Withholding Foreign Aid From Countries That Violate Human Rights

¶ … Withholding Foreign Aid From Countries that Violate Human Rights

Withholding Aid: Restructuring Foreign Policy to Advocate Greater Standards for International Human Rights

Even in the modern era, there are gross violations of human rights taking place all over the globe. Unfortunately, most programs put in place to persuade nations committing such violations to stop such inhuman activities are relatively ineffective at actually securing greater protection for vulnerable populations. As a result, many nations continue to be in violation of international laws, yet go relatively unpunished. The primary purpose of this research is to examine the current situation, and how international aid strategies are dealing ineffectively with particular nations that are clearly violating human rights. From a general understanding of the current situation, an idea of where the true problems lie can be extrapolated, highlighting specific elements of international policy strategies that have proved least productive in helping influence nations to take a stronger stand against human rights violations within their borders. From this, the research then moves to help present potentially viable strategies that the international community should adopt in order to help influence particular nations to adopt international human rights practices within their own borders. Essentially, withholding economic aid to such nations, regardless of our relationship based on security or economic ties, is the most viable strategy to try and persuade autonomous states to fall in line with international sanctions on violations of human rights.

Background of the Problem

Even today, there are gross violations of human rights occurring throughout the international community. Despite several decades of increased international policing and heightened regulations against such activities, many states continue to disregard the international community's mission to protect human rights for the good of all mankind. Thus, the true problem analyzed here is the inability for the international community to successfully impose international protection of human rights. Prior efforts to dissuade such states have been unorganized, unequal, and therefore ineffective. As such, prior efforts to solve the problem have failed to produce significant results that are equally seen across the board. Rather, what has been occurring is the favoring of particular nations over others, despite disregard for human rights.

Scope and Severity of the Problem

Despite past attempts to get violators in line with international agendas, the problem still continues. It is disheartening to think that despite all the progress the international community has made in regulating war and peace time activities, there has been no where near the levels of success that one would hope for. Rather, ongoing strategies have been only mildly successful, as many of them have been adapted unequally based on individual nations formulating their foreign policy on national interests, rather than a more universal commitment to the abolition of human rights violations across the globe. Specific policy measures have been enacted in trying to hold countries accountable for human rights violations, yet these continue to prove successful only in small degrees.

The concept of international regulation of individual state activities is relatively new. For generations, nations did not try much to change moral issues in other states. According to the research, "realist scholars argued that it was inappropriate for states to consider moral issues in foreign policy" (Allendoefer 2010 p 7). Essentially, international programs were weak because of a reigning ideology that favored state autonomy and therefore promoted only small efforts to set up internationally recognized regulations against human rights violations. These ideas of state sovereignty were crafted in a world that was not yet so globally interconnected, as we find the international environment to be. Before the onset of the two major World Wars, most states favored an isolationist approach to the construction of their foreign policies, with the trend being to leave individual states to govern themselves without any sort of international policing that would hold all nations accountable for human rights violations. However, this ideology was eventually replaced with a more globalized concern for the protection of human rights all over the globe, despite the presence of clear national boundaries. The atrocities in both wars created a growing demand for restrictions of certain activities in the name of protecting and governing over human rights. Beginning with the League of Nations and eventually evolving into other international organizations like the United Nations, there has now been an increasing trend for nations to work together to impose more international regulations in order to protect the basic rights of mankind no matter what country one would find oneself in.

A positive progression of international cooperation and regulation has now dominated international policy formation and execution. There are now more international laws regarding the protection for basic human rights since any other generation. After the atrocities of World War II, many internationally held laws have taken aim at human rights violations. Here, the research has shown that "through a variety of human rights agreements, states have committed themselves to respecting the human rights of their own citizens" (Allendoefer 2010 p 2). Most of this cooperation stems from a state's desire to hold membership to crucial international organizations that prove mutually beneficial. For example, organizations like the European Union prove to have incremental financial and economic benefits for its members, but require that such members adhere to policies that are accepted as the norm for within the EU. Out of a desire to further development strategies and increase economic stability, nations like Greece and Turkey have revamped many of their own internal policies in order to fit the EU standards. Greece is now a member of the EU, with Turkey being a potential future member. Thus, such nations readjust their own policies and practices to adopt more progressive stances against human rights violations. This has been a typical strategy to try to influence nations into adopting stricter regulations and enforcement measures.

