Wind Won\'t Know My Name

Wind Won't Know My Name

The Wind Won't Know Me: A History of the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute. Even though ethno-historian, author and Indian researcher David Brugge referred to Emily Benedek's handling of the enormous volume of material she tackled as "superficial," Brugge acknowledges that in Benedek's personal observations she "succeed remarkably well" (Brugge, 1994). Brugge has justification -- or perhaps an axe to grind? -- for his editorial viewpoint since he too has written a book on the Navajo-Hopi conflict. Brugge complains that in her book Benedek does not handle information written by others well at all and he is chagrined that she identifies "virtually every author as an anthropologist," even though the author she alludes to might be a journalist, a historian, or just a researcher. Moreover, Benedek does not evaluate what she has read, Brugge continues; she reports on the relocation program with the competence that is expected of a journalist but her presentation of the events that led up to the relocation is not reliable, Brugge insists (Brugge, 1994). But Brugge's negativity notwithstanding, Benedek uses her journalist's sense to lay out a well-developed recounting of the myriad facts, historical events, personalities, cultures, and conflicts in this sad tale of the U.S. Government's mismanagement, arrogance and cultural insensitivity that targeted 50 Hopis and 10,000 Navajos for removal. This paper incorporates scholarly theories and models related to conflict resolution into the overlapping, sometimes overwhelming and emotional stories that surround these contentious issues.

Rewarding strategies and a coercive approach

In C.R. Mitchell's book The Structure of International Conflict the author discusses "Reward as Conflict Behavior" and offers that these strategies can work when there has been a recent history of friendship between the parties involved in the conflict (Mitchell, p. 148). There has not been a history of friendship in the Navajo-Hopi relationship. In addition, there was never a sense in these tense situations where the Navajos were being asked to leave that "justice" would be accorded to the Navajo. Meanwhile, in order to offer a replacement to the Navajo -- for the 900,000 acres they had to give up to the Hopis (Navajo-Hopi Indian Land Settlement Act of 1974) -- Congress authorized the Navajo to buy 250,000 acres (Benedek, p. 101). That would apparently be a reasonable way to solve the problem for the Navajo, it was thought. However, the property the Navajo selected was known as the "Arizona Strip" and it caused a big negative reaction from white deer hunters and Mormon ranchers. It included land along the Colorado River -- too prime, robustly beautiful and pristine to hand over to Indians, perhaps.

Were there any negotiation over what land the Navajo could have in lieu of their own Tribal lands they were being evacuated from? Within the structure of the Navajo vs. U.S., no. But certainly in Congress there were negotiations between senators and representatives as they reached agreements and passed amendments to the Settlement Act (PL 93-531) that prevented the Navajo from claiming the land that they thought they had been given an opportunity to settle on. In a way, this was "third party intervention" on the part of Congress because elected officials were indeed external to the conflict. But in a real way this is an example of the coercive approach to conflict resolution. The direct power of Congress -- pushed along toward the agenda of the white man -- made a decision in the interest of their own political agenda, and the Navajo had to accept the results.

In Roger Fisher's book Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Fisher, et al., 1991) had their been negotiation between the Navajo and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, three criteria could have emerged: a) a "wise agreement" may have been reached; b) the agreement would have been "efficient" (moving a tribe of Native Americans off their land after centuries of inhabiting that land cries out for fairness vis-a-vis the space where the Indians are expected to relocate); and c) the relationship between the two parties should be improved by the agreement, or at the very least the relationship should not be damaged (Fisher, p. 4). Fisher asserts that successful outcomes are rarely possible when "positional bargaining" takes place. The more attention that is given to a party's position, the less attention will be devoted, Fisher asserts, to "meeting the underlying concerns of the parties" (Fisher, p. 5). In the matter of the Hopi Tribe giving consideration to negotiating with the Navajos (as per the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) (Benedek, p. 389), they went against what Fisher recommends. The Hopi listed ten conditions that had to be met before negotiating with the Navajo. What would have been called for in this matter (Fisher) is integrative and principled negotiation. Fisher's principled negotiation concept (Week 12 notes) calls for separating the "people from the problem" and given the nature of the conflict, it would seem impossible to separate the Indians from the problem because their culture is linked to the land.

The distributive (ZERO-SUM) theory was clearly present (Fisher, et al.) because the Hopi's gain was the Navajo's loss. And moreover the possibility of principled negotiation was rarely a part of the drama that played out over the years between the three parties (Hopi, Navajo and the U.S. Government).

Conflict over property rights; 3rd party intervention; coercive approaches

In the 1976 document titled "Development of the Hopi Reservation" the following subheads review for the researcher how the U.S. Government dealt with the Hopi-Navajo conflicts: "American Indians: Conflict; Cultural Differences; Federal Legislation; Historical Reviews; Land Acquisition; Land Use; Life Style; Religion; Reservations (Indian); Tribes" (Seig, 1976).

