(387 U.S. 33). Furthermore, the notice requirement meant that allegations had to particular. (387 U.S. 33). The juvenile and his parents did not get notice until the hearing on the merits, which meant that it was not timely notice. Furthermore, Arizona had no provision protecting children's right against self-incrimination, but the Court determined that a juvenile is at greater risk of self-incrimination than an adult.
The Court also looked at the Sixth Amendment, which provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. (U.S. Const. amend. VI).
Therefore, it clearly requires that a person in a criminal prosecution have the right to counsel, and had been interpreted as requiring a court to notify a defendant of his right to counsel. However, the Court was required to determine whether juvenile proceedings were criminal prosecutions for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.
The Arizona juvenile code appeared to permit the probation officer to represent the child's interests in a delinquency proceeding. (387 U.S. 35).
However, the arresting officers...
36). Therefore, the Court determined that neither the probation officer nor the judge could represent the child as counsel. The juvenile was facing the loss of liberty and therefore needed "the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law." (387 U.S. 36). As a result, the Court concluded that:
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that, in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or, if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. (387 U.S. 41).
Furthermore, the fact that the juvenile's parent was aware that she could have retained counsel could not constitute a waiver of either the mother or the son's right to counsel. (387 U.S. 42). In addition, the Court examined the juvenile's rights to the confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and determined that a juvenile's rights had the same constitutional protection as adults.
References
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
U.S. Const. amend. V.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
