Al Qaeda training manual

Al Qaeda Training Manual

The manual was certainly written after 1990 as it refers to the failed assassination attempt on Egyptian Minister of the Interior Abdel-Halim Moussa, in which the parliamentary Speaker Rifaat el-Mahgoub was killed instead. However, the technological sophistication seems to support a date not far in excess of 1990. "Some modern devices, such as the facsimile and wireless" (p.31) are referenced as higher levels of technology which "the Islamic Military Organization cannot obtain," (p. 41). There is no mention of internet, cellular phone, or even pager technology, which were gaining popularity in the west in the early 90s, and had possibly made beach heads on under-developed shores. If not proper internet technology, however, it is presumable that technologies such as fax machines were widely available even in the under-developed Middle East by 1995. Therefore, at best estimate, the manual was first written sometime in the early 1990s.

In so far as the intelligence, weapons, and operational methods taught by this manual follow the basic wisdom of these trades, well distilled through the decades, they must be said to closely coincide with American practices. Advice like keeping communications short, practicing proper grip on a rifle, compartmentalization of information, and the simple substitutional codes taught are less tools of the trade and more just well-tried common sense, and are likely used by all intelligence organizations including western ones.. However, as the techniques move into the more intricate tradecraft, they seem to lag behind western standards. Certainly the simple codes presented would easily be broken by any determined cryptographer, and, presumably, are not used for anything important in the west. At best estimate, Al Qaeda methods are similar to the west, in so far as all operational methods of this sort follow a basic root, but are adapted to the lower levels of sophistication available to the mujahidin of the early 90s.

3. The advantage of Al Qaeda is the extreme difficulty which any westerner would have in directly infiltrating their organization. Though the question of how thoroughly candidates are vetted is left in doubt by this manual, it is difficult to see how anyone without a lifelong commitment to Islam would make the cut. Also, as per the techniques described through the agent recruitment sections, it is likely that brothers are recruited from the associates and friends of established brothers. Any western infiltrator would have to be in place for years before being approached in such a way. Finally, the manual makes hints at certain 'tests' -- such as a test for resistance in the face of torture -- which would directly put any infiltrator in harm's way.

4. Overall, the level of sophistication seems to be low. While an intense paranoia is maintained throughout -- a well-reared paranoia rooted in life under harsher regimes than those found in the west -- in many cases that paranoia is not carried through to a logical end. There is an over-reliance on forged documents, which, for instance, are expected to deliver the brother from the police in the event of a raid (p.36); there is also an over-reliance on the integrity of a brother through his faith, by which he is expected to preserve himself from turning informer (p.130). Discussion of poisons is limited to simple agents, with low fatality rates, readily available in most garden stores (p.116). In some cases the dosage and fatality rates of these poisons are incorrectly stated. There is also little evidence of efforts to obtain sophisticated technology to support the cell. Nonetheless, it must be mentioned, that the weapons and explosives techniques are well developed.

An Overview of the Organization

On the basis of the captured manual, Al Qaeda in the early 90s would best be described as a clandestine, grass-roots organization lacking much military and technological sophistication but making up for that lack through zeal, persistence, and patience. In general, the operational methods described are elementary to any graduate of a western intelligence organization but not to be underestimated, especially for their effectiveness in the under-developed world. There is some advanced knowledge of weapons and explosives techniques, however, their greatest asset -- and most fearsome characteristic -- is ideology, through which they stand to recruit those who can improve their level of sophistication. As they gain sophistication, the threat they present to the west increases proportionally.

The intelligence techniques described by the manual are low-tech, but rooted mainly in sound theory. The tradecraft described for cell structure follows basic principles of compartmentalization; that described for intelligence gathering follows basic techniques for avoiding pursuit, for minimalizing documentation, for recruitment, etc.; the assassination techniques described must be called rudimentary at best. While the low-tech nature of is a hindrance to Al Qaeda, it must also be accepted that, in the under-developed countries they operate in, low-tech is less of a disadvantage than it would be in the west. Furthermore, brothers of the organization are encouraged to substitute old-fashioned discipline for technology: thorough preparation, reconnaissance, practice, and patience can sometimes go farther than geosynchronous satellites and the great lengths to which the organization is willing to go must not be underestimated. These are, after all, operatives with an ideology of martyrdom and, in the face of martyrdom, what will a few hours, days, or even weeks on a stake-out matter?

Identifying this type of operative will require equal persistence and patience. Because they will operate through low-tech, undocumented means, it may often be necessary to follow them to the streets, go door-to-door, shop-to-shop, review long hours of video footage; in general to practice old-fashioned gumshoe work.