Asian Pacific Security the Asian

Asian Pacific Security

The Asian Pacific region has been problematical in the world of International Affairs for at least the past two centuries. The emergence of a modernized Japan and China changed the paradigm of the area; and the idea of European-based cultures in Australia and New Zealand only complicating matters further. In addition, the manner in which cultures and civilizations interact with one another in the post-Cold War world, called by at least one academic the "clash of civilizations," has particular meaning in the geopolitical realm of the Asian-Pacific region.

Using the paradigm of the "clash of civilizations," we find that the primary source of conflict has specific reference to the Asian-Pacific region: cultural, rather than ideological or economic competition.. The theory itself was part of a lecture given at the American Enterprise Institute (Huntington, 1992), then further developed in an article in Foreign Affairs (Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 1993; and (Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 1997). Both were a response to other theoretical notions coming out of the literature of the time.

At the center of the paradigm is the definition of culture, which has differing meanings depending on the chronology in history, the particular subject matter, and the formalization of a particular pattern of behavior -- so complex that one scholarly paper lists almost 200 definitions (Kroeber, 1952). This is particularly problematic with Asia. One can find socio-political and even cultural trends that arose out of Europe, even with distinctions in countries and backgrounds. However, this is not necessarily true for Asian cultures, who have tended to spread in a less than homogeneous manner and taken quite different patterns towards development. Still, for most historians and political scientists, culture may be defined as a set of standard attitudes, values, goals, practices, morals, and ethics that result in kindred behavior from an institution, organization, or group (Moore, 2008, intro). Cultural ideology, though, changed during the 20th century. Globalization has had a remarkable effect on both the technological developments and cultural attributes the world's population. Instant global communication is now possible, and individuals know they can instantly communicate with almost anyone - anywhere in the world -- and at an affordable cost. The more technology improves, the more this global economy, culture, and society develops. Of course, globalization continues to break down societal barriers, and one of the key elements to this is communication. For this communication to evolve and prosper it is necessary for a paradigm shift to occur focusing on the way individuals, at a micro level) and political or social institutions (at a macro level) view the world. This new culture is more of a level playing field in terms of economics and culture, in contrast to the 19th and 20th centuries when the larger imperial powers were the developers of policy and controlled more of the world's economic trade and resulting benefits. Instead, the trend is towards a global marketplace where historical and geographical divisions are becoming increasingly irrelevant (Friedman, 2007).

the inevitability of cultural clash between the major cultural arenas, many times based more on linguistics and ethnicity than political divergence.

Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizens and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are a product of centuries. They will not soon disappear (Huntington, 1993, 25).

For Huntington, it is the manner in which cultures are organized that forms their own uniqueness and hegemony. Civilizations then can consist of social groups, may or may not be geographically near one another, but have similarities that are historically based.

His map below gives a brief outline of the way his theory may coalesce individuals into binding units that act or react in similar measures.

Structurally, Huntington breaks the major civilizations into the following groups -- See Figure 1.

This rather dramatic shift in the way the world is organized began after World War II. Post-World War II, of course, began the decades long Cold War between communism and democracy -- ostensibly. The world was divided more into the supporters of the United States and the supporters of the Soviet Union and Communist China. After the collapse of Soviet Power, the new Russian oligarchy operates more in a cultural manner than political, and the large military-industrial complexes that ruled the world during the Cold War have been replaced by multinational corporations, often non-U.S. based, that shift the economic and political power to the two challenger civilizations, Sinic and Islam (Huntington, 1997, 168-70, 240-46).

In the modern age of globalism, however, it is difficult to focus simply on the Sinic civilization group. China, for instance, partners with Iran for oil and, in turn, provides a means of gaining technology. China holds a large portion of U.S. debt, making it difficult for the United States to exert pressure while at the same time professing openess in relationships with all its own Asian partners. For instance, what is China's role as a determiner of Asian security? The entire idea of cultural challenge in the Asian region has undergone dramatic shifts over the past few decades with Japan losing its dominance and China and Korea gaining strides.

The two great powers of Asia, Japan and China, were both similar and different concerning the manner in which both emerged as powerful, industrial nations in the 20th century, and, at least for China, are poised on the precipice of being a mega-power economically for the 21st century. Both countries came from a long tradition of relative isolation, looking internal to develop and maintain their cultural identity. Japan, of course, with its long tradition of feudalism that developed an almost "cultish" paradigm; China who, after conquering most of the Eastern world, pulled back into a hierarchical, but ineffective, society that was a mere shadow of its former glory and aggressive tenacity.

At the end of the 19th century, Japan realized it would need to industrialize and modernize of fade into a minor blip on the international relations scenario -- with other powers, namely Russia, hungry for its lands and fishing rights. In 1895 Japan won a brief war against China over Korea causing the European powers discomfort. However, the Japanese now know that in order to become a power of their own, they must remain steadfast and create an international presence, demanding equality on the international scene. This, of course, did not happen and in 1904 launched a war against Russia with two specific gains in mind: expansion of territory on the Asian mainland and security for Japan by proving their dominance of Manchuria and Korea. Surprising to the rest of the world, Japan beat Russia, sending a clear message to Europe -- we are now an imperial power and must be respected as such. The hubris from winning this war, plus an internal socio-political arrogance resulted in Japan's rapid industrialization and militarization during the early part of the 20th century. Japan did join the Allies in World War I, contributing to its industrial boom, and continued belief that Japan should dominate China. In fact, the decision to bomb the United States in Hawaii was taken because Japan knew the U.S. was completely opposed to Japan's concept of being dominant in China. Thus, the small nation of Japan became a formidable part to the Axis powers in the Pacific and, for a time, emerged as the top power in the region. After the use of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, Japan surrendered and entered into yet another new paradigm of development (Greenville, 2005).