Moreover, there are already reports which show that aid is restricted to many nations that are considered to be violating basic human rights. The notion that foreign aid distribution can be levied in order to produce desired policy changes in particular nations is not a new one. In fact, it has been a strategy that has been used, yet this use has often proved to be unregulated and uneven, costing crucial effectiveness. The United States spends over $2 billion annually on economic support funds (Lum 2008). These funds are often used as a strategy to help get crucial nations on board with pro-American international policies and procedures. Here, the research suggests that "it has become increasingly commonplace for states to consider the human rights records of other states in foreign policy decisions, such as official development aid (ODA), or to publicly criticize other states' human rights records" (Allendoefer 2010 p 2). Currently, the United States has been imposing aid restrictions on several Asian nations based on such states' violations of human rights. Nations such as Burma, Cambodia, and Pakistan have all witnessed such aid sanctions that have been imposed in order to increase these nations' cooperation with human rights policies that are being written by the larger international community.

Yet, many of these restrictions are not very well understood, and even less regulated in a structural system. Unfortunately, such aid sanctions are levied unequally depending on specific interests of donor nations, and thus send a mixed message to the international community regarding the seriousness of enforcing protective measures to ensure a greater quality of standards meeting international expectations. According to the research, "there is a wide range of assertiveness: from cutting aid entirely to withholding only new aid to simply placing vague conditions on aid" (Allendoefer 2010 p 3). Most donor nations only set up the more vague regulations in terms of how they restrict aid, with very few being willing to take such a staunch stand against dealing with human rights violators through complete cutting of foreign aid. Additionally, there are a number of different international agencies with extremely differing policies that create confusion and contribute to the sending of mixed messages to those nations violating common standards for human rights. International organizations like the International Cooperation Administration, Development Loan Fund, and the Export-Import Bank each have their own individual sanctions, that often times are not imposed in conjunction with one another in order to increase the overall effectiveness of the aid restrictions.

Even American initiatives and programs often prove ineffective as well. For example, there is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which was created under the Kennedy Administration. This act was fundamental because it was supposed to set a standard for which the United States expected its aid recipients to follow in order to continue receiving American funded aid programs and initiatives. It essentially formalized the process of giving foreign aid, which was not only meant to streamline the process but also set up clear and definitive guidelines as to what cases warranted restriction of aid based on human rights violations. The act also helped set up more definitive boundaries between civilian and military aid. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 established the United States Agency for International Development, which deals with distribution of non-military aid and assistance programs. According to its statutes, aid is withheld to foreign states that engage "in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person" (Committee on International Relations 2003 p 59). This was monumental in showing how the United States was willing to take a stand and withhold aid to nations failing to stop activities that violated internationally recognized human rights protections. The act has been relatively successful in a number of cases. In fact, it was used in 1977 "to suspend military aid to a number of South American countries in response to human rights violations in these countries" (Allendoefer 2010 p 2). This has proven influential in certain situations and has helped coerce nations into adopting progressive human rights policies within their own borders.

However, the act is not as successful as it could be in actual implementation in a modern context. Unfortunately, there are clear loopholes left open within the diction of the legislation. For example, aid is supposed to be withheld to nations who are "consistent" in their activities that violate human rights. What is considered consistent? This ambiguous terminology has often allowed American politicians and policy makers to enforce its restrictions on aid unequally, depending on the agenda of the United States, rather than a full concern for the protection of global citizens. Moreover, the act states that aid needs to be withheld, "unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country" (Committee on International Relations 2003 p 59). Again, this language is ambiguous and opens up potential loopholes that would result in unequal treatment of states that are known violators of human rights. How can we ensure that such funds will actually go to those in need under oppressive regimes? As it stands today, the act is only partially effective and needs to be revamped in order to make for more regulated processes of withholding foreign aid based on human rights violations.

