criminal law cases analysis

Mr. Stark was the defendant in this case which concerned her action of infecting three women with HIV sexually. He tested positive for HIV, which was then confirmed twice by doing two other independent tests. As an ordinary procedure, Stark was taken through counseling sessions to make him aware of the risk involved in handling HIV. He was informed about the risk of the disease spreading and the importance of making his partner aware before having any sexual escapades with her. However, he disregarded this advice and this came to the knowledge of the county health officer who sought a cease and desist order as allowed by the state statute. Stark did not comply. The officer then asked for judicial enforcement and later filed a police report about the matter.

The police obtained evidence in form of testimony from the three victims who confirmed that they had sex after the counseling sessions offered to Stark. The defendant’s neighbor also gave information about the utterance of Stark to the effect that he did not care about his actions. Stark was therefore charged for knowingly infecting other three women and exposing them to HIV virus.

On the first count, he was convicted by a jury of second degree assault and sentenced to 120 months in prison. On other two counts, he was sentenced to 43months to be served concurrently and consecutively. He sought review based on the sentence exceeding the standard range for second degree assault. The issue under determination was whether evidence submitted by the prosecution sufficient to show the defendant’s intent to inflict bodily harm.
The court affirmed the convictions on all three counts, but remanded the case back to the trial court for re-sentencing on the first count. The court found that there was cogent evidence as given in the testimony of the victims and the neighbor’s testimony, that Stark had knowingly and intentionally exposed his victims to the HIV virus.

Specific intention refers to crimes where in the mens reus goes above and beyond actus reus. This is to indicate that the defendant has some ulterior motive in mind. A specific intent crime is one where in theory the mens rea goes beyond the actus reus, in the sense that the defendant has some ulterior purpose in mind. In the case at hand, the actus reus is to infect the three women with the virus with the intention of causing them some suffering and harm. The defendant must not only be shown to have mens rea for causing infection but also a more specific mens rea in the form of causing suffering and harm. Motive remains very essential to prove this kind of case because it informs the basis of establishing the mens rea. The mental culpability of Stark lies in the motive.

The case was appealed by the defendant after facing trial for assault in the second degree. In the testimony of the defendant, he was asked to accompany Diane Anderson, who then lived in the same house as the defendant and other people too. The house belonged to the estranged husband of Anderson, Mr. Rex. Rex was present at the time, and as he engaged in a chat with Anderson, the defendant participated in the destruction of Rex’s car.

On realizing this, Rex got out of the house and went after the defendant, who ran down a narrow path. The defendant in an attempt to hide from Rex jumped into the bushes nearby while still holding his knife believing that he could not see him. Rex followed him, rolling over the defendant with his knife pointing at Rex. He was stabbed. The defendant indicated that he did not remember making back and forth movement using the knife toward Rex and thus did not intend to stab Rex. He was then charged with unlawfully and knowingly causing physical injury to Rex Anderson by means of a deadly weapon. The knife was the deadly weapon.

According to the Oregon assault statute, what constitutes mental illness includes, intentionally or knowingly causing physical injury to another person by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The statute goes further to define knowingly as; with knowledge- meaning that a person acts with awareness that his conduct is of a nature or that a circumstances so described exist.
Under the formulation of the Model Penal Code, “knowingly” is put to be synonymous with “intentionally”. This is to mean achieves a given result knowingly when he is certain in the practical sense that the conduct he engages in will result into the particular result. This was meant to give the prosecution a simple way to prove his case as the two words would henceforth suffice.

In my opinion, the defendant could have not assaulted his victim for the reason that while participating in the destruction of the truck, he used the knife that committed the assault. As Anderson approached he ran away while carrying the knife. In any case he had the mental culpability to do the assault; he would have not run away but would have assaulted Anderson on the spot. Besides, even though he knew the knife was dangerous, he could have not foreseen Anderson jumping over him where he hid while carrying the knife. The defendant could have acted recklessly but not knowingly because he disregarded the dangers that could be involved in using the knife during this chase between him and Anderson.

