The Ethics of Clandestine Operations

Ethics of Clandestine Intelligence Operations
Introduction
One of the most common yet least understood methods of operations in the art of statecraft is the clandestine operation (Sheldon 1997). Though popularized in pulp fiction and film, such as the James Bond series franchise and numerous other spy thrillers, clandestine operations remain relatively unknown in the public consciousness—and when they are discussed it is generally with distaste, distrust and vilification (Sheldon 1997). Yet as Sheldon (1997) shows, clandestine operations are not new or unique to the modern world and in fact ancient Rome used them whenever military operations were impractical. Thus, “political influence operations, seeding, propaganda, political patronage, safe havens, political assassination, and paramilitary operations” can all be traced back more or less to similar operations implemented by the ancient Romans (Sheldon 1997, 299). Today, there are many different facets to clandestine operations, and many agencies that use them—from the CIA to the FBI to the NCS (the National Clandestine Service)—and those are just to name a few of the ones in the U.S. Every developed nation has their own agencies that implement clandestine operations as a normal part of statecraft. This literature review examines the role that clandestine operations play in the U.S. today and what the risks of those operations can be.
The Complexity of Clandestine Operations among Multiple Agencies
A big part of clandestine operations is the collection of intelligence. The U.S. Intelligence Community is a complex, complicated amalgamation of agencies each with their own work, sphere of influence and foci. In the Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress (2009), it is noted that the power bases are many and diverse: “the Director of the CIA is the National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Manager and serves as the national authority for coordination, de-confliction, and evaluation of clandestine HUMINT operations across the IC, consistent with existing laws, Executive Orders, and interagency agreements” (2). The Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress (2009) was written to give Congress a detailed picture of the various different agencies and organizations involved in the intelligence community, what their roles were and how they collected and disseminated information. The Overview a vast and complicated, loosely confederated community of agencies and organizations that all embark on their own independent clandestine operations at times—often in ways that are not supportive of a unified aim or of a particular administration’s policy, as Warner and McDonald (2005) point out in their research. The Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress (2009) states, for instance, that “the National Clandestine Service (NCS) has responsibility for the clandestine collection (primarily HUMINT) of foreign intelligence that is not obtainable through other means. The NCS engages in counterintelligence activities by protecting classified U.S. activities and institutions from penetration by hostile foreign organizations and individuals” (2). Thus, as the Overview showed, there are both intelligence and counter-intelligence operations that fall under the umbrella of clandestine operations at times, and the agencies involved in managing these operations are not necessarily going to be working together or sharing intelligence or even pursuing the same ends simultaneously.
In their research on this issue, Warner and McDonald (2005) note that these various intelligence agencies can be politicized, meaning their actions may not always be aligned with the policies and platforms of the administrations under which they are operating. This was seen in the lead-up to the Iraq War when in the aftermath of 9/11 there was a push by an inner “cabal,” as Seymour Hersh (2003) called it in his research on the post-9/11 wars and the men responsible for initiating them. The “cabal” described by Hersh (2003) existed under the agency heading of Office of Special Plans (OSP), which engaged in a clandestine operation of its own to create the intelligence used to launch a full-scale invasion of Iraq. Just to give an example of the conflict that can arise among the various clandestine operations that might occur at any one moment under any one administration, the events leading up to the Iraq War provide a fertile ground for understanding: As Hersh (2003) shows, Bush’s policy advisors in the OSP were involved in their own clandestine operation, which focused on overruling the intelligence analysts at the CIA and shaping foreign policy till it met their own aims and objectives. The “cabal” at the OSP involved in this clandestine operation consisted of a group of pro-Israel and dual Israeli-American citizens such as Abram Shulsky, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Doug Feith, and Scooter Libby: they were, according to Hersh (2003) “a small cluster of policy advisers and analysts…based in the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP)” and their clandestine operation rivaled what the CIA and the DIA were doing by supplying the Bush Administration with faulty intelligence on Iraq’s alleged WMD operation. The OSP for instance used the intelligence source known as CURVE BALL, a collection of “soft” evidence (unsubstantiated hearsay) alleging collusion between Iraq and terror networks, to push the Bush Administration into invading Iraq. The other agencies did little to stop them, however. Both MI6 in England and the CIA in Langley offered only minimal resistance to the OSP’s claims, thus effectively making them complicit through their relative silence, as Pfiffner and Phythian (2008) have shown in their research. The husband of CIA agent Valerie Plame, former Ambassador Joe Wilson, published in national media an editorial debunking the claims of the OSP. The OSP in turn unmasked Plame, forcing her out of the field. It was in short an all-out war between clandestine actors in what turned out to be a major foreign policy shift in the wake of 9/11 based not on hard intel but rather on a clandestine operation in the Pentagon. The result of the OSP’s clandestine operation in falsifying intelligence on yellowcake uranium passing through Niger into Saddam Hussein’s hands was a war, more than a million dead, and a succession of destructive insurrections in multiple states across the Middle East (Stone & Kuznick 2012).
That is not the only example of complications in clandestine operations stemming from power plays behind the scenes in which multiple agencies and bureaucrats vie for power. Moir (2012) notes that “the differing bureaucratic cultures and the disconnected approach to intelligence between the CIA and FBI [have been] further compounded by disjointed relationships between intelligence agencies and policy decisionmakers. This is notable in [the CIA’s] frustration with the Clinton administration’s failure to address the al Qaeda attacks on U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as acts of war” (149). Moir’s review of CIA memoirs shows that when it comes to clandestine operations, it is literally every agency and organization for itself, ostensibly united under the banner of intelligence but in reality working on their own towards goals that not everyone is always apprised of.
Oversight
Clandestine operations, because of their very nature, can thus be perceived as an area of intelligence that has remarkably little oversight, and that comes with many risks. The risks are often better understood in hindsight, as is the case with the Iraq War, but they can be discerned at any rate and identified, as Best (2002) shows: “Counterterrorism is highly dependent upon human intelligence (humint), the use of agents to acquire information (and, in certain circumstances, to carry out covert actions). Humint is one of the least expensive intelligence disciplines, but it can be the most difficult and is undoubtedly the most dangerous for practitioners. Mistakes can be fatal, embarrass the whole country, and undermine important policy goals” (2). Best’s (2002) report shows that controlling clandestine operations and knowing how they are being used should be a matter of grave concern. The reason for this is simple: as is currently being revealed with the Trump Administration, clandestine operations can be used against one’s own government—not just against foreign nations—which is what Morris and McGann (2017) demonstrate in their study of clandestine operations. McDonnell (2017) likewise makes this point and supports the findings of Morris and McGann (2017). At the same time, the Trump Administration works with the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command to engage in clandestine operations abroad with little regard for any rule of law: drone assassinations and more fill out the catalogue of events that transpire as a result of clandestine operations being carried out in foreign lands (McDonnell 2017).
Clandestine operations used widely and for a variety of reasons and they are often tied to the War on Terror in the post-9/11 world. The FBI uses them frequently in their counter-terrorism efforts: for instance, the Bureau can utilize the tactic of “tagging,” which involves covertly placing some kind of marker or identifying feature or tag on any and all objects that would be destined for a WMD lab (Carter 2004). Carter’s (2004) assessment of clandestine means within operations shows the range of these methods and their applicability—along with the fact that it is essentially a field in which there is very little regard for oversight or rule of law. For example, the tag can be a transmitter, a chemical marker or anything that allows the Bureau to trace the movement of the material—though there is no debate over whether this is a lawful means of monitoring. Penetrating the information infrastructure of targets is another and often more welcome clandestine operation strategy that security forces will use as part of a counterproliferation policy. This strategy is based on the usage of signals intelligence, which means it relies upon technological means to penetrate and exploit terrorist network cell phones, laptop computers, local area networks and other information infrastructure devices (Carter 2004). These devices are then monitored so that any movement of materials is known in advance and can be intercepted.
Arnold and Salisbury (2019) show that legal means are also at the disposal of security and intelligence forces, indicating that in some cases the rule of law is administered. For instance, the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) allows security forces to identify potential violations of ECRA and engage in preventive measures or pre-emptive raids to uncover and/or recover WMDs. The FBI has used this strategy in the past—for example, when it ensnared Brussels-based Kaiga and disrupted his illicit activities exporting aluminum tubes from the U.S. that were believed to be destined for WMD labs in Iran. Other options are undercover, lure and sting operations, which are helpful in building up criminal cases against suspects and targets. The Department of Homeland Security has used sting operations, like the one it employed against Jiang Guanghou Yan, who was caught trafficking counterfeit goods (Arnold & Salisbury 2019).
Relying on human intelligence for information is going to be a major factor and counter-proliferation policy should make best usage of Humint for intercepting, monitoring, or raiding WMD facilities, transports, or networks (Carter 2004). When it comes to preventing the deployment of WMDs, security forces have numerous options on the table. But when it comes to how oversight of those options and methods is provided, questions remain (Carter 2004).
