Aristotle chapter in book Reality

Aristotle chapter in “Reality.”
The chapter on Aristotle in Westphal and Levenson’s (1994) book, Reality, presents an argument based on Aristotle’s (384- 322 B.C) work. The philosopher is believed, far and wide, to be more empirically minded than Plato, his teacher. Considered “the greatest mind of antiquity,” Aristotle was the most significant intellectual authority when it came to the sciences and philosophy. The chapter attempts at logically ascertaining the answer to the question of what is real, in the end, outlining the defining traits of ultimate reals or substances (p. 45). In this essay, the main arguments put down in the book on Aristotle’s views, and thoughts will be dealt with.
The predicate’s definition, as well as name, should predict the topic. ‘Man,’ for example, predicates individual men, with the species name ‘man’ applied to individuals, as the word ‘man’ is utilized to describe the individual; the word’s definition predicates individual men as well, as the individual is animal as well as man. Therefore, the definition, as well as the species name, can predicate the individual. Meanwhile, concerning components of a subject, often, neither the definition nor the name can be predicated of that they exist in. The definition can never be predicted, but nothing exists in some instances to prevent name usage.
All things except for primary substances can either exist within or be predicated of some primary substance, which becomes clear when referring to distinct occurring instances. ‘Animal’ predicates the human (‘man’) species, and hence, individual men, since, if no individual existed to the predicate, it would be utterly non-predicable of the human (‘man’) species. Once again, color exists in the body, and thus within individual bodies, since if no individual bodies existed wherein it existed, it could not exist – in fact, it could not ever exist in the body. Hence, all things with the exception of primary substances are either being predicated of or existing within, primary substances. Should the last be non- existent, it would not be possible for any other thing to exist.
When it comes to secondary substance, the species more accurately prove to be substance as compared to the genus, as it is associated more directly with the primary substance. This is because, if any individual ought to explain primary substances, he/ she would be rendering a more informative account, which would be more relevant to the given subject, by defining the species as opposed to the genus. Hence, he/ she would be providing a more informative explanation of the person through making the following statement. In essence, he was a man, and not he was an animal, as the former explanation is, to a greater extent, characteristic of the individual, whereas the latter description is overly generic. Once again, a man rendering a description of an individual tree’s nature will provide a more informative account through citing the species (i.e., ‘tree’) as opposed to citing its genus (i.e., ‘plant’).
The most proper term for ‘primary substances’ is ‘substances’ owing to them being entities underlying all else; furthermore, all else exists within or is predicated of substances. The very same relationship subsisting primary substances and all else also exists between the genus and the species, since species: genus::subject: predicate (as species predicates genus while the other way around is not possible). Hence, another basis exists for affirming that species more truly makes substance as compared to the genus. When it comes to the species themselves, except for cases of genera, not one of them more truly functions as a substance as compared to another. We ought not to offer a more apt account of individual men through citing the species they belong to than of a single horse, through utilizing the same definition technique.
One common quality of the substance is: it never exists in the subject, as primary substances neither exist in nor are predicated of subjects. On the other hand, when it comes to a secondary substance, clearly, from the arguments that follow, besides others, they don’t exist within the subject, as ‘man’ doesn’t exist within any subject. Still, predicates of individual men – manhood does not exist within individual men. Likewise, ‘animal’ predicates of individual men, however, are not present within him. Once again, if a thing exists within a subject, while the name might quite well apply to that which it exists in, the definition is not applicable. Nevertheless, when it comes to secondary substances, the definition, as well as the name, are applicable to a subject: in other words, the definitions of the genus as well as of species ought to be utilized when one is referring to an individual man. Hence, substance can’t exist within a subject.
Every substance seems to be symbolizing the individual. The above statement proves unquestionably true when it comes to primary substances, as the entity constitutes a unit. When it comes to secondary substances like ‘animal’ or ‘man’ for instance, the form of speech utilized accords the idea that, in this instance, we are indicating the individual, though this impression isn’t strictly true, as secondary substances do not make the individual, but, rather, constitute a class having a distinct qualification, as it isn’t single and one like any primary substance. The terms ‘animal’ and ‘man’ can predicate two or more subjects.
The most characteristic quality of substances seems to be the following: that, while numerically being the very same thing, it can admit opposing qualities. From out of things besides substance, one ought to find oneself incapable of bringing forward all that possess the above quality. Therefore, the very same color can’t be both black and white. Likewise, one particular action cannot be both bad and good. The above rule is applicable in case of all things that are not substance. However, the very same substance, while maintaining its original identity, can admit opposing qualities. For instance, the very same person can, on one occasion, be black, and on a second, be white, or be warm in particular instances and cold in other, or be good at times and bad at other times. The above capability cannot be found anywhere else. However, one may maintain that a view or statement forms an exception to this principle, the very same statement, one will agree, maybe true as well as false.
Consequently, if a man makes such an exception, arguing that a view or a statement can admit conflicting qualities, the argument may be said to be unsound. The reason behind this is, a view or a statement is believed to possess this capacity not because it changes itself, but due to the change occurring concerning another thing. The falseness or correctness of any statement is contingent on facts rather than any power belonging to the actual statement of admitting conflicting qualities. In a nutshell, nothing is capable of changing a view or statement’s nature. Since, subsequently, no change occurs by itself, they are not able to admit opposing qualities. However, due to the modification that occurs in the substance itself, the substance is considered to be able to admit conflicting qualities, as the substance admits in itself either blackness or whiteness, health, or disease. In the above sense, it is deemed to be able to admit conflicting qualities. In summary, it is the defining trait of substances, that, while numerically staying the same, they can effectively admit opposing qualities, with the change transpiring using a transformation in the actual substance itself.
Let such statements be sufficient when it comes to the topic of substance.
The substance is Aristotle’s topic of inquiry, as the causes and rules that are sought belong to the substance. If our universe is regarded as a whole, the very first component of it would be substance, which adheres simply due to serial succession. From this perspective as well, substance comes first, and subsequently, quality and quantity.
Sensible substances can be changed, not if the change occurs due to intermediates or opposites, as well as not from every opposite (as the voice isn’t white but doesn’t, consequently, become white), but due to the conflicting state since contraries don’t change.
A point to be borne in mind here is that neither form nor matter comes into being – here, Aristotle implies the last form and matter. Because all things that change are some things and are altered by something. The thing that transforms it constitutes the immediate mover; the matter represents the thing altered, and the form refers to the thing it is transformed into. Substances are of three kinds – the matter, ’this’ in its appearance (as every single thing marked by contact rather than organic unity makes up substratum and matter, as all these makeup matters, with the very last matter being the matter of something that, in a total sense, is a substance); nature that is a positive state or ‘this’ toward which a shift occurs; and, lastly, the specific substance comprising of the above two.
References
Levenson, C. A., & Westphal, J. (Eds.). (1994). “Aristotle “Reality is individuals,” from the categories and from the metaphysics,” in Reality. Hackett Publishing.