The appellant was convicted with the murder of his wife. The conviction was for manslaughter and sentenced to 20 years in jail. The testimony showed that the defendant and the wife were arguing in some space outside the house. A physical confrontation started after the wife tried to gain access into the house to prevent the argument but was stopped by the husband. She fell off and died of skull fractures. The defendant stated that at a point he held her on the ground, moving her head up and down, in a way slamming it into the ground. When the wife stopped moving, on rolling her over, he realized there was a stone cover with blood.

He added that he did not know there were bricks in the Yard, and was not aware of any risk that could cause harm. The testimony of the doctor to the court confirmed that the brick caused the injury. The appellant requested the court to be charged with negligent homicide but such was denied and was charged with reckless manslaughter.

On delivering the ruling, the court was of the opinion that it must consider any evidence before the jury from which it could have ended up with a decision that the appellant did not perceive that the wife could have died as a result of his act. The defendant unintentionally allowed the wife to fall after holding her. This is because she bit her and thus letting her go was just reflexive. He was not aware of the presence of the brick in the yard. There was evidence that the appellant did not perceive the risk involved and that his victim might have died due to his actions. The appellant ought thus to be tried on the count of criminally negligent homicide.

Accordingly, I would say that the appellant was negligent. Negligence is different from acting purposefully, knowingly or recklessly. It does not involve the state of being aware of the presence of something. In this case, the appellant creates a risk of which he has a duty to be aware of, after putting reasonable consideration as to its nature and degree. This is looked at through the lenses of the appellant being aware that he has a duty of care towards the wife.

The Appellant could have therefore not knowingly or purposefully killed the wife. This could only happen where the appellant acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a situation which defines as offence making him aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will happen or as to the existence of those circumstances.

The case involved Douglas Bauer being charged with leaving a loaded gun at a place where it could be accessed by six year old child who happened to be the girlfriend’s child. The child carried the gun with him to school where it discharged and seriously caused injuries to a classmate. Bauer was thus charged with third degree assault for “causing” the injuries to the classmate.
On the first instance he sought the case to be thrown out as a matter of law but his plea was denied. He proceeded to the court of Appeal which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the two courts.

The majority opinion of six judges carried the day. Their decision was based on the legal concept of “causation”. According to the judges, the causation is met by proving two elements. One, actual or “but for” causation and secondly, proximate or legal causation. In an event that an intervening act occurs between some action and a later injury, the first no longer becomes the proximate or legal cause of the injury. To apportion criminal blame the court would ask whether the accused “actively took part in the immediate physical impetus of harm” In the case Bauer did not participate in such action. He could have been negligent by keeping a loaded gun in the house visited by a small child. The child also took the weapon with the authority of the owner. This negligence could not be the immediate cause of the child’s misbehavior.

On the dissenting side were three judges. The judges said that putting the decision of the child to take the gun to school an intervening act carries the blame for the injury from the adult who could have likely known of the dangers of having a loaded gun in the presence of the child. In the Washington a child of the age involved in this case was incapable of committing a crime because he was just 12.

The majority judges have applied the strict rule under the legal causation where if intervening act occurs, the primary actor is absolved of any liability. I agree with the analysis of the judges because as precedence established under the common law and there have not been any justifiable reasons to depart from that precedence. However, in a case of this nature the court has an opportunity to caution the public on gun safety and handing weapons in the presence of the children and thus the court could have held the appellant liable under public policy. It is ordinary course of action in a reasonable society for adults to protect children from weapons. This was therefore a crime and not an accident because carrying a gun to school in not an ordinary action done in conducting the business of schooling.

References
Calvin Erick. "Causation in Criminal Law." Bond Law Review Vol 1 (1989): 253-271. Retrieved September 30, 2017 from http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=blr