Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967),

¶ … Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court determined that juveniles in delinquency proceedings had to be afforded many of the same rights as adults in criminal proceedings. These rights included the right to notification of charges, the right of confrontation, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel. To come to this determination, the Court looked at the rights guaranteed to criminal defendants under the Constitution, to see if those rights applied to juveniles, as well as adults.

The juvenile, Gerald Gault, was taken into custody for making lewd telephone calls. He was committed to the Arizona State Industrial School as a juvenile delinquent, after hearings before a juvenile court judge. His parents brought a habeas corpus action, challenging the constitutionality of Gault's commitment. The Supreme Court agreed that Gault's confinement violated the Constitution.

It came to this decision by looking at the Constitution, specifically amendments V, VI, and XIV.

The Court began its examination by looking to the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment basically makes the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. It specifically provides that, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (U.S. Const. amend. XIV). The Court agreed with the Arizona Supreme Court's determination that "due process of law is requisite to the constitutional validity of proceedings in which a court reaches the conclusion that a juvenile has been at fault...with the consequence that he is committed to an institution in which his freedom is entailed." (387 U.S. 12).

As a result, the court determined that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." (387 U.S. 13). Therefore, considerations of the Fourteenth Amendment colored the Court's examinations of the juvenile's other constitutional rights.

The Court examined whether Arizona's delinquency statute, which did not require factual allegations in delinquency petitions, nor that the petition be served on the juvenile or his parents, violated the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment provides that: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury...nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." (U.S. Const. amend. V). The Court examined whether Arizona's delinquency statute, which did not require factual allegations in delinquency petitions, nor that the petition be served on the juvenile or his parents, violated the Constitution. The Court determined that there was no adequate notice. Instead, it held that "Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded. (387 U.S. 33). Furthermore, the notice requirement meant that allegations had to particular. (387 U.S. 33). The juvenile and his parents did not get notice until the hearing on the merits, which meant that it was not timely notice. Furthermore, Arizona had no provision protecting children's right against self-incrimination, but the Court determined that a juvenile is at greater risk of self-incrimination than an adult.

The Court also looked at the Sixth Amendment, which provides that:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. (U.S. Const. amend. VI).

Therefore, it clearly requires that a person in a criminal prosecution have the right to counsel, and had been interpreted as requiring a court to notify a defendant of his right to counsel. However, the Court was required to determine whether juvenile proceedings were criminal prosecutions for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.

The Arizona juvenile code appeared to permit the probation officer to represent the child's interests in a delinquency proceeding. (387 U.S. 35).

However, the arresting officers and the probation officers were the same in Arizona; "they initiate proceedings and file petitions which they verify, as here, alleging the delinquency of the child, and they testify, as here, against the child." (387 U.S. 36). Therefore, the Court determined that neither the probation officer nor the judge could represent the child as counsel. The juvenile was facing the loss of liberty and therefore needed "the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law." (387 U.S. 36). As a result, the Court concluded that: