus, is one by which the proverbial "wool" is pulled over the eyes.

While this researcher makes these arguments based on the findings and the data gathered in the literature review, these claims are by no means conclusive and should not be taken as the final word on the subject. There are a number of ways in which this study could be bettered and they will be discussed now.

The Observational Method might have been employed to test the Routine Activities Theory. Here it could be beneficial to observe the social media tools of today to see how active-Internet-goers are reacting to ideas of "terror," and the safeguards put in place to protect them -- such as the NDAA or the TSA in America. This method would allow for an impression to be made, but its weakness would of course be its imprecise character. How to classify each of the subjects would also be difficult, as users of social media like Twitter or Facebook may maintain an air of anonymity that it is hard to penetrate. Plus, social media is said to be "trolled" by active forces of opposing political or ideological camps: for instance, when comments are left on a webpage concerned with one analysis of terror, those comments may be genuine and they may not be -- and since discerning genuineness concerning the source of 'risk' is the motive of this research, the observational method (while helping to establish an impression) is far from being an accurate and precise tool in the investigation.

Archival research may also be very helpful, for it allows the researcher to accumulate any secondary material on the subject that has already been accrued. The strength of gathering secondary research is that it informs one of the various interpretations that have come before and allows the researcher to negotiate new interpretations if needed. However, if one relies too heavily on archival research, he risks falling behind in current investigation and neglecting the on-going study of new developments.

By employing these different methods, the research may establish a kind of triangulation, which, while not precise, can give a rough estimate of the role of social media in terrorism.

The difficulties of the Observational Method have already been discussed but a way of overcoming them has not been analyzed. Perhaps the best way of overcoming the weaknesses of analyzing subject responses to concepts of "terror" through social media representation may be to limit the observation to one precise sample. For example, in political races, subjects may take to Twitter or social networking websites to project their views. Twitter accounts could easily be monitored and gathered together into one sample. Social networking sites may also be monitored to gather an aggregate swath of information. Thus, a variety of viewpoints could be observed and their threads followed, perhaps all the way to the true sources of terror.

Of course, the monitoring of social networks necessarily limits and constrains observation to a segment of society. It may be that more activist-oriented citizens use social media to express viewpoints that are not indicative of a society as a whole. Adopting such viewpoints as a representative of a whole would be to skew the reality of the situation. While this observational method would be easy to perform, it is only one more piece of data that may be used to draw a composite sketch of the whole and cannot be taken as an illustration of the whole itself.

VI. References

Amble, J.C. (2012). Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 35: 339-353.