Arafat\'s Images Examined Arafat\'s Origins

Arafat's Images Examined

Arafat's Origins and Early Life

Oslo

Clinton Camp David Summit and the "Clinton Parameters"

Arafat's Death and Legacy

Yasser Arafat has been described throughout his career, both by many detractors and supporters, as the "father of the Palestinian people." The view in Colin Shindler's A History of Modern Israel provides a more pro-Israel approach and accurately describes Arafat in all of his duplicitous glory. In this essay, the author strives to provide additional support with other portrayals of Yasser Arafat in an attempt to enhance Shindler's portrayal of the deceased leader of the PLO, Fatah and the Palestinian Authority (PA).

This admirable study faithfully retells Israel's national story, Shindler mostly concentrates on how the Jewish Commonwealth has been historically unable to fulfill peaceful ideals due to the seemingly never ending war with the Arabs. Particularly tragic in his opinion was the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. In his tale, he gives the readers a vision of the state's past history and balances it off with the struggle to realize the dreams of Zionism. In his opinion, many of these ideals have fallen victim to the politics of the moment. By raising these questions from the past, Shindler opens up the debate about whether or not the conflict could have been avoided.

Shindler's study has been very well received and with good reason. Israel is understandable that a country like Israel is the sum total of its history.

Shindler is fundamentally asking why 60 years after Israel's founding have the country's burdens not lightened? Why has it not garnered more accolades from the other nations? On the one hand, the international community approved the founding of the state of Israel, yet they do not let it function like the other nation states.

This two faced approach is not only used by the West and the Arab world toward Israel. In terms of the Palestinians, it is probably symbolized by no one on the planet better than by Yasser Arafat. He has been described throughout his career as "the father of the Palestinian people." This essay will examine Arafat's status as symbol and politician and will evaluate the meaning of this title. What we will find is that like many politicians, the image he projected was many times different depending upon which audience the person finds themselves in, that is, in the energy dependent West or the oil supplying Arab world.

One thing that however did not change is the symbol of Arafat as the father and chief politician of a Palestinian people that was fighting to establish its national rights. What was less visible and much more real was that Arafat, as well as many of the leaders and countries involved in the "peace process" knew that nothing likely was to come out of it. Rather, the politics of oil determined that a "process" had to go "forward."

As with many "peace settlements" between the Arabs and Israel (the Camp David accords of 1979 between Egypt and Israel come to mind immediately), the skids are greased with generous amounts of weapons sales and U.S. weapons manufacturers become involved, as we will see later. As the U.S. is the largest weapons supplier to all parties in the region, any analysis of the situation on the ground comes up short unless you analyze this part of the "peace process." In addition, the deployment of U.S. forces in the region has to be analyzed to understand the background political and military strategies that the American administrations repackage and involve in supposed peace moves. As Condoleeza Rice very candidly defended U.S. weapons deals in the region in an article of Der Spiegel magazine, she said that the U.S. was determined to maintain the balances, military and strategic, within the region (Ilsemann S.V. 2007).

Although not widely known, much of the $150 million dollars of aid per year to the Palestinian Authority is composed of security aid and dissident Palestinians have accused PA officials of embezzling millions of dollars in this aid. Allegedly, they have been using the aid money to speculate in the food and fuel market in the West Bank (Middle East Newsline 1 August 2008). This culture of corruption did not appear overnight. It came out of the duplicitous policies established under Chairman Arafat.

Arafat's Origins and Early Life:

Everything about Arafat, even his place of birth is not straight forward. The best and most agreed upon guess is that he was born in Cairo, Egypt, directly contradicting the official PLO biography which has him born in the old city of Jerusalem, although he grew up in Jerusalem from the age of four (Cery and Brexel 2004, 11-12). It was important for public consumption that the leader of the Palestinian people be born in the capital of Palestine.