The Leahy Amendment is another piece of legislation that is meant to put in place aid restrictions based on a nation's adherence to international sanctions against human rights violations. This is an amendment "which applies to U.S. Defense Department and State Department programs that provide assistance to security forces in other countries, imposes a mandatory vetting and validation requirement" which is partly based on a nation's potential for violating international human rights laws (Chishti 2011). It was meant to augment provisions already put in place in order to increase there effectiveness. Yet again, this policy falls short of its goals based on personal biases and agendas of lawmakers here in the United States. According to the research, "the law is sound in theory, but in practice the real impact on curbing human rights abuses is often tempered by the desire of the United States to advance its own security interests, even if at times it requires overlooking questionable human rights records" (Chishti 2011). For example, he sitting Secretary of States is responsible for determining whether or not gross violations of human rights have occurred. Such elements of policies like this allows for too much leeway in determining when and where aid sanctions will actually be put into place. There is still no universal system that refuses to pay out aid funds based on specific criteria. As such, "this is problematic because the Secretary of State is guided by the predominate goal of his or her job: the self-interest of the United States" (Chishti 2011). There is the notable example of Pakistan, which was exposed to be violating human rights, yet still received $2 billion in military aid (Chishti 2011). This aid was in order to help commence strategies that were progressive to American foreign policy demands, and not based on the protection of human rights alone.

Personal biases often play into the giving and withholding of aid to certain nations within the international community. In fact, Nielsen (2012) illustrates how many private donors refuse to give aid to some violators, but give much more to others, representing how aid is not restricted equally. According to the research, "foreign aid donors impose aid sanctions for human rights violations," yet "they do so selectively" (Neilson 2012 p 2). Essentially, both private and government donors do not hold all nations to the same accountability standards. Rather, "in reality, aid sanctions are applied selectively to some human rights violators but not to others" (Nielson 2012 p 5). Many of these biases are based on measures of national and international security and strategic relationships. Donor nations do not want to impose aid restrictions on nations that they depend on to pursue particular strategies of security or economic well-being. Thus, the research shows that "following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, foreign aid gained importance as a vital cornerstone, along with diplomacy and defense, in U.S. national security strategy" (Lum 2008 p 1). Security measures come first above upholding human rights standards, and this has created a situation where current legislation is weakened because of clear inconsistencies seen in application. There is the prime example of the United States and its connection to Israel and Egypt. More than one third of the foreign shelled out by the United States goes to Israel and Egypt, yet these nations have been criticized for having questionable practices that could possibly place some of their citizens in danger of having their basic rights violated (Allendoefer 2010). Such exemptions from policy structures keep a strong tie to the Middle East, where the United States has a strategically important ally based on its aid. Yet, human rights are not even in the equation. Thus, the potentially successful strategy of restricting aid is actually currently being practiced in order to pursue issues of self- interest on behalf of private donors. Unfortunately, "a few donors seem to respond to good human rights records by allocating more aid, many allocate more aid to countries that do not respect these rights" (Allendoefer 2010 p 16). What results is an unequal application of accepted foreign policy tat sends a mixed message to donor recipients, showing that the United States will overlook violations of human rights if it is the American interest to do so.

This even extends to how private donations are distributed as well. Most private donors do not hold countries accountable for human rights concerns, as their donations are typically investments based on private interests. Thus, "donors use foreign aid, in part, to maintain good relationships with important trading and security partners" (Allendoefer 2010 p 21). Most private donations are given out aiming to strengthen to promote growth that is eventually mutually beneficial to the economic interests of the donors themselves. There is the example of donations into China in order to increase personal economic assets, despite clearly disregarding China's activities that violate human rights. Unfortunately, in such situations, "many donors turn a blind eye to Chinese human rights violations as a result of China's economic power" (Allendoefer 2010 p 25).

