World War II in the Context of History and Modern Warfare

World War II in the Context of History and Modern Warfare

The 20th Century was simultaneously a Century of exceptional advancement and unsurpassed violence. Why was this a Century of incomparable violence? The quick answer is that we, as a human race, used many of our advancements to become far more efficient killers; where advancements of prior centuries allowed armies to kill tens of thousands, the advancements of the 20th Century enabled armies to kill tens of millions. The longer answer involves military technological revolutions, military inventions used in World War II, business methods that drastically increased war production, the transformation of national wealth to effective fighting power, and the conversion of civilian moral energies into the will to win. Keegan, Overy, Ferguson and Weinberg, in turn, either support those conclusions or, at the very least, do not deny them.

Analysis:

a. The Four Military Technological Revolutions

Knox and Williamson point to four military technological revolutions to date, each building on the developments of the prior military revolution. The first military technological revolution, occurring in the 17th Century, was dominated by the French, who made tactical, organizational, naval and general military reforms.[footnoteRef:1] The first military revolution also saw tactical reforms by the Dutch and Swedish, as well as a British financial revolution.[footnoteRef:2] The second military revolution, occurring during the French Revolution of the 18th Century, created national mobilization politically and economically and Napoleonic warfare, including utter destruction of the opposition armed forces.[footnoteRef:3] Within that same second military revolution, the Industrial Revolution's 18th -- 19th Century technological advances of telegraph, railroads, steamships, small arms, automatic weapons and artillery for land wars and naval evolution of big-gun battleships and fleets, made arming, clothing, feeding, payment, swift movement to battle and consequent masses possible.[footnoteRef:4] While Overy does not speak of four military technical revolutions, he does speak of the technical and tactical revolution that took place prior to World War II.[footnoteRef:5] [1: MacGregor Knox and Murray Williamson, The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 6, 13.] [2: Ibid., p. 13.] [3: Ibid.] [4: Ibid.] [5: Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York, NY W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997), pp. 47, 61.]

Meanwhile, Keegan mentions no specific military technical revolutions, though he does discuss Germany's determination in World War II not to technically lag behind the Allies as it had in World War II.[footnoteRef:6] Weinberg wholly supports and Ferguson partially supports Keegan's assertion, stating that by World War II, a determined German naval force was technically superior to the British Royal Navy.[footnoteRef:7] [6: John Keegan, The Battle for History: Re-Fighting World War II (New York, NY: First Vintage Books Edition, 1996), p. 94.] [7: Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 112; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 362.]

The First World War was not merely the third military technological revolution. According to Knox and Williamson, the use of combined-arm tactics/operations, the Blitzkrieg, strategic bombing, naval carrier warfare, submarines, amphibious warfare machinery and signals intelligence all made World War I a huge technological leap forward, as well.[footnoteRef:8] Weinberg agrees with this assessment of new developments in World War I.[footnoteRef:9] Though Keegan and Ferguson do not specifically mention the development of these advancements in World War I, they also mention the World War II use of Blitzkrieg[footnoteRef:10], strategic bombing[footnoteRef:11], naval carriers[footnoteRef:12], submarines[footnoteRef:13], amphibious warfare[footnoteRef:14], signals intelligence.[footnoteRef:15] Overy and Weinberg also discuss the vital uses of these developments in World War II.[footnoteRef:16] [8: Knox and Williamson, p.13.] [9: Weinberg, p. 1.] [10: Keegan, p. 15; Ferguson, p. 385.] [11: Keegan, p. 35; Ferguson, p. 510.] [12: Keegan, p. 66; Ferguson, p. 535.] [13: Keegan, p. 59; Ferguson, pp. 113-14.] [14: Keegan, p. 63; Ferguson, pp. 537, 572.] [15: Keegan, p. 91; Ferguson, p. 113.] [16: Overy, pp. 5, 12, 28, 40-41, 47, 106; Weinberg, pp. 189, 222, 227, 538, 548.]

The First World War also ushered in the use of heavy military vehicles and airpower for military purposes: the first tank was used in battle 1916 and the first strategic bombing by air was accomplished by airplane in 1917.[footnoteRef:17] Overy also mentions the importance of developments before, during and after World War I for effective fighting in World War II, as does Weinberg.[footnoteRef:18] [17: Geoffrey Parker, The Cambridge History of Warfare (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 451.] [18: Overy, pp. 4, 31, 76; Weinberg, p. 1.]

Keegan and Ferguson do not specifically mention the importance of World War I developments of tanks; however, they discuss of the extensive use of tanks during World War II.[footnoteRef:19] For the airplane, in particular, this was revolutionary: during World War I, the airplane went from a flimsy machine that was not taken seriously by military commanders to a dangerous means of reconnaissance, pursuit and strategic bombing.[footnoteRef:20] Weinberg and Overy both mention World War 1 developments[footnoteRef:21], though Overy's assessment of World War I aircraft is less congratulatory, essentially stating that the beginning of World War II saw inadequate airpower which was quickly developed and expanded.[footnoteRef:22] Keegan and Keegan do not specifically mention the airplane's development during WWI, but mentions its importance during World War II.[footnoteRef:23] Finally, the submarine, which had been used with limited success prior to World War I, was now vastly improved, expanded and used in unlimited warfare.[footnoteRef:24] Keegan, Ferguson and Overy do not dwell on World War I's contributions to development of the submarine but speak of the submarine's extensive use during World War II.[footnoteRef:25] Meanwhile, Weinberg specifically points to the submarine as one of the major developments from World War I.[footnoteRef:26] In sum, the First World War grew from the technological advances that grew out of the first and second military technical revolutions, then improved, expanded on and leaped far ahead of those earlier revolutions to create a third technologically revolutionized type of war. [19: Keegan, p, 94; Ferguson, p. 521, 529.] [20: Peter Paret and Gordon A. Craig, Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 628.] [21: Overy, p. 60; Weinberg, p. 1.] [22: Overy, p. 60.] [23: Keegan, p. 66.] [24: Paret and Craig., p. 484.] [25: Keegan, p. 59; Overy, p. 5.] [26: Weinberg, p. 1.]

The First World War also resulted in vastly improved infrastructure. Marshall speaks of sophisticated transportation systems moved personnel and supplies in volume and speed that were unknown merely decades earlier.[footnoteRef:27] Keegan, Ferguson, Overy and Weinberg do not dwell on these transportation developments during World War I but Keegan, Overy and Weinberg speak of their extensive use by both the Allies[footnoteRef:28] and the Germans[footnoteRef:29] during World War II. [27 S.L.A. Marshall, World War I (New York, NY: Mariner Books, 2001), p. viii.] [28: Keegan, p. 100; Overy, p. 53; Weinberg, p. 116.] [29: Keegan, p. 116; Overy, p. 49; Weinberg, p. 143.]

For example, in approximately 2 weeks in August, 1914, French railway system was so sophisticated and efficient that it transported more than 3,700,000 troops and the Germans transported approximately 2,000,000 well-armed troops through their railway system in even less time.[footnoteRef:30] [30: Marshall, p. viii.]