Many times, a name tells us several things about a person. Unlike in English and modern Western languages, in Semitic languages such as Hebrew and Arabic, names mean something. His given name was Mohammed Abdul-Rahman Abdul-Ra'ouf Qudwa Al-Husseini (Cery and Brexel 2004, 13). The name he took was Yasser Arafat. In Arabic, Yasser means "easy" or "no problems" (Rubin, B.M & Rubin, J.C. 2003, 12). The name Arafat denotes Mount Arafat and the plains of Arafat which is mentioned in the Quran where Mecca is now located and where pilgrims begin the trek to the Kaabah (Surah II, 199). Given this, the PLO leader wished to give forth the image of friendliness balanced with a dedication to the Islamic tradition.

Very little else about Arafat's early life is certain including his actions during the 1948 and 1956 Wars between Israel and the Arabs. What is certain is the part of his life that was performed in front of the camera. This is his life in Fatah and the PLO. Even the date of Fatah's foundation is shrouded in mystery until his accession as PLO leader in 1969 and his fateful fight with King Hussein in 1970 during Black September.

After King Hussein ejected Arafat and his PLO fighters from Jordan in 1970, he and his organization turned increasingly to terror to reach their objectives. After its inconclusive results, Arafat began to look to other results, in order to change his public image to garner Western support (Ensalaco 2008, 2-4). Sometimes, a person's perception of themselves and the image that they are trying to portray is as important as the historical facts. Arafat learned this in a very interesting place.

Arafat's International Image:

Certainly, Arafat liked to show two faces (or many faces) and engages in duplicity (Shindler 2009, 3 and 237). To the West, he wanted to appear as the diplomat. To his Arab compatriots, he wished to appear as the uncompromising fedayeen warrior who would wage continual war against Israel. But, where did Arafat learn this Janus like behavior? The two-faced Roman god of gates and doors would prove a better model for Arafat than that of Mars, although his revelations would be useful on occasion as well.

Certainly, the PLO chieftain had enough of the tools of the god of war.

In Red Horizons, Ion Pacepa provides a unique viewpoint that few analysts have taken into account. At the time of his July 1978 defection to the U.S., Pacepa was the highest ranking intelligence official ever to defect from a country of the former Warsaw Pact. In addition to attaining the rank of a two-star Securitate general, he also was the advisor to dictator Nicolae Ceau-escu, acting chief of the foreign intelligence service and state secretary in the Ministry of Interior.

As an ally and supplier of aid and arms to the PLO, this Romanian perspective is truly unique. His political tome is aimed at Ceau-escu, not Arafat, however he definitely expresses disapproval in his memoirs of the close relationship between the PLO leader and the Soviet Bloc. However, he provides rich insights into the Arab leader at a critical time in Arafat and the PLO's development.

As Ceau-escu's right hand man, Pacepa had an intimate knowledge of Romanian and USSR support of Arafat during the late 1960's and early 1970's. Since this knowledge was never meant to be made public, we can rely upon it as a unique and more neutral portrayal, including a trip to Beirut which reveals interesting details about the development of the PLO in Lebanon at the height of the Lebanese Civil War.

Certainly, the Janus effect worked well on the PLO leader, just like it did on Ceau-escu who suggested it to Arafat and who needs to quoted in detail to catch the nuances of his deft diplomatic and propaganda offensive:

How about pretending to break with terrorism? The West would love it. Just pretending, like with your independence? (Arafat) Exactly. But pretending over and over. Political influence, like dialectical materialism, is built on the same basic tenet that quantitative accumulation generates qualitative transformation…Dialectical materialism works like cocaine…If you sniff it once or twice, it may not change your life. If you use it day after day, though, it will make you into an addict…(Ceau-escu) A snort of a pacifist Arafat day after day… (Arafat) Exactly, Brother Yasser. The West may even become addicted to you and your PLO (Pacepa 1987, 25)

The above conversation occurred in the early Carter administration, although the Romanian dictator first began advising and consorting with Arafat in 1972 (ibid, 37). Ceau-escu was not a prophet. Rather, he was just a shrewd dictatorial leader who knew how to use image, propaganda and the repetition of the same information over and over again until his viewpoint became the accepted one.

In Pacepa's narrative, Ceau-escu and Arafat were very close. Arafat saw Ceau-escu as a model and this model set the tone for the next more than two decades of Arafat's leadership of the PLO after their secret March, 1978 meeting in Bucharest. This meeting is so very important to understanding the development and history of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority from Oslo to the leader's death in 2004.