Such unequal execution of policy is sending a mixed message to countries that are continuing to violate human rights, which makes the issue extremely significant in a volatile international environment. Current policies are not attacking the problem of combating human rights violations as successfully as they could. Here, the research suggests that "in principle and by law, the U.S. government needs to take all necessary steps to ensure U.S. assistance is not provided to military units credibly alleged to have committed gross human rights violations" (Chishti 2011). It is generally frowned upon in the international community to coerce other nations into adhering to a more globalized public policy. Such attitudes and hesitations make enforcing human rights internationally almost entirely unsuccessful. There is a need to adopt more effective methods to influence particular nations into making greater efforts towards protecting basic human rights.

The research focuses on presenting possible solutions that would increase the international community's ability to increase its influence in nations abusing human rights. Withholding aid is a strategy often used by private donators in terms of choosing recipients for aid. This is especially the case when the actions of the human rights violators negatively impact the lives of the private donors (Nielsen 2012). However, in its current context, this strategy is vastly underdeveloped. It needs more systematic structure in order to best influence nations to want to cooperate with international assumptions of human rights and the necessity to uphold sanctions against violations of those assumptions.

Problem Statement

Unfortunately, the current discourse shows a clear inability of the international community to successfully influence particular nations to step up their protection of human rights and adhere to policies more in line with the international assumptions of human rights protection. The current problem is thus defined as the inability to successfully coerce nations into adopting more progressive practices within their own borders. Currently, there are ongoing human rights violations being committed by nations who refuse to cooperate with international assumptions on the protection of individuals and their basic rights as citizens. Without the reliance upon an international police force with full authority to deal with human rights violations internationally, there is a major problem in helping protect people in the most vulnerable nations governed under harsh repression.

It is clear that reform is needed in order to better streamline the policies attempting to influence more progressive practices. Yet, this becomes a difficult process in the midst of all the major stakeholders in the situation. Individuals, entire nations, and strategic relationships between partner nations are all at stake. New policies must take shape that limit the negative impact on security measures, yet still increase the level of accountability that nations have to deal with. In order to meet this goal, measures of effectiveness will be needed to track the potential success of any policy adaptations. Such measures would need to include cost effectiveness, but also a clear sign that human rights violations within such nations are dropping, as documented by empirical research from an unbiased international position. Potential solutions could use systems already in place, a prime example of which is the Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.

Rating system which places countries in specific tiers based on their efforts to curb human trafficking. Ratings are downgraded when nations are "not complying with minimum standards required to address the trafficking of people" (Hunt 2012). International research is conducted in order to extrapolate human trafficking numbers in certain nations, and this could be a model for using empirical evidence as an accountability measure for specific nations. Currently, "this can potentially trigger non-humanitarian sanctions" (Hunt 2012). This system could be used as an index to help determine potential restrictions for aid. Under provisions of this law, the U.S. State Department ranks each nation based upon its performance in combating human rights violations. This structure could be useful in making a determination to reduce or limit aid if a country falls below a particular ranking.

Policy Alternatives

There are a number of potential alternatives the international community could agree on. First, there is the most impractical measure, the creation and strict enforcement of international laws that protect against human rights violations. This would be the most difficult and costly measure, as "scholars recognize the enforcement of international human rights law as particularly problematic compared to other areas of international law" (Allendoefer 2010 p 9).

Secondly, there are alternatives which are based on cooperation between states economically and politically. Here, the research suggests that "if one state defects in pursuit of a short-term gain, another state can defect as a punishment strategy" (Allendoefer 2010 p 9). Such policies are already in place, but would need to be enforced with greater scrutiny. However, this often does not work as successfully within enforcement of human rights violations in comparison to other international law genres. There is essentially no mutual gain and no authority for foreign states to punish violators of human rights violations within their own borders.