Zombie Argument v. Physicalism: In the field of philosophy, zombies are imaginary creatures that are used to illuminate problems regarding consciousness and its relation to the physical world. As compared to those in witchcraft or films, zombies are exactly like human beings in every physical aspect but without conscious experiences. However, zombies behave like humans and some of them even spend considerable amount of time discussing consciousness. While few people believe in the existence of zombies, many state that they are at least conceivable and some argue that they are possible. Consequently, there are arguments that if zombies are increasingly a bare possibility, then some kind of dualism is true and physicalism is false. This argument is the chief significance of the zombie idea for many philosophers though it also generates interest for pre-suppositions concerning the nature of consciousness as well as the relation between the physical and the phenomenal. In addition, the use of the zombie idea against physicalism generates more general questions regarding the link between conceivability, imaginability, and possibility. Generally, the zombie argument poses a problem of physicalism and attracted response from physicalists who attempt to defuse the problem.

History of the Zombie Argument:

According to Descartes, non-human animals are automata, which imply that their behavior is completely explicable with regards to physical mechanisms (Kirk, 2011). The philosopher explored the concept of a machine that looked and behaved like a human being. Following his attempts to unmask such a machine, Descartes concluded that no machine could behave like a human being and that characteristically explaining human behavior needed something beyond the physical. This would require an immaterial mind, interaction with the procedures in the brain, and the remainder of the body.

In the 19th Century, scientists started to think that physics was ability of explaining every physical event that was explicable at all. These thoughts were fueled by the fact that nearly every physical effect has a physical cause. This contributed to the emergence of the idea of zombies as counter-examples to physicalism. However, if they are used as counter-examples to physicalism, it is not enough for zombies to behave and function like normal human beings in all physical aspects with the physical properties that physicalists suppose humans have. This requires zombies to be subject to the fundamental closure of the physical, which imply that their supposed lack of consciousness is a challenge to physicalism (Kirk, 2011). However, if the behavior of zombies could not be explained physically, physicalists are likely to argue that there is no reason to be concerned about them.

The origin of the zombie argument can be attributed to the overwhelming intuitive appeal of the zombie idea in the early 1970s. Philosophers who exploited this idea during this period assumed without argument that zombies are not only conceivable but also possible. The conceivability of zombies was described as obvious because of the seeming clear description of a coherent situation. However, since intuition cannot be relied on, there are several difficulties in understanding the nature of consciousness. This means that those who state that zombies are conceivable must support their claims.

Notably, the zombie argument against physicalism was expanded by David Chalmer in 1996 in order to demonstrate the conceivability of zombies and prove physicalism as false. The argument is based on two major premises because it is usually developed through a framework of two-dimensional semantics. First, the zombie argument is based on the premise that if physicalism is true, then it is understandably impossible for zombies to exist while the second premise is that it is logically possible for zombies to exist. Based on these premises, Chalmer concludes that physicalism is therefore false and if the existence of zombies is logically possible, then the idea of consciousness cannot be described or explained reductively.

The Problem of the Zombie Argument to Physicalism:

In the past few years, the zombie argument has developed to take up a central part in the case against physicalist views of consciousness. This development has mainly been fueled by the powerful and influential advocacy that this argument has received from David Chalmers who developed the case against physicalism. Generally, physicalism regarding consciousness is based on the perspective that phenomenal properties are not additional characteristics of the world different from those that could be described by a concluded basic physics i.e. The microphysical features. While there are numerous ways of describing this wide characterization, consciousness supervenes metaphysically on the microphysical (Frankish, 2007, p.650). Based on physicalism, physical facts are determinants of all other facts,...

In this case, physicalism must assert that zombies are not possible on the basis that all facts about a zombie are established by the physical facts that are the same for the zombie and normal conscious humans from which it cannot be physically differentiated. On the contrary, a philosophical zombie is a theoretical being that cannot be differentiated from a normal human being unless it lacks conscious experience.
The main problem that the zombie argument poses for physicalism is that it seems to refute claims that physical facts require consciousness. This argument refutes these claims by arguing that zombies are conceivable and whatever is conceivable is possible even without consciousness. The zombie argument poses a threat to physicalism by suggesting that physicalism is not true because it supposes the impossibility of zombies, which are conceivable and possible. Notably, the zombie argument or idea also generates several concerns and questions about the link between conceivability, imaginability, and possibility as presented in physicalism. Therefore, the zombie argument implies that physicalism is false because it is logically possible for zombies to exist and conscisousness cannot be explained reductively.

Physicalist Response to the Argument:

In the last two decades, the zombie argument has contributed to the resurrection of arguments against physicalism and for various metaphysical dualism. These arguments seem to conclude that phenomenal consciousness is not present in a world that is entirely physical. The culmination of these arguments is that they have been found persuasive by many contemporary philosophers who have adopted some form of anti-physicalism. Consequently, a debate has emerged between physicalism and anti-physicalism, which is about fundamental ontology (Balog, n.d.). Based on physicalism, the fundamental ontology of the world is physical while there are numerous anti-physicalist metaphysical perspectives that have been proposed.

However, physicalists have responded to the zombie argument in attempts to defuse the problem it poses to physicalism. One of the most significant approaches adopted by physicalists to defuse the problem posed by the zombie argument is to examine mental properties in light of whether or not the mind is physical. Physicalists have tried to determine whether mental properties like pain or thinking are actually physical properties. These initiatives have been geared towards demonstrating the importance of consciousness with regards to physicalism. Generally, many physicalists are willing to admit that there are several kinds of elementary particle though it is quite difficult to understand the meaning of non-physical substance and what they could amount to (Montero, 1999, p.185).

The responses of physicalists to the zombie argument always attack two premises i.e. The fact that it is plausible and the argument that if it is ideally conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible (Frankish, 2007, p.652). In this case, the more radical physicalists deny the first premise of the zombie argument while conservative ones accept this premise but deny the second one. One of the responses to the zombie argument is the development of anti-zombie argument for physicalism which is based on the same notion of conceivability in the zombie argument against physicalism. This response is based on several considerations that are geared towards defusing the problem that the zombie argument poses to physicalism. In this response, anti-zombies are conceivable, if they are conceivable, then they are possible, and if they are possible, then consciousness is physical. The conclusion of this response is that consciousness is physical and the argument has a strong claim to soundness.

In the zombie argument against physicalism, there is an assumption of subtracting consciousness while leaving the other physical characteristics intact and concluding that consciousness is non-physical. In the anti-zombie argument, subtracting the non-physical attributed while leaving our consciousness intact means that consciousness is physical. This implies that physicalism is true, especially when considered from the anti-zombie argument. Nonetheless, this response does not defuse the problem of the zombie argument because it is flawed for the same reason as the zombie argument. While it contributes to dualism, the zombie and anti-zombie argument are mutually exclusive since they annihilate each other.

In conclusion, the zombie argument was developed as a concept to demonstrate that physicalism is false because of the conceivability and possibility of the existence of zombies. This argument has attracted huge considerations in the field of philosophy as physicalists try to examine it because of the problem it poses to physicalism. Actually, the zombie argument attempts to show that physicalism is untrue by focusing on consciousness as an important part…