Yom Kippur War the Long-Term

Yom Kippur War

The Long-Term Implications of the Yom Kippur War

As forces from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq massed around Israel's borders in 1967, Israel launched a six-day air campaign which crippled the capacity of its opponents to wage war and which expanded its borders to well beyond the tract originally awarded to Zionists with the independence of 1948. Taking control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strips, Israel now held the fate of the exiled Palestinian people in its hands. In response to this condition, the United Nations Security Council attempted to draft a resolution demanding Israel's immediate withdrawal from its newly occupied territories. Here, the United States introduced that which would epitomize its policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by blocking the passage of any such resolution by the international governing body. Thence forward, the United States has taken a unilateral stance on the conflict, siding almost invariably with the Israeli government in its right to protect its borders by denying statehood to the disenfranchised Palestinian people. These are the conditions which are present today, and which as a point of fact, would also be at the root of the Yom Kippur War.

The nation of Israel, today continually at the center of territorial dispute, vehement ideological disagreement and violent daily conflict, was a state founded amidst circumstances of a similar nature in 1948. Its creation was severely opposed by its surrounding Arab states who viewed the establishment of Israel both as a weapon against pan-Arab control of the Middle East region and as a means to denying Palestinian Arabs the homeland promised them by British occupiers in the early part of the 20th century. As a result, Israel's existence, peace and security have balanced precariously atop a pervasive regional interest in dismantling these goals. To a large part, the Jewish National Homeland's strategy of preservation would be based on countering this regional interest through war and diplomacy. Its formation and its long history of defensive tactics culminated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with two conflicts defining the future course for the region. Remarkably, this course has also had significant bearing on the rest of the world, with nations such as the United States and the Soviet Union taking a vested interest both in times of peace and conflict. The Yom Kippur War, which occurred in 1973, would be an act of strategic vengeance by the Arab states for the disgrace and political disenfranchisement provoked by their defeat in the Six Day War, which occurred in 1967. These events would create a political and geographical deadlock that remains in place today, and would also set the mold for the Middle East peace process, both in its successes and failures.

Israel's policy response, since its founding charter, has been to diplomatically engage its neighbors unilaterally, though diplomacy had rarely been the avenue explored by regional partners. Instead, war marked the year of Israeli independence, with Egypt banding with Syria and Jordan to invade the fledgling democracy. This attempt to undermine the creation of Israel backfired, with Israel's international support, particularly that of the U.S., helping it not only to vanquish its aggressors but to expand its granted borders by 50%. (Timeline, 1)

In the late 1950's, Egypt manned an economic response to what it perceived as an incursion of its borders, blocking Israeli utilization of the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran, both strategically crucial waterways for international trade. This ultimately led to the six-day war in 1967. Again, this marked an instance in which Israel was able to expand its borders in response to regional aggression. This was an expansion that would set into motion the bargaining chips for future peace agreements while simultaneously levying an occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank that would become the basis for major grievances by Arab States. Following its victory, Israel was met by "UN Resolution 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal" from the newly acquired territories. (Timeline, 1) This resolution would thenceforth define an Israeli impetus toward the eventuality of returning all of these lands, though the conditions have not yet been ideal for a thorough implementation of this impetus. In 1973, Egypt's then president Abdel Nasser, in a drive to extend his proclamation of the need and right for a Pan-Arab nation, attacked Israel on its holiest day, Yom Kippur. Though the surprise attack pushed Israeli borders back to pre-1967 proportions, American support again helped Israel conquer its assailant and reconstitute its parameters. Israel's consistent defeat of its most fortified enemy, in Egypt, would make diplomacy the only evident route to relations with the state. Thus, the impact of the Yom Kippur War in its immediate manifestation would be to denote that Israel could not continue to view its newly established borders as secure.

Here, we consider the implications of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which was intended to end hostilities in the wake of the expansion of Israel's borders.

Therefore, "on November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, establishing the principles that were to guide the negotiations for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. This resolution was a tortuously negotiated compromise between competing proposals. By examining what was discarded as well as the language that appears, it is possible to discern the Security Council's intent. The first point addressed by the resolution is the 'inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by war.'" (Jewish Virtual Library, 1) Thus, the resolution would make the argument that Israel was legally not entitled to retain its hold on the lands gained through the engagement of hostilities with its neighbors. In many ways, this aspect of the resolution would become a policy-point by which the Arabs would rally a future engagement against the Israelis, with the presumption being that a will did exist in the world community to see the Palestinian lands be removed from Israeli control.

If the Arab states were preparing to undertake another military strike against the Israelis, it can be deduced that there existed no expectation of outright defeat. The decisive and total reduction of Arab forces by the lone Israeli state would set a new tenor for the military balance in the region. Indeed, "Israel's preemptive attack in the 1967 war and its offensive military strategy in general stemmed from its small size and corresponding lack of defensible territory. Israeli leaders developed a doctrine which called for the attack as soon as practicable in order to carry the battle away from Israeli soil. This strategy, successful in 1956, became doctrine following the 1967 campaign.[20] the 1967 Six Days' War molded Israeli thought about themselves, their Arab foes, and the next war." (Jordan, 3) With considerable justification, the Israelis, in concert with American sponsorship in the form of armaments and tanks, would roll to a stunning victory in 1967, vanquishing foes on all borders. While its objectives had never included the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the implication of the '67 struggle was clear. Israel would need to expand its borders to insulate its people from military aggression. This would imply to the Israelis that there was some credible opportunity to prevent aggression on their own land, even ensconced by enemy territory as they are. And this would become the ambition of the state, in its continued occupation of these lands, particularly in the absence of any suitable agreement providing for said lands to be relinquished. Indeed, Resolution 242 would provide the basis for a mutual settlement to this issue that was never honored by the two conflicting sides, resulting in a basis for the 1973 attack.

As our research denotes, "the most controversial clause in Resolution 242 is the call for the 'Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.' This is linked to the second unambiguous clause calling for 'termination of all claims or states of belligerency' and the recognition that 'every State in the area' has the 'right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.'" (Jewish Virtual Library, 1) While the former parameter for disengagement would never be honored by Israel, so too would the Arab states resist the obligation of this resolution calling for an unconditional acknowledgment of Israel and its right to statehood. In large part, the failure of both sides to come to agreement on the honoring of terms composed by Resolution 242 would perpetuate the situation still in place to day. The situation would be very much a determinant factor in the conditions precipitous to and pursuant of the Yom Kippur War thereafter.

Importantly, the condition of Arab hostility toward Israel had intensified significantly in the space of time following the 1967 conflict. A wounded Arab psyche was inflamed by Israel's refusal to depart from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Great political motive underscored the growth in the pan-Arab Middle East. A brainchild of Egyptian President Abdel Nasser, the notion of a Pan-Arab state governing the Middle East would be the birth of an Arab political movement defined by a regional unity. This unity generally took the form of diplomatic and military opposition to the state of Israel. Egypt's leading role in the acceleration of Arab political unification would have a long-term effect of philosophically influencing such movements as the liberation front of Yasser Arafat in the Palestinean territory, and the host of other terror organizations which have waged guerilla campaigns in search of political recognition.

These examples will be relevant in discussion hereafter on the long-term effects of the conflict. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, it would become clear that these political implications were not accidental. Quite to the contrary, the Arabs understood quite well that they could not anticipate a military victory. Still, "in October 1973, Arab nations led by Egypt and Syria chose war as their instrument of policy -- their primary policy objective in waging war: to recover Arab lands occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six Days' War. Arab leaders translated their policy objective to recover the occupied territories into a grand strategy designed to achieve that objective. The Arab grand strategy contemplated limited military action followed by political pressure to compel recovery of the occupied territories in total." (Jordan, 1)

This strategy would ultimately prove an effective one, insofar is it would provoke a series of world conditions which would in many ways tip the diplomatic scales in favor of the Arabs. Essentially, Egypt and Syria had collectively resolved that with military victory unlikely to impossible, it would be necessary to at least provoke Israel into recognizing its always precarious position in the region. At the time leading up to the ruthless surprise attack on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, the sense of security which the Israeli's enjoyed was on the basis of the understanding that the Arabs were left without motive for an attack. Unable to win in military confrontation, the Israelis had come to view the Arab states as not possessing any bargaining power, according to the source provided by Jordan (1997).

This impression would contribute, the article argues, to a general unwillingness on the part of Israel to cede its position on Resolution 242. Lacking the capacity to enforce Israel's withdrawal from the disputed territories and simultaneously refusing to recognize Israeli statehood, Nasser's leadership of the Arab states coalesced into another strategy altogether as a means to forcing Israel's hand in attending the conditions of Resolution 242.

