Hegel, Heidegger, and Nietzsche on Philosophy

For Hegel, the idea of the progress of history was tied to his immersion in the world of Enlightenment and Romantic writers and thinkers. He lived at a time when the French Revolution occurred and reshaped the direction of history. The Revolution expressed and institutionalized new ideas about Reason (literally deified by the Revolution) as well as socio-political philosophy regarding fraternity, equality and liberty. Hegel came to maturity during this era and for him, philosophy consisted of a clash of forces -- and the old world concept of philosophy (the love of knowledge/wisdom) was what Hegel sought to transform in The Phenomenology of Spirit, as he clearly states in the book's Preface: "To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science -- that goal where it can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge -- that is what I have set before me."[footnoteRef:1] In other words, Hegel wanted to redefine philosophy to be that thing it sought in the old world (pre-Reformation and Revolution) to understand. Instead of looking at knowledge in the way that Plato did -- as that which is acquired through one's ascent to truth (leaving the Cave of shadows and climbing the mountain towards the so-called highest realities), Hegel viewed the philosopher as the source of knowledge, the engagement in the dialectic as the ultimate source of the act of knowing, with perception and experience continually shaping one's knowledge. The progress of history therefore, as far as Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger are concerned, is tied to the philosopher's elevation of Self as definer, interpreter and mover of history, meaning, and time. This paper will assess Hegel's sense of the progress of history and compare it to that of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's. [1: G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (UK: Oxford University Press, 1952), Preface: 2.5.]

For Hegel, the phenomenon of knowing was what The Phenomenology of Spirit was all about. Yet, because of the primary place given to personal perceptions by Hegel, the method of knowing and the art of philosophy altered. Definable reality became fluid under these circumstances and parameters. The philosophers who followed -- Nietzsche and Heidegger -- faced the world from this Hegelian philosophical lens and took to describing their own perceptions of reality, of knowing, of philosophical truth. Nietzsche produce Beyond Good and Evil; Heidegger wrote Being and Time. Both act as rejections of the philosophical footholds that had come before: each acts as an attempt to reconcile the world with the questions, ideas, and interests within the respective philosophers. By projecting his words as knowledge rather than as a study (or love) of knowledge, Hegel inverted the system of philosophical order. There was no longer an insistence on an object (knowledge) to be studied and loved for its own self, its own goodness.

Hegel was interested in the experience of knowing rather than in what knowing produced. He was interested in the phenomenon itself rather than in the objective truths and realities proposed by the old world philosophy and religion. He himself states in the Preface: "The beautiful, the holy, the eternal, religion, love -- these are the bait required to awaken the desire to bite: not the notion, but ecstasy, not the march of cold necessity in the subject-matter, but ferment and enthusiasm -- these are to be the ways by which the wealth of the concrete substance is to be stored and increasingly extended."[footnoteRef:2] The ideals of Western philosophy articulated by Socrates and affirmed by the Christian teachings were here by Hegel renounced, described as "bait" to lure the thinker to the real reality, the real truth -- which for Hegel was, once again, the experience. Instead of seeking the "love" (the one, the good, the beautiful), Hegel sought a "love experience." In other words, he was more interested in the act than in the outcome. His philosophy was akin to fornication without procreation. The progress of history is thus that which is interpreted by the philosopher as he engages with the facts of reality while maintaining a distance, a remove -- just as a lover may engage in the act of love without actually consummating the love through the natural dissemination of the seed. Hegel's notion of the philosopher is like one who wants to be part of the experience of history yet not be responsible for any actual moral objective. History is a process and cannot be understood without the philosopher's engagement with the facts -- after the fact -- and this engagement is but an interpretation, which, when made, alters the shape of history. History thus is re-interpreted again on down the line, with each philosopher altering it and transforming as he engages with it. There is never an objective in the sense that the old world defined one. [2: G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (UK: Oxford University Press, 1952), Preface: 3.7.]

Hegel approached philosophy in a "rational spirit." The Revolutionaries would deify Reason: Hegel would define philosophy as an act of "Rationality."[footnoteRef:3] Oneness had new meaning in this light: it was not unchanging and whole in and of itself, but rather evolutionary and its wholeness derived only from the conscious examination of how the process of Rationality weighs in on the knowledge that is acquired. This is what Hegel means when he states: [3: G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (UK: Oxford University Press, 1952), Preface: 14.55.]