Japan has always been an enigma to its neighbors in Asia. Being such a closed country for so long, then trying to rapidly industrialize, beating Russia in the 1905 war, and then modernizing and, for such a small island, almost winning a World War with the West. After WWII and the reconstruction of Japan, it has certainly been far more Western than Eastern -- culture, trade, entertainment, political and cultural ties, government, and a staunch U.S. ally against the U.S.S.R. And Red China. It is with banking and trade, though, that Japan has aligned more with the West, indeed -- Nissan, Honda, Subaru, etc. are all very important auto brands in the United States.

China, however, had a different pattern, and emerged in quite a different manner post-World War II. After centuries of aggressive rule, the 19th century found the Ching dynasty in decline and conflicts with Japan rising. The West increased its trade in the 19th century, and therefore had a reason to limit Japan's political influence in the vast land, culminating the early 20th century watching other power breaking it apart into various spheres of influence with Japan vying for control of most of Manchuria. This culmination of a vast disaffected peasant population, western aggression, and lack of internal control resulted in a Communist Revolution led by Mao Tse-Tung, culminating in victory in 1949 after a 15-year struggle.

In the post-World War II model Japan, under the economic and political influence of the United States, began repairing its economy and was a clear strategic ally for the U.S. In relation to the Soviet Union. As Japan became more and more sophisticated and built up wealth, its reputation as a financial and technological leader grew until, but the 1980s, it surpassed most of the world in numerous business niches. China, on the other hand, opted for a "sleeping giant" template, slowly and carefully building up its internal structure until the past decade or so, in which many capitalistic opportunities abound and a rising wealthy/educated population promises to change China into a dominant, global economic power.

China's first 33 years after WWII were a period of relative isolation from the rest of the world, certainly acting with the U.S.S.R. As part of the World Communist Bloc, but concentrating on retention of internal control and the building up of infrastructure and modernization. After 1978, there has been much more openness with the West, increased trade, increased openness to its citizenry, and the adoption of many more capitalistic paradigms internally (ownership of business, development of modern facilities, etc.). In the contemporary world, China's ascendance to superpower status makes the world a far more stable place. When China was nervous about having enemies on all sides, it geared up its own military might, and had the population to out-last most other nations. Now that there is a thawing of tension between China and the West, the idea of a nuclear exchange is minimized -- trade relations are important to both countries, and indeed, China is acting to put restraint on one of its own allies, North Korea. China and America are probably economic and globalization allies, with the Chinese system slowly, as is their way, moving much closer to the West than ever in its last 50 years of history.

From a security perspective, what do we see as a microcosm of Asia? Asia is an area of dramatic dichotomy economically and socially. Japan and South Korean, for instance, are both relatively wealthy nations, with the bulk of their population enjoying a high standard of living, life expectancy, and ability to pursue education and equal rights for men and women. Other countries show a very real schism between the haves and the have-nots; China has many millionaires within the bigger cities, but then extreme poor in some rural areas; same with most of S.E. Asia -- there are families who sell their children just to support the family for another year, yet there are owners of clubs, shipping lines, tourist areas, and manufacturing in these same countries who have amassed vast wealth. Most countries seem on the path towards development, globalism has strengthened this, but many are still in the throes of feudalism: lack of roads and other infrastructure for transportation; minimally existent mass education system, lack of potable water, and overpopulation and underdevelopment of their own resources.

China has emerged in the 21st century as truly the "sleeping giant awakened." For the past fifty years, the country has spent considerable resource modernizing, coalescing power, investing in other countries, and changing the way it utilizes its greatest resource -- its population. However, this does not mean that China is invulnerable to internal and external difficulties. Quite the contrary, China is poised to become of the most influential nations on the globe, but it will need to contend with several internal issues in order to manifest this. For instance, China has taken steps to bolster nationalistic views -- improve the state, improve the population to serve the state, and improve our land to become part of the global village. This nationalism has a dual effect. On one hand, it has tempered the resources and allowed a dramatic jump from a peasant rural economy to a modern, market-based economy in just a few decades. However, the intensity of Chinese nationalism has the potential to cause conflict within Asia as well as its own borders. For instance, there are problems with ethnic minorities in many of the Central Asian regions; certainly in Tibet, and Chinese nationalism often threatens Korea and Japan (See Shrik, 2007).

Internally, while the leadership has certainly changed and moderated since Mao, there is still a paranoia and playground mentality that could, under the right circumstances, drive a wedge between growth and hegemony. Additionally, China is so vast that its antiquated transportation and utility systems are straining to supply needed materials to the urban areas, which are growing exponentially. Already China is vulnerable due to its dependence upon Mid-Eastern oil, and despite the great river systems and vast deposits of natural resources, China is still not working at capacity to develop and exploit these resources. Too, its rapid development has costs -- China is less concerned about environmental issues than rapid development, leaving some areas so polluted they remain unusable, therefore wasted (Dahlman, 2001).

China has trained its population that given hard work they can succeed and gain consumer luxuries. Younger Chinese, unfamiliar with the lengthy process to get to the modern level of tolerance, are impatient for more westernization. This, coupled with the inability to regularly move consumer products and foodstuffs rapidly and reliably from the major food producing areas to the population in need also brews resentment. This is especially true when the population sees exported products treated differently (China's Economy, 2009).