The first conflict that was introduced into this matter was launched by the December 16, 1882 Executive Order (issued by President Chester A. Arthur) that essentially, arbitrarily established boundaries between the Hopi and the Navajo. That was both a third party intervention and a coercive approach because President Arthur believed he was using his power to intervene to resolve a serious cultural conflict between two Indian tribes. But it was also coercive because it was the power of the state laying down the law with no ongoing negotiation between the two principle parties.

However, in the initial executive order the instructions were somewhat vague, contributing to the tension and conflict. The order stated that "…the lands should be 'set' apart for the use and occupancy of the Mogui (Hopi) and such other Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle thereon" (Seig, 1976). The phrase "such other Indians" left the door open for conflict. Since the federal government never officially settled the Navajo on this reservation and did not take action to prevent further encroachment, the Navajo continued using the reservation for grazing. Looking at maps of the reservation, the Hopi basically held title to a rectangle of land (fifty miles east-to-west and seventy miles north-to-south) in the middle of the huge reservation.

This joint-use policy was applied to the lands in question and Seig writes (in an understatement) that this policy "has occasioned conflict between the Hopi and the Navajo." The Hopi culture is more "sedentary" and the Navajo are "nomadic" -- hence the lifestyles alone caused conflict, Seig explains. And the Hopi's "religious attachment to certain specific land formations" contributed to "continued conflict between the tribes," Seig went on. A final settlement of the conflicting rights and the cultural, political and social interests of the Hopi and Navajo tribes was enacted in 1974, according to Seig's document, dated April 29, 1976. The purpose of the paper that Seig prepared was to explain how those boundaries came to be on the reservation, and the paper raises the question as to "…whether the imposition of boundaries to protect one cultural group from another actually does so in an area of cultural conflict" (Seig, p. 3).

The Indian agent named Bowman reported in 1884 that there was "trouble between the two Indian tribes…'usually caused by the careless herding of the young Navajos, who allow their herds to overrun…" gardens that are maintained by the Hopi. "The Navajos are almost invariably the aggressors," Bowman wrote (Seig, p. 8).

Meanwhile, author Benedek (p. 35) points out that in a way the government believed it was using a third party intervention strategy when they sent the military into the reservation in 1888 to "remove all Navajo Indians found trespassing with their herds and flocks" on the Hopi reservation. The military arrived at the reservation in December, and with the cold and snow the Navajo were not moving sheep around on Hopi territory. Besides, it seemed like it would be creating an "undue hardship" to force the Navajos to pack up and move in the bitter winter climate (Benedek p. 35). Again in 1889 the troops were sent to remove Navajo from Hopi lands but again it was December, albeit the soldiers met with several Navajo bands and ordered them "…not to bother the Hopis" (Benedek p. 35).

Rather than being a third party intervention clearly this was more like a "coercive approach" to resolving conflict. On pp. 35-36 it is clear that the U.S. government wanted to keep the Navajos "away from the Hopis" but didn't want to "anger the Navajos by moving them." The failure to correctly administer a negotiated settlement in this ongoing dispute was, according to Benedek, "exacerbated" because Indian agents respected the "industriousness" that the Navajos showed and agents on the other hand were "highly critical of the Hopis lackadaisical attitude toward animal husbandry" among other matters (Benedek, p. 36).

This was obviously a misunderstanding on the part of Indian agents because the Hopi culture was far more interested in dances, religious customs and ceremonials than raising animals and other cultural traditions of the Navajo.

Negotiation or Third Party Intervention? Or Alternative Dispute Resolution?

The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act called for a "New Deal for Indians" and contained a requirement that tribes create constitutions and governments (like the white man does). New boundaries based on soil conservation and grazing lands were drawn, and when about 100 Navajo families were found to be living within Hopi lands (District 6) in 1965, "They were expelled" (Benedek, p. 36). Interior Secretary Stewart Udall's 1958 statute (Public Law 85-547) allowed for a third party intervention into the ongoing squabble over land rights. A three-judge panel in Arizona's District Court was established to rule on this issue and nine days later the Hopi chairman (Healing) sued the Navajo tribal chairman (Jones) in a "friendly lawsuit" called Healing v. Jones. This it seems clear was an attempt of a third party (the court) to resolve an issue that hadn't been resolved previously through negotiation.