In the nature of existence as thus described -- to be its own notion and being in one -- consists logical necessity in general. This alone is what is rational, the rhythm of the organic whole: it is as much knowledge of content as that content is notion and essential nature. In other words, this alone is the sphere and element of speculative thought. The concrete shape of the content is resolved by its own inherent process into a simple determinate quality. Thereby it is raised to logical form, and its being and essence coincide; its concrete existence is merely this process that takes place, and is eo ipso logical existence.[footnoteRef:4] [4: G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (UK: Oxford University Press, 1952), Preface: 14.56.]

If the outcome of the old world's love of knowledge was conformity (to doctrine, to a way, to an ideal, to truth, to the teachings of religion -- because of the appreciation of the objective facts that knowledge made plain), the outcome of Hegel's philosophy was the opposite. Conformity was not the purpose -- instead experience was the purpose. The examination and understanding of experience would lead to deeper and greater knowledge, but the cycle was constantly continuing. In some ways this was consistent with the idea of Plato about the philosopher climbing the mountain towards the Sun -- the Truth, because the higher the philosopher climbs the more deeply into the Oneness he sees.

However, in Hegel's view, the Oneness was mutable, was never really fixed, was always changing because it derived its meaning from the experience of the climber, the philosopher. It did not project meaning to which the philosopher should conform, but rather the philosopher's climb towards the perceived Oneness projected the meaning and the Oneness changed with regard to the climber's position. The focus, in this sense was away from the objective towards the subjective -- which describes modern philosophy as a whole in general. Hegel elevates the role of the subjective experience and diminishes the role of the objective. This same practice is furthered by both Heidegger and Nietzsche as each arrives at different conclusions about self, life, and truth based on their own subjective experiences, thoughts, and inclinations. Their relevance was made possible because of Hegel, and Hegel's relevance was made possible because of the Revolution and the role the Romantic-Enlightenment thinking played in European society. And, to take it one step further, Romantic-Enlightenment thinking was made relevant by the Reformation and the overthrow of the doctrinal system and the philosophical system that could be described as Thomistic, but which had roots in the foundations poured by Aristotle and the whole of philosophy that had come before. All of that was based on the love of knowledge -- of the objective.

The Reformation served as the first rejection of this old world objectivity and began the cascade of subjectivity evident in everything from Hegel to Nietzsche: the predominant rise of Self as opposed to the subjection of Self to the One (identified as God by the pre-Revolutionary world). It is thus that Hegel insists on the "scientific method" (as though method were lacking in the pre-modern world) and states: "This nature of scientific method, which consists partly in being inseparable from the content, and partly in determining the rhythm of its movement by its own agency, finds, as we mentioned before, its peculiar systematic expression in speculative philosophy."[footnoteRef:5] There is no separation between observer and the observed (the essence of phenomenology). The breakdown between objective reality and subjective reality is achieved by this merging of the two in the science of phenomenology. The philosopher is partly "inseparable from the content" -- from that which he seeks to know, to understand. The essence of the method is bound up in the "rhythm" of the philosopher's own interaction with that which is being studied, examined. [5: W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (UK: Oxford University Press, 1952), Preface: 14.57.]

Beethoven would elevate rhythm during this same time period -- most notably in his 5th symphony -- and also introduce the sustain pedal -- and thus do for music what Hegel did for philosophy: overthrow the old established order and assert a new emphasis or focus that blurred the lines of distinction and made knowledge into a fluctuating. Hegel makes this point most clearly when he objects to the proposition that God is Being.[footnoteRef:6] He states that by dividing the subject from the predicate the former "God seems to cease to be what he was when the proposition was put forward, viz. a fixed subject."[footnoteRef:7] Simply attempting to define something through the traditional process of propositional logical changes the substance of the thing being defined, according to Hegel's theory. The outcome is this theoretical position is that "thinking [i.e. ordinary reflection], instead of getting any farther with the transition from subject to predicate, in reality finds its activity checked through the loss of the subject, and it is thrown back on the thought of the subject because it misses this subject."[footnoteRef:8] The act of thinking, of ratiocination, obliges the thinker to mix with the propositional sides and become part of the proposition in his attempt to comprehend it. This means that the thinker's engagement with the proposition leads to a synthesis, which in turn creates a new cycle of propositional logic, of which the thinker so long as he is engaged in the act of knowing is still required to be a part. Hegel describes it thus: "Thinking therefore loses that fixed objective basis which it had in the subject, just as much as in the predicate it is thrown back on the subject, and therein returns not into itself but into the subject underlying the content."[footnoteRef:9] The act of knowing does not move the thinker/philosopher towards the object (which would lead to conformity of the thinker to the objective according to the old world method), but rather it returns him to himself as he attempts to reconcile subject with predicate or thesis with antithesis. The subject and predicate are not bound by nature but require the thinker's examination of the relationship to have any real meaning. This is the ultimate awakening of the subjective for which Hegel is responsible, and it is made completely clear in this manner in The Phenomenology of Spirit. [6: W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (UK: Oxford University Press, 1952), Preface: 14.62.] [7: W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (UK: Oxford University Press, 1952), Preface: 14.62.] [8: W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (UK: Oxford University Press, 1952), Preface: 14.62.] [9: W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit (UK: Oxford University Press, 1952), Preface: 14.62.]

Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil takes Hegel's approach to its logical end, which is a total repudiation of any objective character to the concepts of good and evil. If, as Hegel points out, the philosopher's self is intimately bound up in the meanings derived from propositional logic (a thing cannot be said to be what it is without the assent and engagement of the thinker, which in giving assent, changes the equation by becoming part of the equation). Nietzsche's philosophy is a giant assertion of Self into the definition of Things. There is a complete disregard for subjection or conformity of Self to something Higher, as this is anathema to Nietzsche's own sense of self-worth. In other words, to subject the Self instead of assert the Self is, for Nietzsche, immoral. As he states in Beyond Good and Evil, there is no really good or appropriate understanding of morality in society even still because those doing the thinking are infantile and immature: they are still tied to the old world moral codes, which Nietzsche denounces as ugly to the Self. He states, "moral sensibility is as subtle, late, manifold, sensitive and refined in Europe today as the 'science of morals' pertaining to it is still young, inept, clumsy and coarsefingered -- an interesting contrast which sometimes even becomes visible and incarnate in the person of a moralist. Even the expression 'science of morals' is, considering what is designated by it, far too proud, and contrary to good taste."[footnoteRef:10] This reference to "good taste" is an explicit signal to the inherent underlying principle of Hegelian phenomenology: the phenomenon of knowing replaces the idea of knowledge being loved so that, as the old world West put it, one could conform oneself to the higher truths (which during the rule of Christendom were intertwined with religious doctrine). [10: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (London: Foulis, 1913), 182.]

The progress of history as interpreted by the philosopher is altered according to the subjective beliefs of the philosopher, who in turn further changes the progression of history. History, as defined by the Old World, had a fixed center -- the Incarnation -- around which all meaning of history revolved. Christ was the centermost point of human history and all progression or regression was determined by one's proximity to Christ -- to what the Apostle called "putting on Christ." In other words, for the Old World, history had a religious significance -- but following the Reformation, the Age of Science, the Enlightenment, the Revolution, and the Age of Romance, the West had renounced its heritage and was determined to define itself anew. Hegel had already rationalized this by describing a continuously renewing and regenerating cycle of historical perspective and understanding. Nietzsche sped up that cycle and pushed it further from the remnants of old world sentiment. Nietzsche's view of the progress of history was decidedly anti-Christian, and this sentiment is evident all through Beyond Good and Reason, as he rejects the philosophers from Plato to the Christian theologians. He excoriates the former by saying that Plato's aim was "to prove to himself that reason and instinct move of themselves towards one goal, towards the good, towards 'God'; and since Plato all theologians and philosophers have followed the same path that is to say, in moral matters instinct, or as the Christians call it 'faith', or as I call it 'the herd', has hitherto triumphed."[footnoteRef:11] Nietzsche had no liking for the Christian faith, as for him it went against Reason, which the Revolution had deified (usurping the place reserved for God by the Old World). Nietzsche goes on to praise Descartes for being "the father of rationalism" and "the grandfather of the Revolution" -- but will not stop there for in typical Nietzschean style he insults Descartes as well by asserting that "reason is only an instrument, and Descartes was superficial."[footnoteRef:12] From this point on, Nietzsche gives his own view of the "progress of history" -- the progress by which the "stupid" will themselves into believing something that is false in order to make up for their own deficiencies, inadequacies, lack of sense of self-worth, etc.[footnoteRef:13] [11: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (London: Foulis, 1913), 191.] [12: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (London: Foulis, 1913), 191.] [13: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (London: Foulis, 1913), 192.]