Risk
Not only is there risk of too little oversight of clandestine operations, there is also risk of safety to the actors involved in those clandestine operations (McCormick & Owen 2000). The research conducted by McCormick and Owen (2000) focused on providing a model “designed to highlight the tradeoff between the operational capacity and operational security of clandestine groups” (175). The findings of the researchers were that a high level of internal connectivity would be needed to provide any actors within a clandestine operation with the high level of efficiency and high level of relative performance required for a successful operation (McCormick & Owen 2000). One of the big problems in any clandestine operation is, however, that internal connectivity can be impacted by a “regime’s ability to find, fix, and destroy underground cells” (McCormick & Owen 2000, 190). Additionally, in regions were the clandestine actors seek a rich payoff/outcome, the risk increases as exposure of the clandestine activities will be a major focus of multiple players, state actors and non-state actors. Questions focus on how to secure communications, how to secure operational performance and so on (McCormick & Owen 2000).
As Crumpton (2013) points out, clandestine operations can collapse in the field because of budgetary collapses back home. Thus, financing is an additional risk, which is why many operations turn into black operations using off-the-books funding. Clandestine propaganda operations in the Middle East fall into this category, as Barker (2008) shows: “For example, the US-based company Lincoln Group have been active in planting stories in the Iraqi media (Mazzetti and Daragahi 2005). Radio Takrit also appears to be a ‘black clandestine’ operation linked to Al-Mustaqbal, the radio station ran by the CIA-backed Iraqi National Accord (founded by Dr Ayad Allawi) as it is being broadcast into Iraq via a CIA-owned transmitter” (121). The problem with research into this area, however, is that “seems” is often the operative word, as the clandestine operations have the special character of cloaking themselves behind the veneer of a front organization designed to hide the actual character and mission of the clandestine actors. A researcher or analyst attempting to determine what is at play, what the aims are, what the risks are, who is funding what, and so on, must supply a fair amount of conjecture to make sense of the various players and moving parts.
Where the Research Should Go Next
The authors of the research are all persuasive in their analysis and depiction of the state of clandestine operations today. Their research reveals a complex, complicated web of independent agencies and organizations operating at times in unison with one another but at other times in diametrically opposed initiatives. That every agency or organization could have its own particular intentions or aims when it comes to intelligence collection and clandestine operations suggests that there possibly too many groups with the power to wage clandestine warfare by way of a variety of methods with little to no oversight or regulation. The question this raises is: What is the risk of an agency, organization or group of actors going rogue and engaging in clandestine operations in order to achieve their own unsanctioned aims or objectives?
The research in this field could thus be improved upon in a number of ways. First of all, there should be some research conducted into how clandestine operations are developed, implemented, funded and regulated. As many clandestine operations are unlikely to be reported, this would require serious investigative work and the results would undoubtedly be denied by the same agencies and organizations that have information revealed about them, the way Hersh did with the OSP. Nonetheless, this is a necessary step and could be helpful in providing Congress with a better sense of what the intelligence community is actually doing when it comes to clandestine operations and their objectives.
From a theoretical point of view, the research that has been conducted thus far has been adequate and sufficient in explaining the rationale for clandestine operations, particularly that by Sheldon (1997). However, a philosophical and ethical/moral perspective on the rationale for clandestine operations could be beneficial in this field, and there are many investigators, academics and researchers, from Peter Kuznick to Douglas Valentine, who have published extensive works that venture into this subject to some degree. However, a genuine focus on the philosophical and ethical/moral principles that justify clandestine operations could be beneficial in terms of establishing a set of guidelines or parameters that Congress could use for overseeing and regulating the agencies and organizations that engage in these activities.
Finally, research into whether so many agencies and organization should be permitted to engage in clandestine operations could yield some positive results. Currently there is little indication that such a question deserves to be asked, and instead reports by Best, Carter et al. focus instead on how to make the current system/community work with what it has and what all the different agencies and groups and trying to do in the current environment. An alternative perspective on this community could help to answer the question of whether the community itself does not have too much autonomy and ability to wage clandestine operations without discretion. I would look at this topic by engaging in field work, conducting interviews with stakeholders (members of Congress and individuals in the intelligence community or former members of the intelligence community) to obtain more insight and understanding about what really goes on behind the scenes.
Conclusion
This literature review has shown that clandestine operations predate modern society by thousands of years. The ancient Romans practiced clandestine operations in lieu of warfare to satisfy state ambitions. Statecraft today is replete with instances of clandestine operations that range from operations designed to influence politics in other countries and domestically to political assassinations. However, with so many different agencies, organizations and groups flying under the radar like OSP in the Pentagon, the oversight and regulation of clandestine operations is limited to say the least. The moral and ethical risk of this situation is something that needs to be better understood, as too many groups engaging in this type of activity could ultimately undermine the principles of freedom and democracy that this country was founded upon and that it actively promotes throughout the world.


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