The ruling (the case went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court) flatly gave the Hopi Tribe "the exclusive right and interest, both as to the surface and the subsurface, including all resources,' to District 6." But the lower court -- backed up by the High Court -- also said that the Hopi and Navajo "have joint, undivided and equal rights and interest both as to the surface and subsurface [meaning minerals, coal, oil, etc.] including all resources" (Benedek, p. 37). Besides the District 6 property, the High Court asserted what all objective observers knew, that both tribes had equal interests in the 1.8 million acres that made up the rest of the territory designated in 1882, "leaving more unanswered questions than had existed before the case was heard" (Benedek, p. 37).

But because of the many questions that were not answered, the courts in this matter really didn't put a final resolution in place at all. Still this situation between the Hopi and Navajo could fall within Mark Davidheiser's Alternative Dispute Resolution category. This clearly was a court-connected attempt to resolve a long-standing conflict; and it was not a "standard form of adjudication" because the tribal chairpersons were originally given the opportunity to launch a "friendly suit" to resolve the matter.

Coal, Oil and Conflict in the world of the Navajo

Coercive Approach: Energy companies need land and resources to keep producing electricity. That is always their argument and there is no doubt about their needs. It is not necessarily true that energy companies are greedy or that they have cultural or ethnic bias against Native Americans. It's just that when there are resources available, the goal is to find a way to recover those resources. Sometimes the goal is sought with such aggressiveness that the energy companies appear to be insensitive to cultural and historical land issues. But after all, without electricity, humans -- certainly Navajos are included on this list -- are left in the dark and have no way to power their homes, schools and industries. How important is electricity? Hundreds of members of the National Academy of Engineering held a vote on the "Greatest Engineering Achievements of the 20th Century." The greatest engineering achievement wasn't the airplane, the automobile, the radio, the TV, the computer or space travel. It was "electrification" -- the wires and structures that move electricity from power stations out to cities, factories, schools, and Indian reservations (www.greatachievements.org).

Coal, oil and gas are certainly vitally important energy sources; energy companies dislike knowing the coal is there but certain land rights block access to those resources -- and create conflict. In the case of the discovery of an estimated 21 billion tons of coal lying under the Black Mesa, along with substantial other energy sources, Benedek writes that the political reality of the disputed lands -- the Hopi had bitterly complained for years about Navajo "encroachment" -- was not about Hopi complaints or Navajo expansion. It was about "the pressure of oil and gas companies to determine ownership of the area" (Benedek, p. 134).

Conflict in this matter has many faces. The initial conflict was between the Hopi and the Navajo over boundaries and land use.

In the matter of oil and gas and coal resources there were several layers of conflict heaped on top of one another. The coercive approach to these several conflicts is clear and apparent, but it cries out for careful examination because it is deeper and wider than the obvious.

Without the pressure from the energy companies, however, the land conflict might not have been resolved, Benedek writes (p. 138).

Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements without Giving In

The way in which the process of moving Navajo and Hopi -- in order for energy companies to fully exploit the coal beneath their disputed lands -- was through the Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation Commission. Coal is king when huge energy companies decide they need what's under the land, no matter that the Hopi really believed that the Great Spirit had placed them there to protect the land. But the commission was the way in which this long-term conflict was to be resolved. The expert on relocation that is referenced in Benedek's book is Thayer Scudder, who predicted "four primary effects of relocation on the Navajos" (p. 174). He believed that moving hundreds of Navajo families would: a) "undermine the people's faith in themselves"; b) make the "relocates" become "dependent on the agency that had moved them"; c) cause "stress and alienation" which would "lead to the disruption of the family"; and d) lead to the increase of "depression, violence, illness and substance abuse" (Benedek, p. 175). Moreover Scudder projected that the moves would "undercut the influence of local leaders" and indeed "set up conflicts between the relocates, the hosts, and the outsiders" (Benedek, p. 175).

"All these dire predictions came to pass," Benedek writes (p. 175). One of the reasons the move was such a total disaster is the selection of members of the commission; Benedek explains that they were "political hacks who were astonishingly unqualified and ill prepared for their jobs." Their task to make the transition livable and smooth required "sensitivity, flexibility, and foresight" but instead the "upper level" Commission staff was "rigid, unimaginative and defensive" (Benedek, p. 175).

The Commission's attitude was like "the guards as Auschwitz," Benedek continues. "This is the law and we have to do it' is what they say." Clearly here the Commission could have pursued a third-party style intervention, being sensitive to these proud Native Americans, understanding their needs. But instead, the Navajo were actually expected to move onto land "that was already occupied and overgrazed" -- which was dispiriting and depressing for the Navajo.

The Navajo and the Hopi may have had "joking relationships" within their cultures, but clearly from Benedek's narrative the reader does not have a sense that there was any joking relationship between the Hopi and the Navajo. Mark Davidheiser writes about West Africans who are connected by relationships that are good-natured and tend to reinforce "positive inter-ethnic interaction and mitigate inter-group conflict" (Davidheiser, 2006).