For Nietzsche, morality is intimately bound up with the idea of historical progress. If for the Old World, progress was marked by one's relation to Christ, for Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil, progress is made by one's ability to assert one's Self without respect to the false gods that demand subjection and obeisance. To explain his disdain for those who have attempted to define morality through slavishness (which he lays at the feet of the Jews and their religions, ultimately), Nietzsche states: "He who has followed the history of an individual science will find in its evolution a clue to the comprehension of the oldest and most common processes of all 'knowledge and understanding'."[footnoteRef:14] Nietzsche is clearly building on the evolutionary sense of history, as proposed by Hegel -- but his antagonism to anything that is not wholly atheistic (which for Nietzsche is the natural end of a rational interpretation of historical progression) is altogether palpable as he writes, with reference to the acquisition of knowledge and understanding: [14: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (London: Foulis, 1913), 192.]

In both cases it is the premature hypotheses, the fictions, the good stupid will to 'believe', the lack of mistrust and patience which are evolved first it is only late, and then imperfectly, that our senses learn to be subtle, faithful, cautious organs of understanding. It is more comfortable for our eye to react to a particular object by producing again an image it has often produced before than by retaining what is new and different in an impression: the latter requires more strength, more 'morality'. To hear something new is hard and painful for the ear; we hear the music of foreigners badly. When we hear a foreign language we involuntarily attempt to form the sounds we hear into words which have a more familiar and homely ring.[footnoteRef:15] [15: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (London: Foulis, 1913), 192.]

Nietzsche derides the simpleminded Old World conceptions of morality, of purpose, meaning, and conformity by asserting that those who still hold onto these tenets do so because they are afraid or unused to confronting new ideas. They are simply unable to encounter and engage with anything that disrupts their preconceived notions of reality. "To hear something new is hard and painful for the ear," he states, which is of course a completely subjective statement -- but one he can make without compunction as the Hegelian model of philosophy has empowered the modern philosopher to insert the Self into the definition of Things by way of the phenomenological assessment. Nietzsche is simply being true to Nietzsche, if he is not being true to the objective, as the old world would have defined it. Nietzsche's sense of the progression of history thus leads away from the Christian conception (already overthrown by the Revolution) towards an atheistic interpretation in which Self -- the Will -- is the supreme arbiter of morality and meaning. Nietzsche's philosophy builds on the structure given by Hegel -- but he rejects the proposed principles of the Revolutionaries as being as equally repugnant as the ideas proposed by the Old World Christians: "The collective degeneration of man down to that which the socialist dolts and blockheads today see as their 'man of the future' as their ideal! this degeneration and diminution of man to the perfect herd animal (or, as they say, to the man of the 'free society'), this animalization of man to the pygmy animal of equal rights and equal pretensions is possible, there is no doubt about that! He who has once thought this possibility through to the end knows one more kind of disgust than other men do and perhaps also a new task!"[footnoteRef:16] That new task, of course, for Nietzsche was to rise above the herd, assert the Self, and be an individual who was not afraid of presenting his Will before the people. [16: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (London: Foulis, 1913), 203.]

One can see how Hegel's sense of how the philosopher's role in the interpretation of historical progress is inherent in Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil. How does Heidegger's sense of the progress of history in Being and Time relate? If Nietzsche is the ultimate assertion of Self into the system devised by Hegel (an assertion that ultimately wrecks the ongoing cycle, because Self has no need of anything else -- neither of subject nor of predicate, as it is wholly capable of asserting itself without respect to anything else), Heidegger is the after-effect: the philosopher who is adrift, cut off from all moorings -- no attachment to anything, struggling to make sense of Self of Being without any sense of Other. Hegel's sense of the progress of history acts as the prelude to Nietzsche's and Nietzsche's acts as the prelude to Heidegger's. Hegel initially inserts Self into the relationship between love and knowledge. Nietzsche displaces both love and knowledge as external to the Self and therefore oppressors of the Self (at least when they are defined in Old World terms -- or, rather, in any terms that are not of his own devising). Heidegger attempts to extrapolate meaning and sense of the progress of history in the aftermath of both Hegel's and Nietzsche's philosophical blows. Nietzsche writes that "the perils in the way of the evolution of the philosopher are in truth so manifold today one may well doubt whether this fruit can still ripen at all"[footnoteRef:17] and this certainly applies to Heidegger as he seeks to make sense of a world that had begun to blow itself to bits in the 20th century. For Nietzsche the most that a philosopher could accomplish was to annihilate -- for anything short of annihilation and the philosopher is still beholden to something outside of himself; he is still attached, "in the hand of one who is mightier", as Nietzsche puts it -- and thus a subservient.[footnoteRef:18] Heidegger had to live with the manifestation of what Nietzsche projected: the assertion of Self does lead tragically to the destruction of the Other -- and without the Other, how does the Self have meaning? What does it mean to be? This was the essence of Heidegger's Being and Time, and the question that he sought to answer in the light of the philosophy of the progress of history in the modern era. Heidegger states, "our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the sense of being and to do so concretely."[footnoteRef:19] For Heidegger, time was intimately related to the concept of being, because time bears on existence and the Self is, ultimately, bound to time and subject to death -- a point not lost on Nietzsche, which is how he derived his ultimate tragic sense of Self. The progress of history, therefore, from this perspective at which Heidegger is attempting to understand being, self, time, and meaning, is seen in a kind of post-apocalyptic setting, where the fundamental answers to fundamental questions such as "What is being?" have been lost in the destructive wake of the conflagration of Selves at war. The progress of history for Heidegger had resulted in World War One, with the prospect of Second World War not too far off. If this was progress, what would regression look like? Heidegger sought to know. [17: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (London: Foulis, 1913), 205.] [18: Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (London: Foulis, 1913), 207.] [19: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (NY: Harper and Row, 1962), 1.]

