World power structures and global influence

¶ … Politics

Some say that world politics is all about power. What do you think about this idea? Are there elements of international relations that are not about power? What might these be?

While it is true that there are some elements of international relations that are not solely about power, it stands to reason from a brief review of international relations over recent years that the majority of international relations are about control. Those elements which are not about control, we will call diplomatic elements -- or elements that take into consideration the common good. Yet, sometimes these elements overlap one another so that what appears to be diplomacy is also about power.

One good example of what I have just said may be seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 when Khrushchev allowed Kennedy to believe that nuclear missiles were being installed in Cuba. Historians now note that Khrushchev's main objective in allowing the "crisis" to escalate was to draw to Kennedy's attention the unfairness of America's being allowed to install missiles in Turkey and Italy (while if Soviets tried to place missiles in the West there would be uproar).

Kennedy invoked the Monroe Doctrine to keep the foreign power out of the West, but Khrushchev responded with a letter in which he outlined the West's arrogance: the U.S. wanted Europe to respect its boundaries, but had no intention of respecting Europe's: "Imagine, Mr. President, what if we were to present to you such an ultimatum as you have presented to us by your actions. How would you react to it? I think you would be outraged at such a move on our part. And this we would understand…" (Khrushchev Letter to President Kennedy, 1962).

One may see in this letter how international relations can often be strained. The strain is a result of the pull between power and diplomacy, force and negotiation. There is, of course, a strategy when it comes to negotiating: neither side wishes to reveal his hand -- a point which can result in political confusion and military conflict. All the same, however, the real crisis in Cuba was not nuclear -- but economic. Castro had just led a rebellion in which one dictator was overthrown, and now he had a nation's economy to think about. Most importantly he needed supplies: "Castro told Alekseev at a private dinner on February 3 that what Cuba needed most from the U.S.S.R. were oil exports and sugar imports" (Fursenko, 1997, p. 38). The Soviet ambassadors wanted Cuba to retain its independence from American interests and thus were more than obliged to help. Cuba needed cash -- not missiles.

Nonetheless, the CIA (who had its own ties with the corporatocracy) had convinced Kennedy that an attack was imminent. (The CIA had already attempted a coup with the Bay of Pigs invasion -- and anti-Castro sentiment was still high in the government/corporate sphere, which wanted a dictator in place who would "play ball" with American business interests). Kennedy initially gave in to the political pressure mounting all around him: he went live over the airways on American radio on 22 October 1962 stating, "It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union" (1962-Year in Review).

The "crisis" of war was averted as both Kennedy and Khrushchev were able to come to the agreement that the Soviet wanted all along -- which was for the U.S. To remove missiles from Italy and Turkey. The Cuban Missile Crisis was never about attacking the U.S. -- it was about the U.S. having the ability to attack everyone else. Khrushchev got his wish on October 28, 1962 and Kennedy was able to secretly remove his missiles from the European countries without losing face.

The outcome of the "crisis," however, was the creation of the Washington-Moscow hotline, which became a line of direct communication between the two governing powers. This line of communication was opened as a means of allowing the two nations to communicate directly -- rather than through third world countries like Cuba. Thus, the threat of war can be utilized to restore international relations -- and even improve the means of communication and policies of forthrightness. Of course, Kennedy would be assassinated just one year later -- dispelling the notion that peace is always the agenda: the first thing Johnson did after being sworn into office was to send troops to Vietnam.

This is all just one example of the way in which international relations can be both about power and diplomacy. While Kennedy attempted to sanction the Soviet Union by invoking the Monroe Doctrine, Khrushchev replied that no quarantine could be imposed on two nations by a third party, for such violated international law. International law does exist, and it may be traced all the way back to the Peace of Westphalia in the 17th century -- a treaty that essentially set the foundation for modern international relations.

One may thus argue that international relations are not always about power per se, but about the balance of power. Keeping the balance of power in place allows for healthy relations, trade, and exchange. When the balance is threatened, however, sanctions are often imposed; and when sanctions fail to restore the balance -- war is the final result.

2. American foreign policy and the foreign policies of other nations are shaped by many factors. What are some of these factors? Which ones are most important? What are the drawbacks or benefits of these factors?

According to John Perkins (2004), American foreign policy is dictated by one factor -- the corporatocracy. He provides numerous examples to back up this theory, but one example is that of United Fruit (now Chiquita) in the 1950s: The CIA had been running black ops -- off the books operations -- for years, in conjunction with other interests, whether corporate or political; and United Fruit just so happened to be one of those interests lobbying to have a new dictator installed in Guatemala in the 50s for its own economic gain. This, of course, is only example in the long series of government agency/corporate operations that has secretly guided American foreign policy (Perkins, p. 112).

In fact, resources often play a big factor in countries' foreign policy. Resources may be said to be the factor behind what Perkins calls the corporatocracy -- but there are numerous examples of the way natural resources, such as oil or gas, give nations leverage over other nations, and help create political allies.