It was Nasser's determination that American involvement in diplomatic affairs hat especially interceded in the prospect of achieving a meaningful compromise. To the point, "following three years of political efforts, Arab leaders concluded that diplomatic resolution of their problems was at a political impasse. The Arabs believed Israel would never negotiate concessions so long as Israelis felt militarily secure inside their borders and the United States was unwilling to apply pressure to force a settlement. Arab leaders determined that war was the only viable alternative to achieve their political goals." (Jordan, 2)

Therefore, with force and finance support from other Arab states, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on October 6th, 1973, while its citizens observed a ritual day long repentance through fasting. (ADL, 1) in the immediate shock which revealed Israel's vulnerability, the Arabs made fast gains on the ground. For the first day and a half, the Israelis were besieged by the attack as expected. And also as expect, their response was swift and ultimately decisive. While not as total or concise as the 1967 conflict, the 1973 engagement would nonetheless restore Israel to the same borders which it has established six years prior. In this respect, the Egyptians and Syrians had made no initial progress in brokering a return of occupied lands However, as we have noted, the intent of this strike was to provoke eventual gains in the enforcement of the 1967 United Nations Security Resolution.

In this they would be successful, returning the United Nations to the floor to discuss the brokering of piece. Thus, "on October 22, 1973, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, calling on all parties to begin "implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts" through negotiations." (ADL, 1) Once again, however, the process of establishing peace by carrying out the implications of Resolution 242 would be hampered, this time, by a failure of Syria even to show up to engage in negotiation on a peace treaty. Syria argued that unless Israel immediately and unconditionally relinquished its control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, followed by an immediate withdrawal of all troops there, it would refuse to appear in a discussion on the conditions of Resolution 338. Thus, the doctrine would hang in suspended animation once again, this time disrupted by the inconsistent approach taken by Syria, which had thus essentially removed itself from the political and diplomatic proceedings which had ultimately been intended by the invasion. It may perhaps be credibly argued that in attempting to compel Israeli withdrawal without conceding recognition of Israel's right to exist, Syria over-estimated the power which the Arab states had gained within the world community.

Egypt, by contrast, would seize the intended opportunity and being a new era for Arab efforts at again political momentum against the historically better organization Zionist movement. The Yom Kippur invasion had simply been a way to regain both Israel's respect for the threat laying in wait at its borders and the world community's undivided attention. There is, in reflection, a set of provocations for this approach that would become clearer in Egypt's behavior in the war's aftermath. Accordingly, we find that "in 1973, the Middle East question no longer held center-stage internationally. The superpowers, focused on detente, sought to avoid Middle East tensions that could disrupt Soviet-American diplomatic accords. American Middle East mediation efforts progressively declined, finally ceasing entirely in mid-1973.[10] the environment in the Middle East, albeit tense, was not war, and the superpowers, immersed in rapidly evolving global politics,[11] tolerated this no peace-no war situation." (Jordan, 2) Thus, to the Arabs, this meant that the world community had tacitly come to accept Israel's military dominance over the Arabs, its occupation of the Palestinian territories and, thus, its resistance to the conditions of U.N. Resolution 242.

The conflict was inherently designed to remind the global powers that this status quo was not acceptable to the Arab states. Still, when Syria balked at negotiating, immediate moves toward political progress would be couched in the general ethnic and ideological rancor which had inclined constant military friction. The diplomatic process would enter a new point in history, where the empathy of some members of the global community for the anti-Semitism represented in the Arab states, and where the political motives of aligning against a U.S. ally for others, would create a political alliance aimed at attacking Israel's general right to existence.

Thus, perhaps one of the most dubious accomplishments to be yielded by the conflict would be that established by an overwhelming majority of member states in 1975. The political ascendancy of the Arab states, notably supported by their Soviet sponsorship, would gain the Arab coalition a seat at the world table. It would use this to condemn Israel and to de-legitimize its claim to its state. Empowered by the political gains made in its entrance into a peace process, the Arab community succeeded in introducing and passing Resolution 3379, which would ultimately define the Zionist movement toward the founding of the state of Israel as an inherently racist political movement and ideology. The Resolution identifies other movements such as Apartheid as a way of creating an association between Zionism and a distinctly racist form of political exclusion. The resolution explicitly states, "taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racism and imperialist ideology." (UNGA, 1)

That an Arab coalition of states had introduced such language was hardly surprising or novel. Quite as a point of their political identity, the Arab states had established as a primary political and military objective the destruction of the state of Israel.

And in the wake of the 1967 and 1973 conflicts, the anti-Semitism which has long persisted within the world community would find a galvanizing point of contention concerning the absence in legitimacy of Zionism. The global community's condemnation, though repealed in 1991, would touch off a longstanding official world policy of hostility toward Israeli existence, highlight by rejection of Israel's right to occupy the territories gained in 1967. Nonetheless, the United States remained in firm support of its strategic and philosophical ally, ensuring that a strong voice in world affairs protected it from multilateral action. This would create an impasse which would only be attended by diplomatic interaction will individual states. As Egypt had taken this conflict on with intent to gain a political voice, it would rationally become a leading force in a new period of Middle Eastern history. This would be a period of negotiation and cessation of hostilities with Israel.