As Heidegger pointed out, the question of being was one that "has today been forgotten -- although our time considers itself progressive."[footnoteRef:20] Heidegger seeks to recover the sense of Being by deconstructing the philosophies of the past -- philosophies that had shred the objective concept of sense of Being by inserting Self into the propositional discourse. In order to understand Being objectively, without reference to the Self, Heidegger sought to move past the modern philosophers. Yet, at the same time, he is enveloped in the science of phenomenology and must contend with the formula given him by Hegel, ultimately: "We can depict the way such entities 'look', and we can give an account of occurrences in them and with them. This, however, is obviously a pre-phenomenological 'business' which cannot be at all relevant phenomenologically. . . . What we are seeking is Being."[footnoteRef:21] The phenomenon of knowing, as Hegel described it, is now an obstacle to the understanding of Being. The progress of history has slowed to a halt as society has devolved into total war. The need to define the most basic of concepts -- Being -- is now a philosophical imperative for Heidegger. Who are we? he asks. What are we doing? It is a question that mirrors Augustine's question in his Confessions. It is also a question that calls to Heidegger's own Catholicism, which he celebrated in his youth but which he began to question and distance himself from as he felt more and more the pull in his adulthood between academia on the one hand and the religious doctrine of Pius X on the other hand. Heidegger states with reference to Being as defined by religion, "theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of man's Being towards God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within it."[footnoteRef:22] Heidegger's Catholic roots prompt him to discuss the idea of "conscience" as an aspect of Being. Heidegger states that "conscience is the call of care from the uncanniness of Being-in-the-world -- the call which summons Dasein [Being There] to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty."[footnoteRef:23] Heidegger's attempt to conceptualize conscience is limited by his failure to apply any of the old world ideas, which have been rejected and discarded by Nietzsche and which Heidegger, having abandoned Catholicism, is reluctant to use. He attempts to give shape to the voice inside him without structuring it according to the old world system in which belief/faith figured predominantly. He is trying to understand Being without reference to Christianity. Heidegger is attempting to define Being without reference to the past. [20: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (NY: Harper and Row, 1962), 2.] [21: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (NY: Harper and Row, 1962), 91.] [22: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (NY: Harper and Row, 1962), 30.] [23: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (NY: Harper and Row, 1962), 335.]

The progress of history is, therefore, problematic for him because it appears to have progressed from nowhere to nothing. Any concept of the absolute or of First Causes is disconnected from him. Thus, he states: "Both the contention that there are 'eternal truths' and the jumbling together of Dasein's phenomenally grounded 'ideality' with an idealized absolute subject, belong to those residues of Christian theology within philosophical problematic which have not as yet been radically extruded."[footnoteRef:24] In other words, Heidegger cannot and will not return to the old world conceptualizations because, simply put, he has not any faith. Being is therefore something he will question endlessly, in a variety of forms and juxtapositions, as he will not accept what has passed as revelation in the past. He is in much the same vein as Hegel and Nietzsche though his own Self has its own particular inclinations, which are presented in Being and Time. Nonetheless, the same familiar desire to interact with knowledge in a phenomenological manner is evident in Heidegger's work, and it is this emphasis on knowledge as a phenomenon that is constantly evolving rather than as a process towards which the mind pursues an objective that frustrates Heidegger's goal -- which is to define Being objectively. As a phenomenologist he cannot accept a final definition because he considers his own engagement with the Thing to change it. [24: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (NY: Harper and Row, 1962), 272.]