While agreeing with Ceau-escu on the methods of dealing with opponents, he was opposed to declaring a PLO government in exile. Arafat wanted the PLO's struggle to remain a revolution and not become a country. He claimed that the Palestinians lacked the ability to become a formal state, including the traditions, unity and discipline to do so. He said that a Palestinian state would be a failure from day one.

In confidence to Ceau-escu, he said that this would be something for a future generation. Ceau-escu then said that he could work through associated terror organizations that were not directly associated with him. This included furtively and effectively taking over Abu Nidal's "Black June" operation. He would maintain a pristine record and could maintain plausible deniability (ibid, 28).

One marvels at how effectively the Soviets handled the PLO leader, compared to his relative difficulty in handling by the West. Perhaps this had something to do with Arafat's alleged homosexuality, as documented by Pacepa's wire taps (ibid, 36). If this was so, this would provide incredible insights into the close, intimate and seemingly short leash that the Eastern Bloc seemed to have on the PLO leader who would definitely have wanted to keep this secret deeply in the closet to maintain his support in the ultraconservative societies of the Islamic world. If one were to engage in counterfactual historical speculation, one would really wonder what would have happened during say the al-Aqsa Intifada had the Palestinian people knew information about PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's potential closet homosexuality (Shindler 2008, 284).

Oslo:

As the Second Intifada and he became less directly involved in the peace process. Effectively, from 2002 and on for more than two years, Arafat was confined to his Ramallah compound by the Israeli army. Gradually, he became more and more marginalized. For this reason and the short length of this discussion, the essay's examination of Arafat's life will not go beyond the Taaba talks. The Shindler text is excellent, but is much best with regard to the PLO and Yasser Arafat in the period since the beginning of the Oslo process and will remain the primary source for this section of the essay. This is why it is used as the primary text for the period of time from the early 1990's until Arafat's death in 2004. As Professor Shindler points out so many precious opportunities for peace slipped through the grasp of the participants in the peace process.

Because of the low key and unofficial nature of the Madrid conference, we will not consider it because it reflects little directly upon Arafat because he did not take part in it. However, the decisions at that 1991 conference had a direct impact upon and set the agenda for the later Oslo accords (ibid, 222-226). At Oslo, the most difficult problems were left off of the discussions. These included the right of return for the Palestinians and Jewish settlements. The excluded issues were left to be addressed in so-called permanent status talks.

In spite of the piecemeal nature of the talks, several breakthroughs were made. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat both agreed to the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as an interim self-government in the Gaza Strip and in parts of the West Bank. In return for the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to exist and the promise not to conduct armed attacks (the disconnect between promise and reality will be considered below), Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

In terms of armed struggle, this continues against the State of Israel, despite PA promises. Rather than noting this glaring violation of the Oslo Accords and praising Israel's efforts to uphold a lack of violent activity, every U.S. administration from Bill Clinton's to Barack Obama's has pushed Israel to continue to try to negotiate with an increasingly rejectionist Palestinian Authority, first under Arafat now under his former lieutenant Mohammed Abbas.

Clinton Camp David Summit and the "Clinton Parameters":

President Clinton had called a summit at Camp David in July of 2000. He did this for the purpose of jump-starting the negotiations between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. As usual, the PLO was insisting on the principle of a right of return for all Palestinian refugees. Arafat offered that the details of the return could be negotiated.

Israel refused the right of return, but Prime Minister Barak offered 92% of the West Bank, all of Gaza and a swap of land for Jewish settlements on the West Bank. The PLO refused. They accused Israel of offering unarable areas of the Negev Desert for fertile areas on the West Bank. Countering Israel's offer, they demanded 100% of the West Bank. Israel offered to give up 3 of 4 quarters of the old city. The PA demanded full control over the Temple Mount. Israel refused this due to the risk to their religious sites. The second intifada then broke out, derailing the talks.

The Clinton Parameters then offered some proposals that would deal with the most difficult and protracted problems, including settlements, refugees and Jerusalem.

The Parameters offered the PA the following concessions:

Control over a viable, internationally recognized state with sovereignty and contiguous borders.

Control of the Al Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem.