For example, as Elie Krakowski (2000) points out by asking, "Why have so many great nations fought in and over Afghanistan, and why should we be concerned with it now?" The answer is one that is geo-political and it spans the entire run of recorded history from ancient Macedonia to now -- and it has everything to do with natural resources. Krakowski answers his own question thus:

In short, because Afghanistan is the crossroads between what Halford MacKinder called the world's Heartland and the Indian sub-continent. It owes its importance to its location at the confluence of major routes. A boundary between land power and sea power, it is the meeting point between opposing forces larger than itself. Alexander the Great used it as a path to conquest. So did the Moghuls. (Krakowski 2000)

Afghanistan, of course, is only one example of how foreign policy is shaped. But Cuba in the 1950s could easily be another. To be honest, one need only look over the past century starting with the rise of Industrialization to see that American foreign policy has been Imperialistic since the 19th century when U.S. forces went to war with Spain and invaded the Philippines in an effort to "spread democracy."

And the present wars in Afghanistan are no different: as John Perkins states, when the economic hit men fail to turn countries that U.S. corporations wish to exploit in their favor, a war is started -- and that usually takes care of the situation. Krakowski further illuminates the point:

An object of competition between the British and Russian empires in the 19th century, Afghanistan became a source of controversy between the American and Soviet superpowers in the 20th. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has become an important potential opening to the sea for the landlocked new states of Central Asia. The presence of large oil and gas deposits in that area has attracted countries and multinational corporations. Russia and China, not to mention Pakistan and India, are deeply involved in trying to shape the future of what may be the world's most unchangeable people. Because Afghanistan is a major strategic pivot what happens there affects the rest of the world. (Krakowski, 2000)

But aside from the natural resource factors, and the geo-political factors, that go to shape foreign policy, there is also the factor of ideology.

Ryan Dawson (2011) helps illustrate the way ideology shapes foreign policy by digging into Project for a New American Century files and showing how the PNAC reports are basically a lobbying tool for Israel. Dawson refers viewers of his documentary to PNAC many times in his attempt to show how the papers lay out the blueprint for American foreign policy post-9/11: "The policy of 'containment' of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over the past several months. As recent events have demonstrated, we can no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades UN inspections." Such reports coupled with the yellow cake uranium story and the WMDs hoax, and of course the "harboring terrorists" myth, and the American public was read to back a war against Iraq -- even though Iraq was no threat to the U.S.

So who did deem Iraq a threat? -- enough of one to topple the regime? That question may be answered by asking another question: which nation benefits most from a war with Iran? It is not Palestine -- that much is for sure.

Thus we can see that countries' foreign policy may be shaped by corporations, geo-politics, natural resources, and ideologies. Which ones are most important? That depends upon whom you ask. When policy is based on corporate greed, rapine, and control, I would have to answer that none of these factors are crucial to devising sound foreign policy. The libertarian Ron Paul seems to make the most sense when it comes to devising sound foreign policy -- and that policy would tend more towards isolationism (with however a free and open trade agreement). But a foreign policy based on the factors listed above leads only to militarism -- and that is a major drawback, for militarism leads to war -- and war is rarely good for any country.

3) Some believe that we are eventually heading toward a new world order with one world government. Others think that this would be a terrible thing. What do you think about the prospects of a unified world government? How do international organizations such as the United Nations and other smaller alliances (NATO, EU, etc.) play into this?

The prospects of a unified world government do not appear particularly enticing when one considers the kind of government we have today. As technology has enabled the world to become a very small place in recent years, governments have seen themselves bought and sold by money men -- and the American government is no exception. The new world order is neither "for the people," nor "by the people." It is, rather, based a system of central banks like the Federal Reserve all over the world. Central banks, like the Fed, that have the power to manipulate a nation's currency essentially have the power to destroy that nation. And as those banks unite around the world their power increases.

Governments do not run the world -- Paddy Chayefsky stated it correctly in 1976 when he wrote that "the world is a business." In other words, businesses run the world and businesses are not elected -- they are self-made. That is one reason why the prospects for a unified government look dim: the new world order is not a unified government -- it is a unified business, and the business is made of the central bankers around the world. Why else would the EU have formed and given Europe the Euro?

One need only review the works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn -- most particularly The Gulag Archipelago -- his massive expose on the abuses of Stalinist Russia in the 20th century. Millions of innocents were detained and sent into prison camps (not because they posed a threat to lives and safety, but because they opposed the political and social ideas of the regime -- and in some cases, they did not even do this, but were simply "outed" by others who had been arrested and been compelled to confess the names of other "traitors" to the State). The historical perspective offers a very sobering testimony of the abuses of power of a Totalitarian State.

Ironically, the title of Ryan Dawson's book is Welcome to the USSA. Dawson, an alternative media journalist and American expat living in Japan, has written and archived extensive reels of footage concerning 9/11 and the American foreign policy concerning Israel. According to Dawson, all signs have been pointing to war in the Middle East for years -- all on the behalf of the Israeli State. Dawson's argument is that just as it took the Maine to get the U.S. To back war against Spain, the Lusitania to get the U.S. into WWI, Pearl Harbor to get the U.S. into WWII, and the Gulf of Tonkin to get the U.S. into Vietnam, it took 9/11 to get the U.S. into Iraq -- not for oil, but for Israel. At least that is Dawson's assessment. And -- Dawson continues -- it is precisely such things as the Patriot Act that keep the public keyed up to such an extent that they continue to applaud American "intervention" in the Middle East.