The Iraq War: U.S. Justifications, Aftermath, and Hidden Interests

Personal Narrative: A Memory of War

The drums of war once again echo in my ears. I am disgusted seeing Donald Rumsfeld on television defending the U.S. invasion of Iraq. CNN shows old footage of Rumsfeld shaking Saddam Hussein's hand, filmed in the late 1980s when the U.S. was providing know-how for Saddam to build chemical weapons. I was five years old when we left the country, but I have one clear memory of the Iran-Iraq War in 1987. I was at my grandmother's house in Esfahan, Iran.

My grandfather was listening to the radio report on our volunteer army, fighting the evil Saddam Hussein in the name of Islam. Grandfather turned the radio up — it was a bombing raid. "Let's go," Grandfather said; we went to the basement and I heard engines roaring. My mother pressed me to her bosom. The roaring grew louder; they were closer to us. "La ilaha illa Allah," my mother prayed. Bombs fell — "boom!" "boom!" — light flashed at the window. "Don't be scared," my mother said. I should have been scared, but the pounding in my chest was not fear. Then the roaring grew faint again. Mother's hand rested around me. I felt my mother breathe out. "It's over."

Key Terms and Introduction

The "war in Iraq" should more accurately be called the "U.S. attack on Iraq and the U.S. occupation of Iraq." The term "coalition forces" refers to those countries that sent a small or token contingent of troops to assist in the fighting.

The justifications for the American attack on Iraq in March 2003 were largely based on the political decisions of President George W. Bush, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and others in the administration. Those justifications were: (a) Saddam Hussein was in the process of developing weapons of mass destruction, and United Nations inspectors should not be given more time to search suspected sites in Iraq for them; (b) Saddam Hussein was linked to Osama bin Laden's network of Islamic extremists and was giving support or sanctuary to al-Qaeda; (c) Saddam Hussein was in the process of building nuclear weapons; and (d) attacking Saddam was part of the administration's ongoing "war on terrorism."

However, those justifications have not stood up well to the tests of truth and time. Soldiers were being killed daily, and the American public was growing increasingly impatient with the so-called post-war occupation of Iraq. It was a dirty and destructive war that played directly into the hands of extremists like bin Laden, whose goal has always been to kill Americans at every opportunity. Moreover, since associates of President Bush were earning billions of dollars through no-bid contracts awarded to corporations tasked with "rebuilding Iraq," an even darker shadow was cast over the U.S. presence there.

The United States does not have clean hands when it comes to involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. The U.S. orchestrated a coup in Iran in the 1950s, which is outlined in this paper. The U.S. also supported Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s — going so far as to provide Saddam with money, materials, and training to help him build weapons of mass destruction. As American forces in Iraq continued to take casualties, Bush insisted America would not back down. There are solid reasons to doubt Bush's justifications for going to war, and those reasons — along with the facts and issues surrounding the administration's conduct — are examined here.

U.S. History of Involvement in Iran and Iraq

It is an established historical fact that Iraq's neighbor, Iran, has long been used as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The true story of U.S. meddling in the Middle East is important for understanding why many Islamic militants — and many ordinary Muslims who hold no extreme views — harbor such intense resentment toward the United States.

According to well-documented sources, the CIA carried out a bold coup in Iran in 1953 (EIU.com, 2003), marking the first successful overthrow of a foreign government by the United States. The operation was code-named TP-AJAX (Iranchamber.com, 2003), and it was implemented to depose Iran's nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, who had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company — much to the displeasure of both the U.S. and British governments, which were intent on maintaining access to Iran's rich oil supply. The CIA's mission was to replace Mosaddeq with Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, known as the Shah of Iran.

Although the coup, which concluded on August 19, did not go precisely as planned, one of the key figures in its strategy was General H. Norman Schwarzkopf — the father of the commander of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. After the Shah came to power, President Eisenhower funneled an estimated $5 million to Iran to help him consolidate his position (Iranchamber.com, 2003).

During his 26 years in power, the Shah used brutal repression to silence political dissent. He expelled the popular Ayatollah Khomeini — a Shia cleric who was stirring Islamic opposition to the Western-leaning regime — in 1964. But in 1979, the tide turned against the Shah and American foreign policy, as Khomeini returned to Iran and led the Islamic Revolution.

The foreign policy cycle continued under President Reagan and his successor, George H. W. Bush. After Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces invaded Iran in 1980, both administrations provided Saddam with millions of dollars and weapons — largely because of their intense hostility toward the post-revolutionary Iranian government. The first President Bush initially lavished money and support on Saddam, yet later reversed course entirely when Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, triggering the Gulf War.

Adding to the historical irony, General Norman Schwarzkopf — whose father had helped engineer the 1953 CIA coup that brought the Shah to power — commanded American forces against Saddam in 1991. Schwarzkopf reportedly wanted to march his troops all the way to Baghdad and remove Saddam from power, but the senior Bush would not permit it; the UN and U.S. allies had been sold on the limited objective of expelling Saddam from Kuwait, not deposing him. Yet years later, the senior Bush's own son launched precisely the campaign his father had refused to authorize — overthrowing Saddam — albeit under deeply controversial circumstances.

Conclusion: Unanswered Questions

This paper has identified key aspects of the pivotal history of Iran and Iraq and the United States' involvement in both countries. It has also shown that Bush did not always tell the truth when he sought to justify his attack on Iraq. The paper has further documented that Bush and Rumsfeld made only sketchy plans for what to do with and for Iraq once major combat operations ended — and that the daily, bloody attacks on American soldiers were clearly not something they had prepared for effectively.