Opperman\'s Violence in the Workplace

Opperman's Violence In The Workplace

Identification:

Opperman, S. (2007). Violence in the workplace: is your agency prepared? Retrieved May 14, 2009 from Fedsmith.com. Web site: http://www.fedsmith.com/article/1263/

In this article, Opperman discusses the threat of violence in the workplace, and asks federal employees to consider whether their agency is vulnerable to the threat of such violence. He talks about three different scenarios of workplace-type violence, including the Virginia Tech murders, a killing in a Troy, Michigan office building, and a killing at the National Aeronautical & Space Administration (NASA). Opperman discusses the events behind the two lesser-known events. In Troy, Michigan, a man walked into his former workplace and opened fire on three of his ex-coworkers; the assailant had been fired a week prior to the assault. At NASA, a contract employee barricaded himself into a building, killing a man, kidnapping a woman, and then killing himself. The NASA assailant had received an email that his performance was going to be reviewed. Both incidents occurred with disgruntled employees, exactly the same type of employees that pose the greatest risk of workplace violence. However, one of the problems that Opperman mentions is that most workplaces simply refuse to acknowledge that workplace violence can happen to them, so they ignore signals that, in hindsight, clearly predict workplace violence.

One thing that the article makes clear is that workplace can happen anywhere, at any time. An average of one employee is killed and 25 seriously injured each week in America violent assaults by current or former coworkers. In fact, workplace homicide is a major cause of work-related fatalities. More alarming than those statistics are the fact that the killers generally display clear warning signs about their intentions, such as showing weapons to coworkers, threatening their bosses, or talking about an upcoming attack.

Despite these clear warning sides, the myth that workplace violence cannot be prevented is still pervasive. However, the reality is that many companies are simply failing to take appropriate steps to end that violence. Employers fail to identify risks or teach managers how to defuse scenarios, including failing to respond to employee reports that they are scared. The perception is that employees snap, but the reality is that almost all perpetrators broadcast their intentions to harm someone. Another problem is that people minimize the threats posed by potential perpetrators, instead of taking those threats seriously and acting accordingly.

Most federal employees do not seem to feel that their agencies are adequately prepared to deal with workplace violence. Opperman acknowledges that the problem is a multi-faceted and complex issue that highlights various different areas. Opperman concluded by stating his intentions for future articles. Those included addressing workplace threats and bullying, workplace violence prevention training, dealing with the aftermath of workplace violence, how to defuse potential workplace violence, and how individuals can protect themselves.

Critique:

Opperman's article did a good job of introducing the topic of workplace violence. It helped defuse the myth that some workplaces are immune from workplace violence. In addition, by alluding to the term "going postal" and describing the incident at NASA, Opperman made it clear that federal agencies are very at-risk for workplace violence. In addition, Opperman did a good job of defusing other myths about workplace violence, such as the fact that workplace violence is almost always preceded by very threatening behavior. In that way, Opperman's article was a good introduction to the topic of workplace violence.

However, Opperman's article was seriously lacking in substance. The article's title asks the question "is your agency prepared?" But leaves the reader with no real way to assess whether their workplace is prepared to deal with workplace violence. From the title, the reader expects to see a detailed description of the steps that agencies need to take in order to be prepared to deal with workplace violence. For example, one expects Opperman to describe predictors of workplace violence. Yes, Opperman describes the fact that workplace violence is often preceded by threats and violent displays, but he does not describe the type of threats that should concern agency security officials. How does an agency separate an innocuous "I could have killed him" from a threat of actual harm? In addition, while Opperman sites Honeywell's obvious error in rehiring a man who had previously committed workplace violence, he does not give other ways to cite potentially violent people in the hiring or review process.