Sovereignty over the Arab sections of Jerusalem to serve as the capital of a Palestinian state.

A settlement plan for refugees that was comprehensive. Several potions offered would include return to the new state of Palestine, a restricted return to the state of Israel, resettlement in a third country and/or compensation.

Clinton offered the Israelis:

80% of West Bank settlers would be able to stay that lived near the 1967 borders.

Guarantees of security.

Israeli control over Jewish sections of Jerusalem, to be internationally recognized as the capital of Israel.

Israeli control over and access to the Jewish Holy sites of Jerusalem, including the Western Wall.

One particularly mistaken characterization that Shindler made was an error with regard to the "Clinton Parameters" that the U.S. President proposed to Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat in the wake of the events following the collapse of the Camp David summit in December 2000. Barak had accepted the proposal. Arafat refused to respond and went off traveling. As Shindler points out, the Israeli government accepted the Clinton Parameters as the basis for ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Prime Minister Barak phoned Clinton on January 1, 2001 and then said he could not accept the deal before the general election.

Arafat traveled to Washington D.C. He met Clinton on January 2, 2001 and rejected the parameters. Unfortunately, these matters are still at the center of Israel's disputes with regard to the Syrians and the Palestinians (Shindler 2008, 279-281).

The new Bush administration tried to pick up the pieces in January 2001 at Taaba, Egypt, but the talks fell apart. Here, Israel proposed that it keep 6% of the West Bank. Disputes continued over refugees, land swaps, and sovereignty over the Temple Mount. The two sides were unable to reach agreement and the talks fell apart amid the worsening conditions during the second intifada (Ibid, 288-290). Unfortunately, the Shindler text paints the regrettable death of the peace process in the Second Intifada. Without this tragedy, we might have had peace today. It gives us pause and awe to think about what the tragedy of a third one would be for Israel now.

Arafat's Death and Legacy:

As noted earlier, Arafat was effectively confined to his Ramallah compound for more that two years by the Israeli Army. He became ill and had to be flown to Paris

where he died on 11 November 2004 at age 75 and was later laid to rest "temporarily" in his Ramallah compound after Israel denied his request to be buried near the Al-Aqsa Mosque or anywhere in Jerusalem. Since no autopsy was performed, the exact cause of death remains unknown. Even in death, Arafat holds mysteries.

This mystique is not all that Arafat left behind. It is the author's opinion that Charles Krauthammer said it succinctly and the best as he described Arafat as being "single-minded, but not about statehood or a real peace" (Krauthammer, C. 2004, A25). While Krauthammer saw the possibility of peace, he was being optimistic. Instead, the PA effectively remains the child of Nicolai Ceau-escu, immature and still in neonatal intensive care. If it survives, it will hardly be viable. Instead, the entity remains a security concern for Jordan, Egypt and Israel alike who are unfortunate enough to share boundaries with it. While Israel bears the brunt of its attacks, all of the other nations bordering the area look nervously over their shoulders, in particular Jordan's King Abdullah whose father King Hussein was very nearly overthrown by the Palestinians in 1970 and whose country is so very heavily populated by Palestinians.

In an article by Barry Rubin in the Middle East Quarterly written in the spring before Arafat's death, he very accurately predicted what we now see to have transpired since the death of the PLO Chairman. Again, the Ceau-escu model comes strikingly back into view.

Firstly, Arafat never designated a successor. If this was the only problem, the Palestinians might be able to have been considered to have been luck. Unfortunately, he also blocked the grooming of anyone else to succeed him to include the crippling of institutions that might be able to provide for a smooth transition of power.

It was always important for Arafat to be the indispensable man. Like most dictators, he had more than just a complex of megalomania. He knew that if he depended on anyone else, he made himself vulnerable. Unfortunately, this megalomania caused issues for all of the Palestinians and they suffer from it to this day.

Like Arafat, the PLO movement itself became uncompromisingly dogmatic and rejectionist. The PLO and its competition (such as Hamas) garner their power largely from killing Israelis. Without violence, they have almost no reason to exist. Like Arafat, they refuse to compromise on matters such as Israel's legitimacy and borders. Maximalist goals could not be downsized in Arafat's lifetime, as they can not be downsized now either.